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FOREWORD 
Climate change is the defining challenge of our generation.  
And it already is a reality. We are confronted with the 
effects close to us. Like the devastating forest fires in my 
home country, and the unprecedented heatwaves of this 
summer. 
Recently, the Special Report of the International Panel on 
Climate Change on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C 
above pre-industrial levels has given us yet another wake-
up call. It demonstrates that a global temperature increase 
of 1.5 °C has large advantages over a 2 °C increase. For 
instance, it will mean the difference between an already 
disastrous 70–90 % reduction in coral reefs, or their complete disappearance. It 
means a difference of a 10-cm sea-level rise, which would negatively affect 10 
million people. It would mean the difference between an ice-free Arctic ocean 
once every century, or once every decade. 
The IPCC report also carries a positive message — it is still possible to limit 
global warming to a 1.5 °C increase. This will result in an extra investment of 
12 % compared to a 2 °C increase. However, the benefits will outweigh these 
extra costs in the long term. It also shows that a 1.5 °C increase is still 
‘physically’ feasible. In short, we can still shape our future. This in itself should 
be more than enough reason to change our thinking, to change our actions. 
Nothing short of immediate action leading to net zero emissions by 2050 will 
suffice. This will require a massive mobilisation of public and private 
investments. We need a ‘Marshall Plan for Climate Readiness’. Only a truly 
global ambitious coordinated approach will lead to success.  
Research and innovation is by definition an essential element of such an 
approach. All kinds of R&I actions, from scientific breakthroughs to socio-
economic research, will have to work hand in hand. Nothing less will be enough 
to face the existential threat to society as we know it. 
For climate-related research and innovation, delivery will be at the heart of 
Horizon Europe. A 35 % target on climate mainstreaming will be linked to other 
EU instruments. We are pursuing a coherent framework of policies, legislation, 
partnerships and alignment with Member States and regions and cities. 
I am very grateful to the Members of the High-Level Panel on Decarbonisation 
for identifying the essential research and innovation elements of an ambitious 
and coordinated response to climate change. Their vision is crucial in designing 
our future research and innovation programme. And it is crucial to support the 
European Union in its leading role in the fight against climate change. 
Commissioner Carlos Moedas  
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MEMBERS OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL 
Hans-Joachim SCHELLNHUBER (Chair) 
Founding Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research (PIK) 
Hans Joachim Schellnhuber founded the Potsdam Institute 
for Climate Impact Research (PIK) in 1992 and has been 
Director Emeritus since September 2018. He is a Professor 
of Theoretical Physics at Potsdam University and holds 
positions as Research Fellow at the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre and Senior Advisor at the Institute for Advanced 
Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam. From 2001-2005 
he also served as Research Director of the Tyndall Centre 
in the UK and became a Visiting Professor at Oxford 
University thereafter. 
Schellnhuber is currently member of the German Advisory 
Council on Global Change (WBGU), Chief Scientific Advisor 
of the Climate-KIC and Chair of the High-Level Panel of the European 
Decarbonisation Pathways Initiative of the European Commission. He is an 
elected member of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, the German Academy of 
Sciences (Leopoldina), the Academia Europaea, the US National Academy of 
Sciences, the Max Planck Society and several other academies. Schellnhuber 
has received, inter alia, the Royal Society Wolfson Research Merit Award 
(2002), the German Environment Prize (2007) and the Volvo Environment Prize 
(2011). Schellnhuber was awarded a CBE (Commander of the Most Excellent 
Order of the British Empire) by Queen Elizabeth II (2004), the Order of Merit of 
the State of Brandenburg (2008) and the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (2011). He holds honorary doctorates from the University of 
Copenhagen (2011) and Technische Universität Berlin (2012).  
In 2017, he received the Blue Planet Prize from the Japanese Asahi Glass 
Foundation, which is considered the most important award for environmental 
sciences worldwide, and has received the Hans Carl von Carlowitz Sustainability 
Award.  
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Maria VAN DER HOEVEN (Vice-Chair) 
Former Executive Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
Senior Fellow at het Clingendael International Energy Programme 
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Maria van der Hoeven is the former executive director of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA). As Executive 
Director, she steered the agency during a period of 
exceptional change in the global energy economy. 
One of her overarching priorities was implementing a 
new Global Engagement Strategy to bring in 
institutionally the major emerging energy players of the 
21st century. Another was expanding modern energy 
services to the 1.3 billion people worldwide who 
currently lack them. In recognition of the IEA’s efforts to 
address the crisis of energy poverty, Maria van der Hoeven served on the 
Advisory Board to the UN Sustainable Energy for All initiative. Since 2015 she 
has been a Senior Fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme. 
She is a member of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate and of 
the Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation. 
Previously, Maria van der Hoeven served as Minister of Economic Affairs of the 
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becoming Minister of Economic Affairs, Maria van der Hoeven was Minister of 
Education, Culture and Science from 2002 to 2007. 
She was an elected member of the Netherlands House of Representatives of the 
States-General from 1991 to 2002. Until 1987, she was head of the Adult 
Vocational Training Centre in Maastricht, after which she served as head of the 
Limburg Technology Centre until 1991. 
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Catia BASTIOLI 
Chief Executive Officer of Novamont 
Catia Bastioli is a chemist, researcher and entrepreneur. 
She is CEO of the Novamont Group and Matrìca, and 
President of Terna (the first European independent grid 
operator for electricity transmission), the Kyoto Club 
Association and the Italian Technological Cluster of 
Green Chemistry, SPRING. 
She has been developing and field-studying an 
economical, social, environmental and above all cultural 
development model based on territorial regeneration, 
conceived as an opportunity to decarbonise the 
economy and reconnect it with society, increase sustainability and relaunch 
competitiveness through continuous innovation applied to local areas and their 
specific features, interconnecting different territorial projects towards a 
common vision. 
The innovative technologies developed for the bioplastics integrated value chain 
have led Catia Bastioli to found and grow a series of companies that today form 
part of the Novamont Group. Moreover, she has been a member of important 
EU working groups on climate change, the environment and the bioeconomy, 
such as the European Union Bioeconomy Panel and the ECCP-European Climate 
Change Programme, the Committee for Renewable Raw Materials of the 
Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
and the Environment Advisory Group of the Directorate General for Research 
and Innovation of the European Commission. 
She is also the inventor of around 80 patent families in the sector of 
biopolymers and of transformation processes for renewable raw materials, and 
was awarded a European Inventor of the Year 2007 prize by the European 
Patent Office and the European Commission for her inventions related to starch-
based bioplastics between 1991 and 2001. 
Bastioli holds honoris causa degrees in industrial chemistry (2008, University of 
Genoa), in materials engineering (2016, University of Palermo) and in business 
economics (2018, University of Foggia). 
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Professor Paul EKINS 
Professor of Resources and Environmental Policy at and director of the 
UCL Institute for Sustainable Resources, University College London 
Paul Ekins has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of 
London and is Professor of Resources and Environmental 
Policy and Director of the UCL Institute for Sustainable 
Resources, University College London.  He is also Deputy 
Director of the UK Energy Research Centre, in charge of its 
Energy Resources theme. He was a member of the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution from 2002-2008. 
In 2011 he was appointed Vice-Chairman of the DG 
Environment Commissioner’s High-Level Economists Expert 
Group on Resource Efficiency, and in 2012 a member of 
the European Commission’s European Resource Efficiency 
Platform. In 2013 he was appointed to the UNEP 
International Resource Panel, for which he coordinated and was the lead author 
on a major report on resource efficiency at the request of the German 
government at the G7 Summit in 2015. In 2015, he was appointed to the 
Advisory Committee of the Green Growth Knowledge Platform and currently co-
chairs its Research Committee on Natural Capital. 
Ekins is also one of two chief co-editors of UNEP’s sixth Global Environmental 
Outlook (GEO-6), which is the United Nations’ flagship environmental report, 
and which will be presented to the United Nations Environment Assembly in 
March 2019. 
In 1994, Ekins received a UNEP Global 500 Award ‘for outstanding 
environmental achievement’. In the UK New Year’s Honours List for 2015, he 
received an OBE (Officer of the Order of the British Empire) for services to 
environmental policy. 
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Beata JACZEWSKA 
Former Executive Director at the International Visegrad Fund 
Former Deputy Minister of Environment of Poland 
Civil servant, diplomat 
Soon after graduating from the Faculty of Law and 
Administration at Warsaw University (MA in legal studies), 
Beata Jaczewska started her professional career in 
Poland’s public service. 
She worked for the Ministry of the Economy in various 
positions, and was mostly involved in policymaking for 
the country’s economic growth. In particular, as the 
Director of the Economy Development Department she 
was involved in climate change negotiations under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), and identified the potential of green growth 
for Poland’s development. 
Serving as Under-Secretary of State in Poland’s Ministry of Environment 
(December 2011–December 2013), she was a member of the board of the 
Green Climate Fund, organised COP19 in Warsaw and led the team of climate 
change negotiators, both in the UNFCCC and the EU. 
Recently, she was Executive Director at the International Visegrad Fund in 
Bratislava (Slovakia). There, working with representatives of civil society in the 
region, she introduced a new impact-oriented methodology of project 
assessment, bringing ‘community changing’ ideas closer to the people. 
Currently she is serving as ministerial advisor in the European Policy 
Department in the Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
She holds diplomas in cultural studies from Jagiellonian University in Kracow, 
Poland, and English and European Union law from the University of Cambridge, 
UK. She has also finished her PhD Studies in the Economics-Social Studies 
Department at Warsaw School of Economics, Poland. 
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Barbara KUX 
Member of several Boards of Directors 
Barbara Kux is a recognised Member of Boards of 
Directors. Her board mandates include global companies 
such as Henkel, Pargesa Holding (e.g. Adidas, Total, 
SGS) and the world’s largest privately owned fragrance 
and flavour company, Firmenich. In her role as board 
member, she contributes to sustainable leadership, 
strategies for growth markets and digitisation. The EU 
Commission nominated her to the High-Level Panel of the 
European Decarbonisation Pathways Initiative  to give 
strategic advice on research and innovation. 
From 2008 until 2013, she was a member of the 
Managing Board of Siemens, the first woman in the 160-year history of the 
company. There she increased results from green technologies and supply chain 
management by several billion euros, as she had done previously at Royal 
Philips, where she was a member of the Group Management Committee. Under 
her leadership, both industrial companies reached top positions in the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index. In 2012 and 2013, Siemens was distinguished in 
this index as the most sustainable industrial company in the world. As a 
member of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network Leadership Council 
for the United Nations, she contributed to the definition of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
In the 1990s, she led Nestlé in the emerging markets of Central and Eastern 
Europe, where she established the company as the leader in fast-moving 
consumer goods, after she had achieved the same there for ABB in power 
generation. She started her professional career in 1984 as a Management 
Consultant with McKinsey in Germany. 
After studies in Switzerland and as an AFS scholar in the USA, Kux earned her 
MBA with distinction from INSEAD Fontainebleau. She was educated in Zurich, 
where she was also born. 
In 2012 Barbara Kux received the environment prize for large companies from 
the German Minister for the Environment. The Wall Street Journal listed her 
among leading international business women, as did Fortune magazine 
consistently over a period of more than ten years. Since 1995, she has been a 
Global Leader of Tomorrow of the Davos World Economic Forum. 
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Christian THIMANN 
CEO Athora Germany 
Affiliated professor of finance at the Paris School of Economics 
Chairman of the EU High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance 
Vice-chair of the FSB Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures 
Christian Thimann is CEO of Athora in Germany, a 
solutions provider and long-term investor in the 
European insurance market. He was Head of Strategy, 
Sustainability and Public Affairs of the AXA Group and 
member of the AXA Group Executive Committee from 
2014 to 2016. At that time, he also served as a member 
of the Board of Directors of Alliance Bernstein Asset 
Management (New York) and a member of the Board of 
Directors of AXA Investment Managers (Paris). Until 
2013 he was a Director General at the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt.  
Mr Thimann has been Chair of the High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance established by the European Commission and Vice-chair of the Task 
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures established by the Financial 
Stability Board. He continues to advise the European Commission on financial 
regulation, with a specific focus on sustainable finance.  
He teaches insurance and finance at the Paris School of Economics and has 
published on insurance, international money and finance. 
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Laurence TUBIANA 
CEO of the European Climate Foundation 
France’s Special Representative for COP21 
Professor, Sciences Po Paris, and Professor, Columbia University 
Founder and Director, Institute for Sustainable Development and 
International Relations (IDDRI) 
Co-Chair, Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) 
Leadership Council 
President, French Development Agency (AFD) Board of Governors 
Laurence Tubiana is CEO of the European Climate 
Foundation (ECF). In addition, she is the Chair of the 
Board of Governors at the French Development Agency 
(AFD), and a Professor at Sciences Po, Paris. Before 
joining ECF, Laurence was France’s Climate Change 
Ambassador and Special Representative for COP21, and 
as such a key architect of the landmark Paris Agreement. 
Following COP21, she was appointed High Level 
Champion for climate action. 
Tubiana brings decades of expertise and experience in 
climate change, energy, agriculture and sustainable 
development, working across government, think tanks, NGOs and academia. 
From 1997 to 2002, she served as Senior Adviser on the Environment to the 
French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. From 2009 to 2010, she created and then 
led the newly established Directorate for Global Public Goods at the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE). In 2013, she chaired the French National 
Debate on the Energy Transition. She founded in 2002 and directed until 2014 
the Paris-based Institute of Sustainable Development and International 
Relations (IDDRI). In the 80’s and early 90’s she founded and then led Solagral, 
an NGO working on food security and the global environment. She started her 
career as a Research Director for the French National Institute for Agricultural 
Research (INRA). 
Throughout the years, Tubiana has held several academic positions, including 
as a Professor and Scientific Director for the International Development and 
Environmental Studies master degrees at Sciences Po, Paris; and Professor of 
International Affairs at Columbia University, New York. She has been a member 
of numerous boards and scientific committees, including the China Council for 
Internaional Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED). 
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Karin WANNGÅRD 
Mayor of Stockholm 2014-2018 
Mayor Karin Wanngård studied human resources at the 
University of Stockholm and worked in human resources 
management before becoming a full-time politician. She 
has a long and impressive political career. She entered 
the Stockholm City Council in 1994 representing the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party and acted as Opposition 
Vice Mayor 2011-2014. For the same period, she was 
Vice President of the City Executive Board. 
After the general elections in 2014, the City Council 
elected Wanngård as Mayor of Stockholm for the election 
period of four years. She was President of the City 
Executive Board, Chair of the board of Stockholm Stadshus AB and group leader 
of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in the City of Stockholm. Karin 
Wanngård was also Vice President of EUROCITIES, a co-leader of the C40 Low-
Carbon District Network, a Champion Mayor of the OECD Inclusive Growth in 
Cities Campaign and a member of the board of the Strong Cities Network. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
What strategy to adopt in R&I in order to speed up and foster 
mitigation policies in the EU that respond to the goals of the Paris 
Agreement, while growing the competitiveness of the EU economy? This 
was the main question that Commissioner Carlos Moedas put to the Members of 
the High-Level Panel (HLP) of the European Decarbonisation Initiative when this 
group of nine experts was first convened in October 2016. After two years of 
work, the High-Level Panel has delivered its final report, but in these two years 
the framework conditions have changed, new science emerged and global 
emissions, having been flat for about three years, have started to grow again. 
In October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
released its Special Report on 1.5 °C impacts and pathways, and its 
compelling conclusions affected the final drafting of this report. The IPCC in fact 
says that there is a significant difference between stabilising the average global 
temperature at 1.5 °C compared to 2.0 °C, with dangerous tipping points and 
substantially higher risks being triggered between these two temperature 
thresholds. A window of opportunity for remaining at 1.5 °C still exists, but the 
challenge is huge, and all the best means to achieve it have to be mobilised, 
including R&I. 
The HLP has therefore considered that a very ambitious R&I programme, 
capable of delivering the zero-carbon solutions needed, while also promoting 
industrial competitiveness in the EU economy, is one of the necessary means — 
even if not sufficient — to achieve the goal. 
For ten discussion sessions, the HLP invited experts and stakeholders in the 
fields of energy, transport, industry, agriculture, finance, urban planning, social 
innovation, policymaking and more to debate the key challenges for 
decarbonisation and the R&I needs, in particular those emerging from economic 
and societal sectors for which the transition to a zero-emission future still looks 
difficult. 
The recommendations of the HLP have been based on a number of 
assumptions that resulted from a preliminary discussion on the fundamental 
features that constitute the basis of the Paris Agreement. These derive from 
climate change science, and in particular from the very important conclusions of 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, which brought to policymaker 
attention the concept of the ‘carbon budget’. The burning of fossil fuels, which 
started massively with the Industrial Revolution around 1750, has injected in 
the atmosphere a huge amount of carbon as carbon dioxide (CO2) that was 
previously stored in geological deposits. CO2 builds up and shows an almost 
linear relationship between its atmospheric concentration and the warming of 
the planet. Therefore it is possible to calculate the overall CO2 emission budget 
that leads to 1.5 °C or 2.0 °C of warming beyond pre-industrial levels. This 
budget has already been used for its greater part. The above-mentioned IPCC 
Special Report on 1.5 °C says that at current emissions, ranging around 42 Gt 
CO2/y, the available carbon budget for reaching 1.5 °C will expire between 
2030 and 2040, and for 2.0 °C will expire some time between 2040 and 2050. 
 19 
The main principle that has therefore been used as the basis for the HLP 
recommendations is that the focus of public investments in research and 
innovation should be on zero-carbon solutions. Low-carbon technologies that 
only reduce but do not eliminate greenhouse gas emissions have to be used at 
best for the transition towards a carbon neutral future, but have to be replaced 
soon by zero-carbon ones. The remaining carbon budget available to stay within 
the Paris Agreement boundaries is too small to lock ourselves into technologies 
that do not lead to zero emissions. It is true that some ‘negative emissions’ 
(from technologies or practices for removing CO2 from the atmosphere) can be 
generated to offset emissions that are more difficult to cut, but relying too 
much on negative emissions implies difficult and risky land use choices, e.g. 
afforestation and reforestation. 
A second key assumption is that zero-carbon solutions shall be tackled at the 
system level, and for this the role of digitalisation is of utmost importance. 
A set of thematic and cross cutting recommendations have been produced by 
the HLP, in particular for the orientation of the new EU Framework Programme 
for Research and Innovation 2021-2027, Horizon Europe. These 
recommendations include: 1) the need for sustained R&I activities on 
decarbonisation across all sectors, including a robust programme on climate 
change science; 2) the establishment of large mission-oriented 
programmes of a cross-cutting nature for the deployment of system-level 
transdisciplinary innovation; 3) the development of partnerships with 
industry to address together the most difficult aspects of decarbonisation, on 
which industry alone would not invest enough and with the necessary urgency; 
and 4) the launch of ‘Transition Super-Labs’, very-large-territory initiatives of 
real-life management of the transition from typical fossil-fuel-based local 
economies to zero-carbon ones.  
Putting decarbonisation at the heart of Horizon Europe and of other 
national R&I programmes in the EU may be the starting point of the change of 
pace in mitigation that is required to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. 
Horizon Europe in particular, with its engagement of investing 35 % of its 
proposed EUR 100 billion budget in climate-related activities, is a unique 
opportunity to transform this target into a true coherent zero-carbon 
programme.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE OVERARCHING NARRATIVE: THE PARIS AGREEMENT, 
EUROPE'S ROLE AND NOVEL APPROACHES TO RESEARCH AND 
INNOVATION 
1 Some framework considerations 
The challenges associated with mitigating anthropogenic climate change is the 
broad focus of this report, which analyses the R&I needs and proposes a 
strategy that shall accompany feasible EU decarbonisation pathways, 
compatible with the Paris Agreement goals.  
However, just focusing on anthropogenic climate change is not enough to set 
the scene within which the EU is called to deploy radical changes in the way 
in which energy, resources, goods and services are produced and used. 
Modernity is in fact faced with a multiplicity of crises, which go well beyond 
the crucial environmental imperative of stopping greenhouse gas emissions. 
Some ten years after the great financial crisis, the world is realising that the 
promises of exponential growth to increase human well-being for all have not 
and may not be fulfilled. Today, many regions of the world — including in 
Europe — are stricken with economic stagnation and worsening of social 
disparities, and are at risk of falling behind, characterised by little economic 
value added (VA), structural unemployment and consumption largely based on 
imported goods, including foodstuffs. Furthermore, accelerating digitalisation 
and, most notably, the development of artificial intelligence, may widen those 
gaps unless swift and wise governance is implemented at all political levels 
(Frey and Osborne, 2013).  
Other core promises of modernity to the world, such as cheap energy for 
everybody, based on the massive exploitation of fossil fuels resulting from 
millions of years of biological and geological history, or unlimited mobility for 
people and goods, to be delivered by private vehicles, public roads and cheap 
oil, have clearly shown their inconsistency with the planetary boundaries of 
natural resources and with their huge unpaid externalities. This declination of 
modernity has organised entire nations in concentric rings around 
megalopolises, while largely degrading natural landscapes to the role of 
hinterlands for resource extraction, throughput of people and goods, waste 
disposal and industrial agriculture. This epitomises the dichotomies of 
conventional modernity: while the sheer supply of cheap high-calorie food has 
reached an unprecedented level, the social costs in terms of illness, obesity, 
antibiotic resistance, animal cruelty, biodiversity loss, soil degradation and GHG 
emissions increasingly mount. 
Economic and financial globalisation was initially hailed as an unprecedented 
source of efficiency in the worldwide allocation of capital and production and as 
an opportunity to boost consumption possibilities globally. As it turned out, the 
shift of VA production to emerging economies, Asia in particular, has certainly 
boosted incomes in the latter parts of the world, but at the same time has been 
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the cause of unemployment and social disruption elsewhere. It has promoted 
production processes in emerging economies that are often not environmentally 
friendly, and has resulted in an upsurge of global trade volumes which became 
a source of pollution, environmental degradation and CO2 emissions. Unbridled 
digitalisation and robotisation may exacerbate this race to the bottom. Keynes’ 
forecast of a world where the material needs of people are all satisfied and 
people’s jobs — mostly replaced by machines — may turn into other forms of 
social and artistic occupation (Keynes, 1930) is unfortunately far from being 
achieved. 
In summary, the economy as we know it operates in a materially 
expansive, socially divisive and environmentally hostile way, and 
receives disruptive shocks at an increasing rate, including from new business 
models. This is hardly sustainable. 
The alternative to a ‘more-of-the-same’ strategy, which will eventually turn 
crisis into collapse, needs to be grounded in a fundamental re-conceptualisation 
of the structure and operation of the current economic system. Such changes 
will deeply affect lifestyles and societies, and represent a critical 
challenge because they will necessarily create winners and losers. For 
these reasons, the re-design of our economies should be organised around 
three key notions, namely (i) purpose, (ii) capacity and (iii) viability. 
For the first notion [purpose], one needs to ask how the current system can be 
redirected to serve the needs of the many (young, old and those yet to be 
born) and not of the few. For the second [capacity], one needs to take stock of 
the fantastic pool of mature as well as embryonic methodologies, technologies, 
infrastructures and institutions that classical modernity has assembled or 
instigated over the last two centuries. If used wisely and effectively, this pool 
can lead to improved living conditions, even with 10 billion people on planet 
Earth. As for the third [viability], practically everybody nowadays accepts the 
motherhood statement that there cannot be infinite material growth on a finite 
resource basis. Note that this does not exclude intangible growth — in terms of 
experience, science, culture, quality, design, institutional structure, digital 
capital, etc. — which can go on for millennia to come. It is all about the vision 
of a civilisation based on resource efficiency and the (semi)circular flow of 
resources, respecting planetary boundaries. 
This vision implies that most material fluxes currently supporting the 
economy are converted into closed loops. For instance, in the long term one 
can imagine that roughly fixed quantities of certain raw materials (such as 
copper or rare earth elements) circulate through the entire industrial 
metabolism with the help of advanced recycling processes, reducing the need 
for further mineral extraction to practically zero. Likewise, one can envisage full 
recycling of organic agricultural waste, the replacement of chemical substances 
(such as pesticides) with biological agents, and the minimisation of the loss of 
hard-to-retrieve inputs (such as phosphates). Such a resource-efficient and 
(semi-)circular economy will still be semi-open from a narrow perspective but 
could result in a closed loop if we consider the system as a whole. On the one 
hand, it will receive energy from outside, yet the relevant sources can all be 
renewable. It will produce waste, yet only of the type that can be fully degraded 
then absorbed and recycled by natural ecosystems, which must therefore be 
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protected and enhanced accordingly. Equally important are the many regional 
initiatives on sustainable agriculture that will thrive and also create meaningful 
employment opportunities in Europe’s remote regions. Concepts such as cradle-
to-cradle design can be helpful in this context, if they prove their worth in 
practical value creation and preservation. 
In summary, the (semi-)circular economy shall remove critical 
externalities, respect planetary boundaries, aim to maximise 
inclusiveness, be financially and economically viable, and rely on 
intelligence, knowledge and information. 
This (semi-)circular model in general and the decarbonisation of the economy in 
particular represent a brilliant perspective for a continent such as Europe, 
characterised by slim critical raw mineral stocks and rapidly declining fossil 
resources. Apart from contributing to climate stability as a common good for 
humanity, rapid and efficient decarbonisation could provide numerous 
extra benefits for the EU: a much increased level of energy autonomy, most 
notably from authoritarian countries and regimes; the saving of hundreds of 
billions of euros currently spent on fossil-fuel imports and subsidies; the 
improvement of air quality, which would save the lives of millions of people; 
and the avoidance of direct ecological damage such as that caused in the few 
remaining coal-extraction sites or by the expansion of agricultural 
monocultures. 
Therefore it is of a paramount importance to change production 
processes, patterns of consumption, recycling and disposal of biological 
resources drastically. Integrating the bioeconomy into the (semi-)circular 
economy model is the key element for the development of a sustainable 
society, since the circular bioeconomy is a cornerstone linking forestry, 
agriculture and fisheries to the industrial production of bio-based products that 
are functional for both sustainable land use and societal services. 
This bioeconomy model includes the notion of ‘sustainable regions’ and the 
need to think in terms of local areas, of their socio-economic and ecological 
specificities and problems, thus transforming their challenges into opportunities 
for development. This should be achieved by reviving both regional and 
sustainable agricultural initiatives and local production of goods and services, 
using local skills and avoiding mass transport. 
Europe’s character and role in the world is based on a unique set of values 
and convictions that emerged from the stunning humanistic advances made 
during classical antiquity, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Individual 
freedom and social empathy are defining elements of that set. Many argue 
today that fundamental transformations of the industrial metabolism of a 
society can only be realised by non-liberal, central-planning nations. Proving 
that hypothesis wrong by ushering in trans-modernity in a just and democratic 
way would arguably be one of the greatest achievements of the EU. 
It is therefore to be highlighted that despite the very clear compelling case for 
decarbonisation proposed for years by scientists, intellectuals, associations and 
several political parties, decarbonisation is still happening at very slow 
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pace compared to what would be necessary for climate stability, and what 
could be achieved. Decarbonisation needs to accelerate if the race is to be 
won also from the standpoint of the economy and capacity for job 
creation. In this respect, innovation will accelerate the pace of transformation 
by making the costs of zero-carbon technologies equal to or lower than those of 
fossil-fuel based options, as is already the case for wind and photovoltaic 
energy in some parts of the world. This, in turn, will give economic advantage 
to the front runners in these new industries and technologies and will push 
fossil fuels out of the market, without the need to wait for an agreement on a 
global carbon tax (which would be very hard to achieve today) that would 
internalise the global warming externality. 
2 The Paris Agreement and the innovation challenge of 
decarbonisation 
The Paris Agreement of December 2015 at COP21 (UNFCCC, 2015) opened a 
new phase in climate action by setting the target of keeping a global 
temperature rise this century to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 °C. These 
ambitious objectives have to be achieved through the cyclic upgrading of 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to climate action, reviewed every 
five years to ensure convergence towards the goals.  
After the first exercise at COP21, it was clear that the NDCs proposed by 
countries were highly insufficient to achieve the targets, and are likely to 
lead to global warming between 2.7 and 3.0 °C, or even more. Most of 
modelling work around this issue shows that the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions should peak as soon as possible and rapidly decrease afterward if we 
want to have some hope of remaining within the estimated carbon budgets 
leading to 1.5 or 2 °C. Every further year of emissions at today’s level of about 
42 GtCO2/y will make the Paris Agreement goals more difficult to achieve as the 
remaining carbon budget is low and not precisely known. 
In the Paris Agreement policy framework, R&I play a major role by 
providing the technological and non-technological solutions for a rapid 
decarbonisation of the world’s economy. Climate action can, and must, start 
and progress with today’s available solutions, but these will soon be insufficient 
for the pace of decarbonisation required unless accompanied by climate policies 
of politically difficult stringency. The development of cheaper and more effective 
mitigation solutions is therefore essential to increase the speed and the 
ambition of decarbonisation. 
In this context, the success of rapid and deep decarbonisation depends 
largely on the effective development of portfolios of low- and zero-
carbon, cost-efficient and high-performance technological and non-
technological solutions, and on their integration into all facets of the 
European economy and society. These include key productive sectors, such 
as industry, energy, agriculture and transport, but are also more generally 
related to the way of living of European citizens, which can be changed through 
social innovation promoting moves towards zero-carbon, sustainable cities. 
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Further, innovation will need to happen at all scales, including local 
communities and small and medium-size enterprises.  
Digitalisation is key to deploying innovation at system level across all 
traditional sectors. Electrification is a sine qua non for the decarbonisation of 
a large part of the mobility system, of energy-intensive industries and of 
heating needs. Electricity needs will increase substantially, but smart grid 
technology and a wise management of future diffused energy storage systems 
— such as batteries for electric vehicles — and of diffused production may very 
much help to flatten peak demand. An ‘Internet of Energy’ will need to be 
developed. 
Given the magnitude of the decarbonisation challenge and the need to 
ensure that competitiveness and job co-benefits fully materialise 
through decarbonisation, R&I efforts should be intensified. The technical 
and socioeconomic transformation implied by decarbonisation amounts to a new 
Industrial Revolution, and the EU should focus its R&I funding to push the 
frontiers of science and knowledge in this direction. This includes funding 
curiosity-driven research, mission-oriented research and demonstration projects 
that together will accelerate the transition from the lab to the market, resulting 
in cost reductions, jobs and economic growth. However, it also requires 
innovative ways to overcome other significant barriers to technology diffusion, 
such as system integration, infrastructures that lock in high-carbon behaviour, 
transitional costs, non-technical and behavioural barriers, and difficulties in 
accessing and securing financing and increasing market reach.   
Furthermore, there is a clear need to steer the process of innovation 
towards zero-carbon solutions. Historically, technological innovation has not 
necessarily brought about improved material, cleaner energy or input efficiency. 
For instance, innovation in the Industrial Revolution or many aspects of the 
Internet Revolution increased the use of materials and energy. The 
implementation of a set of policy and institutional incentives thus becomes a 
necessary pre-condition to foster zero-carbon innovation and the diffusion of 
low- and zero-carbon business models. In this respect, digitalisation — if 
properly steered — can become a means to support decarbonisation.  
Demand-side measures and technologies should always accompany the 
introduction of new supply-side technologies or services. Taxation and 
regulatory instruments are the most common demand-side instruments. Many 
more examples can be cited, which are frequently facilitated or made possible 
by technology and in particular by ICT. One example is the potential of 
distributed 3D printing to reduce freight transport. Another one is teleworking, 
to reduce personal car use and congestion. Many other examples can be made 
in the realm of energy and resource use. Behavioural aspects and lifestyle 
changes have also to be addressed when acting on the demand-side, also 
because the potential emission reductions in relation to the introduction of a 
new technology might be partially offset by rebound effects. R&I, including on 
the design of social innovation mechanisms for citizens’ engagement in 
decarbonisation plans, may bring considerable additional benefits in terms of 
emissions reduction. 
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To successfully address this innovation challenge, public and private 
investments need to work synergistically, and in a stable policy 
environment. As history demonstrates, publicly-driven mission innovation 
programs are crucial to giving clear and stable signals to firms and 
entrepreneurs, and, if properly implemented, can be extremely successful in 
addressing the high risk and uncertainties that characterise the early stages of 
the innovation process. However, private engagement and investments will also 
be crucial to achieving the deep technology transition necessary for 
decarbonisation, particularly in the demonstration and deployment phases, 
which should leverage the private sector’s knowledge of markets, business 
models and customers. 
3 Decarbonisation: risks and opportunities 
Since the Industrial Revolution, societies have built their wealth on the 
availability of cheap energy derived from fossil fuels. Economic growth has 
grown for about two centuries in parallel with the consumption of fossil fuels. It 
is only in the last two decades that the two curves have started to show signs 
of decoupling, at least in OECD countries. 
Fossil fuels have become so much part of our societies, economies and value 
chains that the process of their phasing out will be difficult and encounter 
barriers of all kinds, even if — as is in fact the case — the move to zero-
carbon energy sources and technologies is generating tremendous new 
opportunities, alongside key challenges. The transition phase to a zero-carbon 
society is and will be complex and difficult, and thus needs to be managed and 
well supported by robust research and demonstration activities. 
Any transition creates winners and losers, and it is critical to ensure 
that no-one will be left behind in the transition. Public support for the 
decarbonisation agenda is important. Region-specific transition roadmaps can 
be a means to maintaining public support for such a challenging endeavour. 
Prospective analyses should include considerations of key aspects such as EU 
industrial policy, competitiveness, distributional considerations, and a global 
view in respect of markets and trade. The importance of quick adaptation to 
local conditions should be highlighted, and the implications of having new 
competitors such as China emerge in technology innovation should be fully 
understood.  
The HLP, in the preparatory work towards this report, analysed several sectoral 
(energy, transport, industry, agriculture) and inter-sectoral issues (cities, value 
chains, supply chains, inter-sectoral impacts, digitalisation, etc.), knowing that 
solutions to the decarbonisation challenge have to be systemic, but also 
taking into account that today’s societies and economies tend to adopt 
technological solutions that create lock-in situations and rebound effects. The 
intervention of governments is therefore necessary to correct market failures 
and distortions, and support for R&I is a key element of this intervention. 
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4 A long-term strategy, including for R&I 
The European Commission, at the request of the European Council, is 
working on the development of a strategy for long-term greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction in the EU. A strategy of R&I for the development of 
the necessary zero-carbon solutions must be an integral part of this. This report 
provides suggestions for such a strategy, together with some methodological 
approaches. 
R&I for zero-carbon solutions, however, is somewhat different from innovation 
challenges in other fields. In fact, the presence of fossil-fuel subsidies, and 
the quasi-absence of taxation related to their negative externalities, makes 
for a very uneven playing field, on which zero-carbon solutions must be 
developed and compete. Zero-carbon technology diffusion will therefore require 
appropriate market measures to level the playing field, at least until a certain 
level of market penetration is achieved. 
Diversification of technological options is essential to avoid lock-in on 
unsuccessful development paths. The development of an appropriate zero-
carbon technology portfolio for phasing out greenhouse gas emissions will 
therefore require a very wide and varied R&I effort, one that will need to span 
from fundamental research — essential for developing breakthroughs — to 
applied research, demonstration and support for the various stages of 
innovation and deployment. This is essential to foster the evolution of the 
existing EU industrial sector and promote the growth in Europe of a 
new, powerful industrial sector that will increase our overall 
competitiveness.  
Europe is at the beginning of a true revolution, and one that will not 
only be carried out in the technological domain. Social innovation will 
also be essential, in particular to engage citizens in the decarbonisation 
challenge and to promote living-lab experiments on ways to boost the zero-
carbon economy through lifestyle changes (for instance, the sharing 
economy).  
Digitalisation will be a key enabling factor, both to allow action at system 
level, to increase efficiency, to deploy a (semi-)circular, dematerialised, 
service-oriented and shared economy, and to ensure that citizens become 
engaged actors in this transition. 
Notwithstanding the uncertainties linked to quantification of the global carbon 
budget necessary to remain well-below 2 °C, the EU should continue to play 
a leading role in climate action, showing leadership in its 
decarbonisation plans. This leading role entails risks and opportunities, and 
requires the engagement of the EU business sector and of citizens at large. The 
technological and organisational capacities that exist in Europe, its climate 
policy experience and the existence of channels of engagement for business and 
civil society, provide a good basis for acquiring a first-mover advantage if all 
capacities are deployed. 
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Five principles should inspire the EU R&I strategy for supporting its 
greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts: 
 engage in a race to the top in innovation for decarbonisation, searching 
for new alternatives; 
 give priority to zero-carbon solutions that have the potential to be 
developed and deployed within the 2050 time frame; 
 explore and develop portfolios of zero-carbon technologies, promoting 
diversification, and reducing the risk of early and risky choices; 
 emphasise system-level innovation, so that the individual elements of 
decarbonisation fit together in a coherent whole; 
 focus R&I investments in the high added-value segments of the value 
chains. 
These principles should then be applied through different approaches and 
combine actions at different time horizons. 
In the short-term horizon (2025), considering that the main goal at a global 
level is to start a rapid reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, the priority for 
R&I programmes should be two-fold. On the one hand, they should aim to fully 
understand and tackle the barriers hindering the large-scale deployment of all 
the existing economically convenient low- or zero-carbon solutions. On the 
other hand, they should make financial instruments available to help boost mid-
TRL1 low-carbon technologies to the commercial level. 
For the medium-term horizon (2035), it will be necessary to design mission-
oriented activities that have the goal of developing key zero-carbon solutions. 
Taken together, these solutions shall be able to address and potentially reduce 
today’s emissions by a level greater than 50 % per decade. These programmes 
have to be the backbone of the Herculean efforts of decarbonisation that have 
to be deployed throughout the 2030s. 
R&I actions for the longer-term horizon (2050) then have to address those 
sectors and areas of decarbonisation that are currently perceived as more 
challenging — such as, to name a few, process-based industrial emissions 
(steel, cement, chemicals), air transport, shipping and animal husbandry. In 
many of these examples, alternative solutions are sometimes still being 
conceptualised. Given the size of these challenges, longer-term actions have to 
start now or very soon, and should be supported through multi-annual funding 
programmes. Within this category, technologies for generating negative 
emissions also have to be included. However, the investment in this category of 
‘end-of-pipe’ solutions should never crowd out the much more necessary 
development of zero-carbon solutions, or finally outcompete them. 
                                               
1  Technology readiness level (from 1 to 9). 
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In the conclusions of this report the recommendations are presented in relation 
to these different time horizons. We will not address here the post-2050 
scenarios. We are convinced that the uncertainties that today still exist on the 
possible activation of positive emission feedbacks require us to do whatever is 
possible to avoid going beyond the carbon budget identified by the IPCC in its 
recently published Special Report on 1.5 °C warming (IPCC, 2018) for 
remaining within the 1.5 °C target with no or minimum overshoot. This implies 
— at least for industrial economies — achieving zero net emissions of all 
greenhouse gases by 2050. 
This report has also the ambition of feeding into the strategic programming 
discussion that is preparing the implementation of the future EU framework 
programme for research and innovation 2021-2027, Horizon Europe, 
and of being of inspiration to other national programmes. 
The proposal of the Commission that Horizon Europe will invest 35 % of its 
resources in climate-related actions is highly welcome, and should guide 
the preparation of ambitious work programmes, in particular on mitigation.  
In the conclusions of this report, some proposals for mission-oriented, cross-
thematic programmes are presented. They identify medium-term thorny 
challenges that can be achieved through mission-oriented activities involving 
different stakeholders beyond the scientific and technological communities. 
However, as already said, the race to full decarbonisation can be won only if 
multiple engagements addressing diverse timelines and appropriate financial 
instruments supporting the various phases of innovation can be deployed in 
parallel with sufficient human and capital resources. 
Horizon Europe should also dedicate resources to maintaining Europe’s 
leadership in climate science. The implementation of the Paris Agreement 
from 2020 onward requires a stronger scientific backing to help countries 
increase their decarbonisation ambitions cost-effectively and to ensure they 
comply with the Paris Agreement objective of maintaining the average warming 
of the planet well below 2 °C with respect to pre-industrial times and to adapt 
to the residual impacts. 
Within this broader context, a wide space for international cooperation 
is open and should be fostered. Europe is not alone, and showing leadership 
implies working with others. International alliances such as Mission Innovation 
have high potential to build higher critical mass on key innovations. Sharing 
results with others does not necessarily result in lost competitiveness. On the 
contrary, the development of global supply and value chains around new 
zero-carbon technologies provides a better sharing of the risks that exist for 
lone forerunners, and enhances the possibility to tackle effectively what is a 
global problem. 
International cooperation should also help less developed countries to jump 
over the technological divide and to ground their future growth on sustainable 
solutions, including through the better management of land and marine 
resources. This aspect will be a critical component of future development 
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policies, with multiple and reciprocal spillover effects on growth, stability and 
security, as all countries seek to achieve the agreed Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) embodied in the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 and essential for 
ensuring sufficient removals by sinks for the attainment of the Paris objectives. 
5 The body of the report 
The chapters that follow summarise the main analytical elements that the HLP 
has reviewed in its discussions and taken into account for its deliberations. The 
content has neither the scope nor the ambition to provide an exhaustive 
assessment of all the sectoral and cross-sectoral decarbonisation challenges 
and their R&I dimension. The chapter contents represent, however, a deliberate 
selection of topics that the HLP considers of primary relevance for the design of 
a successful R&I strategy meant to accompany and promote the European 
Union efforts towards carbon neutrality and a stronger leadership in the fight 
against anthropogenic climate change. Each chapter makes specific, more 
detailed recommendations regarding R&I needs in specific societal and 
economic sectors, which are then addressed in a more integrated and systemic 
manner in the conclusions. 
The HLP chose to adopt a programme of discussion sessions of a sectoral 
character (energy, transport and mobility, agriculture and land use, industry) 
together with others of more cross-cutting nature (cities, finance and 
innovation, social innovation, digitalisation). However, the analytical approach 
used was similar, always focusing on the system-level dimension as well as on 
the cross-sectoral issues. This was clearly facilitated by the richness of the 
heterogeneous competences and professional roles of the HLP Members. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DECARBONISING THE ENERGY SECTOR IN EUROPE 
1 The present state of energy supply  
The energy-environment/climate nexus is determined by three factors: 
sustainability, secure energy supply and affordability, which are the 
pillars of our energy and climate policy. The sustained global economic growth 
since 1950 is due in part to the availability of affordable sources of fossil fuels: 
coal, oil and gas. From a longer-term perspective, fossil fuels have been fuelling 
the industrialisation of all the economies of the world, starting in the middle of 
the 18th century in the UK, and have contributed to the increased affluence of 
the (growing) world population. 
The mass-scale use of cheap fossil fuels has enabled global economic 
growth but also resulted in a great challenge for our societies: 
anthropogenic climate change. The growth of energy consumption in our 
societies also has a massive external cost, described by the Stern Review as 
‘the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen’. Climate change is in 
large part a consequence of energy use. Mitigating climate change depends 
critically on whether energy use can be greatly reduced, energy can be 
decarbonised or both. Greenhouse gas emissions can be broken down by the 
economic activities that lead to their production. The 2017 statistics released by 
the European Environment Agency (EEA) show that energy in the broad sense 
is responsible for almost 75 % of direct greenhouse gas emissions in the EU, 
with the energy supply sector being the single largest contributor (28 %)2. 
Besides climate change, energy use has a substantial effect on many 
other societal and environmental challenges such as air pollution, resource 
extraction, biodiversity and land use. Taking air pollution as an example, over 
80 % of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx) and primary particulate 
matter (PM2.5) emissions can be attributed to energy use (International Energy 
Agency (IEA), 2016). Accordingly, when aiming for a fundamental change to 
the energy system, it is also paramount to take into account these other 
externalities, and how the SDGs are affected.  
 
                                               
2  Numbers for 2015, which are the most recent EEA and Eurostat figures available. The circle 
shows the direct GHG emission shares of major economic sectors. The pull-out shows how 
indirect CO2 emission shares from the energy supply sector can be attributed to sectors of 
final energy use. AFOLU refers to agriculture, forestry, and other land use. This graph 
includes international aviation, which is covered by EU targets but is not accounted for in 
national totals under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). 
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Figure 1: EU-28 greenhouse gas emissions by economic sectors.  
Source: based on EEA, Eurostat and own calculations, 2015. 
 
2 Recent developments and lessons learned 
In the past couple of years, the energy landscape in Europe and the 
world has become more aware of the need for sustainability. The 
massive investments in new low-carbon energy technologies in China, the US 
and Europe, as well as the switch from coal to gas in the US since the shale 
revolution, are affecting the growth path of CO2 emissions in the world. Since 
2010, CO2 emissions growth has been tapering off and was even flat from 
2014-2016, in part because of the downturn in economic growth. However, the 
recent increase in 2017 shows that CO2 emissions have not yet peaked (IEA, 
2018). 
The changes in today's energy landscape in Europe are the result of 
several interdependent mega-trends, both pushed and pulled by the EU’s 
2020 and 2030 climate and energy plans and the recent Clean Energy for All 
Europeans package. These trends are: 
 greater renewable energy sources (RES) production and (potential of) 
increasing electrification; 
 greater energy efficiency; 
 new energy technologies (such as distributed energy technologies) and 
governance structures; 
 digitalisation as a key driver and enabler of greater integration and service 
orientation; 
 active consumers. 
Up to now, these changes have taken place neither at a sufficient pace nor 
homogeneously throughout the EU. For instance, while overall energy-related 
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CO2 emissions decreased on average by 2 % annually from 2005 to 2015, 
transport-related emissions reduced by only 0.6 % per year (European 
Commission, 2018).  
In order to deeply decarbonise our economies, we need zero-carbon 
molecules as well as increased use of zero-carbon electrons3. More 
concretely, we need new technologies to produce, convert, store and use zero-
carbon electrons and molecules. These technologies will enable new systems 
integration across different types of energy demand and the management of 
intermittent supply and demand of all types (CIEP, 2017). The European 
Battery Alliance, launched in October 2017, is an important first step towards 
the next generation of battery storage technologies. Further such initiatives, 
targeting both other storage technologies (including chemical and thermal) as 
well as other building blocks of the future energy supply system, are necessary. 
A certain trade-off between the extent of decarbonisation and short-
term emission reductions exists. For most processes and technologies, 
implementing a zero-emission solution requires higher investments than going 
for only partial decarbonisation. An investment into, e.g., second generation 
biofuels will only be economically viable at high carbon prices that are much 
higher than the level seen today. Furthermore, many zero-carbon solutions, 
such as hydrogen trucks, are not yet market ready. Thus these technologies will 
require substantial R&I funding and will certainly not be implemented on a large 
scale for at least a decade, meaning that they will not contribute to the 
emission reductions that are necessary over the next decade to stay within the 
emission budgets for 1.5 °C or 2 °C of warming. On the other hand, cheaper 
intermediate solutions exist that will bring down emissions in the short term, 
such as natural-gas-fueled trucks. While being cheaper to implement and closer 
to market, these technologies can potentially create lock-ins into partially-
decarbonised processes that prevent the full decarbonisation required to meet 
the Paris Agreement targets.  
This trade-off cannot be solved in general — it needs to be weighed 
separately for each specific case, factoring in the differential costs of additional 
abatement, the expected R&I timeline of a technology, the danger of lock-ins 
into unsustainable pathways, and the adaptability towards future zero-carbon 
solutions, e.g. injecting hydrogen and biogas into gas grids.  
In several practical cases, given the very ambitious target of full 
decarbonisation by the mid-century, public R&I money should be 
focused on processes that achieve close-to-zero or even negative 
emissions, and not on processes that only reduce emissions, especially 
if solutions take 10-20 years to go from the laboratory stage to high 
market shares. 
                                               
3  It is clear that electrons do not contain carbon, while methane or liquid fuels invariably 
contain carbon. The terms ‘zero-carbon molecules/electrons’ are used throughout this 
report as shorthand terms for ‘fuels/electrons whose production and use result in very low 
or negative GHG emissions’ and where carbon atoms are not of fossil origin. 
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Carefully designed R&I policies will ensure that reducing one 
externality (e.g. greenhouse gases) does not create new externalities, 
e.g. new material scarcities or increased land use. Although new energy 
technologies are coming to maturity, we cannot assume that the low-carbon 
character of the new energy technologies means that they are perfect on all 
accounts. We need to look at the energy system in a dynamic and integrated 
manner, rather than a static one, if we want to understand fully all the impacts 
of existing and proposed policy measures. This requires a fundamental update 
of current energy system models to include the necessary dynamic 
representation of links between the energy system, land and water nexus, for 
macroeconomics as well as the industrial metabolism. 
3 Moving to sustainability with new energy technologies 
Driven by diminishing costs and more extensive deployment of new 
low-carbon energy technologies, Europe's energy system is already 
becoming less carbon intense. This trend is set to continue, but needs to be 
accelerated and broadened from electricity generation to other types of energy 
demand and use. Moreover, zero-carbon electrons need to be effectively linked 
to zero-carbon molecules. Renewable energy sources, particularly onshore as 
well as offshore wind and solar PV, are now cost-competitive with fossil energy 
sources in many parts of Europe. In the past decade, renewables have attracted 
a growing share of new energy investment. Global investment in renewables 
has dropped in the recent past as a result of declining specific investment costs 
for renewables, but there has been a record installation of renewable power 
capacity (UNEP-FS, 2017; IRENA, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 2:  
Left: Global new investment in renewable energy excl. hydro (data in billion USD). Source: UNEP-FS, 2017.4  
Right: Global capacity additions of RE excl. hydro. Source: IRENA, 2017. 
  
                                               
4  New investment volume adjusted for re-investment equity. Total values include estimates 
for undisclosed deals. Developed country volumes are based on OECD countries, excluding 
Mexico, Chile, and Turkey. 
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The rapid expansion of renewables brings manifold challenges and 
opportunities: knowledge growth, massive grid requirements, storage and 
capacity mechanisms, to name a few. Further sustained deployment of these 
technologies will result in more efficiency gains, greater economies of scale and 
additional cost reductions through processes such as automation and learning-
by-doing. However, the variable (but forecastable) generation profile of solar 
and wind energy is starting to pose integration challenges in some Member 
States. To address these challenges, many potential options exist, e.g. building 
extensive high voltage connections to demand centres, developing energy 
storage through batteries or conversion to molecules (for instance hydrogen), 
or making demand flexible.5 Also, variability implies that (extended) periods of 
low wind and solar generation occur and may in fact coincide. As a result, 
alternative capacity is required, either renewable or conventional in the short 
run, which is only needed for limited amounts of time. While electricity systems 
presently rely on (legacy) conventional power plants, it remains to be seen 
whether operators and investors are willing to put their resources into capacity 
given this kind of risk/reward profile. Finally, while the costs of wind and solar 
can now be competitive with newly-constructed fossil fuel power plants, the 
current oversupply of fossil capacity in combination with long-lived capital 
stocks means that the decarbonisation of the EU power supply will happen 
much too slowly without additional policy action. 
Although decarbonisation is driving a general shift towards increased 
electrification of parts of the economy and society, a zero-carbon power 
sector will not be sufficient to meet the EU’s climate targets. In 2015, 
the EU had a ‘final energy consumption’ of 1086 Mtoe, of which about 20 % was 
electricity (2752 TWh) while the remaining 80 % is mainly represented by fuels 
for transport, heating and industry. If we assume that electricity production is 
to double its current share — through renewables — by 2050, a large amount of 
the other energy vectors will still need to be decarbonised, underlining the 
importance of zero-carbon molecules. Apart from generation, the additional cost 
of storage and transportation will be important determining factors in the 
balance between zero-carbon electrons and molecules. Particularly in countries 
with large seasonal demand for low temperature heat, either zero-carbon 
molecules or heat networks with seasonal heat storage might be crucial in 
meeting decarbonisation goals. 
Zero-carbon molecules have an important role to play, but due to 
efficiency considerations they should be limited to cases that lack other 
decarbonisation options. There are a number of different routes to producing 
                                               
5  Absorption challenges can both be technical and economic. The technical challenges are 
well understood and managed by transmission system operators (TSOs) and distribution 
system operators (DSOs). This is less so for the economic challenge. In today’s liberalised 
European electricity markets, wholesale electricity prices reflect supply and demand 
balances. The variable nature of solar and wind generation means that at times, large 
amounts of supply are available, depressing prices. This poses a challenge to generators, 
which depend on revenues from sales on these wholesale markets. Over time, it can mean 
that (previously subsidised) capacity leaves the system unless new (public) financial 
guarantees are provided to (RES) generators. 
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liquid and gaseous fuels with minimal or even negative GHG emissions over 
their full life cycle: 
 Hydrogen could be produced via low-carbon pathways such as electrolysis 
from renewable electricity or through alternative production processes (e.g. 
biomass gasification and carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) or 
thermochemical water splitting) to ensure a minimal or even negative 
emission impact. If further R&I achieves fast ramping and low capital costs 
of electrolysis technologies, hydrogen electrolysis could be an important 
source of flexible electricity demand, thus assisting the integration of large 
shares of variable renewable electricity sources6. 
 Methane and liquid fuels consist partially of carbon. However, if they are 
produced from zero-carbon hydrogen and CO2 captured directly from the air 
or from biogenic CO2 emissions such as off-gases from industrial 
fermentations, the net GHG emissions of production and use of these fuels 
would be close to zero.  
 Finally, the conversion of biomass into gas or liquid fuels via the Fischer-
Tropsch process or fermentation can be combined with CCS to capture and 
sequester part of the carbon contained in the feedstock biomass, thus 
yielding net negative CO2 emissions when accounting for CO2 uptake during 
biomass growth (IEA, 2011). These negative emissions could be an 
important contribution to compensating residual GHG emissions that are 
very difficult to mitigate, e.g. from agriculture or certain industry processes. 
It should be noted that there is a trade-off to be considered: while 
electrification sometimes requires higher capital investments, e.g. into batteries 
or heat pumps, high conversion losses along the different conversion steps of 
synthetic fuels leads to a much lower energy service yield per input compared 
to direct electrification7. 
Zero-carbon heat can be provided in many different ways. Via 
electrification it can be a large source of flexible electricity demand that 
may facilitate the integration of variable renewable energies. The 
provision of heat, both for residential use as well as in industrial processes, is 
currently dominated by carbon-rich solid, liquid and gaseous fuels. For deep 
decarbonisation, different routes exist: 
                                               
6  At high capital costs, high full-load hours would be required to recover the investments. 
These loadings are difficult to realise when using only surplus electricity that would 
otherwise be curtailed. 
7  Rough estimation of conversion efficiencies for provision of heat or motion along different 
routes:  
Heating: Electricity -> E-fuels -> Heat: conversion efficiency ~ 0.6 * 0.9 = 0.54 vs.  
Electricity -> Heat pump -> Heat: conversion efficiency ~ 3; 
Mobility: Electricity -> E-fuels -> motion: conversion efficiency ~ 0.6 * 0.25 = 0.15; 
Electricity -> electric engine -> motion: conversion efficiency ~ 0.9 * 0.6 = 0.54. 
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 Direct solar-thermal is a well-known technology, but its use is hampered due 
to a lack of standardisation and the mismatch between supply and demand. 
 Electrification of heat provision can be either direct (resistive) or via 
(geothermal, water- or air-based) heat pumps, which have much higher 
conversion efficiencies but also higher capital costs. 
 Industry boilers and heaters can easily be upgraded to hybrid systems that 
include direct electric heating at minimal additional costs. This creates a 
sizeable flexible electricity demand that can be used to accommodate surplus 
electricity from variable renewable energies and thereby decrease the use of 
carbon-rich fuels. 
 In areas with high heat demand, e.g. densely populated cities or clusters of 
industry, heat networks can provide substantial benefits by pooling demand 
and supply. This allows the use of capital-intensive heat pumps and taps 
substantial economies of scale to provide cheap seasonal underground heat 
storage, thereby facilitating the use of waste heat from industry as well as 
solar-thermal heat that is mostly supplied during summer. An example is the 
city of Hamburg’s plan to source the heat required for heating ~300 000 
apartments from a number of different low-carbon sources and store it 
seasonally underground. 
 For use cases that are not amenable to electrification, other options to 
decarbonise heating include direct use of solar thermal energy, connection to 
a heat network or the use of zero-carbon molecules in regular boilers. 
Despite and because of zero-carbon molecules, the electricity system 
will grow. 
While there are many paths to decarbonising the different energy services, 
electricity is a key input to most of them, either directly or indirectly as an input 
to the conversion of fuels and gases. Accordingly, deep decarbonisation will — 
through increased direct and indirect electrification — lead to growth in 
electricity demand and to an increasingly fundamental role of the electricity 
system in decarbonisation. 
R&I has a pivotal role in this transformative transition. An essential R&I 
question is: ‘What is required next, from a technical, market and policy 
perspective, to achieve a step change towards a quickly decarbonised electricity 
system?’ To develop a fully decarbonised energy system, the complementary 
R&I question is: ‘How can renewable energy technologies contribute to the 
transformation outside the power sector, and what advances may be needed to 
exploit renewables differently from today?’ To drive decarbonisation 
achievements beyond the power supply sector, another crucial R&I question is 
relevant, namely: ‘How can electrification be increased, and what will be the 
main bottlenecks to full energy-system-wide decarbonisation?’ 
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4 From centralisation to decentralisation 
Next to existing centralised systems, new decentralised systems are 
emerging, based on social innovation and citizen involvement, 
differentiated by Member States according to their respective 
characteristics. Today's energy system is moving from a structure with a few 
very large operators and centralised power generation and distribution to one 
where facilities are more widely distributed and control is potentially shared on 
platforms where ‘prosumers’ can also participate. Some important challenges 
remain, particularly how to guarantee the stability of the electricity grid in the 
face of greater fluctuations in supply from small renewable sources. But on the 
whole, the trend to more decentralisation and more market actors seems 
unstoppable, and is backed by the Market Design regulation proposal from the 
European Commission. The emergence of energy prosumers, who produce 
some of the energy they use themselves, and the growing availability of smart 
products and services, such as new platforms, allow consumers to participate in 
the energy market. Cities, towns and communities at large are among the chief 
beneficiaries of this trend, which allows for more autonomous energy choices. 
Nevertheless, the pace of decentralisation may differ among Member States as 
cultural, socio-economic and geographical differences between regions and 
Member States are expressed in differing market rules, regulation and 
technology support mechanisms. Consequently, some places are seeing the 
emergence of renewables primarily in the form of large installations, with the 
associated economies of scale, whilst other regions are going for very small 
scale installations, for instance rooftop PV. 
In light of the decentralisation and high shares of renewables, large-
scale innovation on transmission and distribution networks is 
necessary to prepare the power system for the digital age, while safeguarding 
security of supply and flexibility. The large investments that are necessary for 
the zero-carbon transformation will require efficient, multi-actor financing 
schemes since interconnection infrastructure is largely characterised by up-front 
costs. Financing of decarbonisation projects is pivotal for keeping the cost of 
this transition low, and is closely related to the presence of a stable policy 
environment. Innovation is also required in the way in which the control of 
distributed sources is managed and connected to demand. From developments 
in the field of information and communication technology, we can learn that 
platforms facilitate suppliers and consumers of products and services on the 
one hand, and at the same time may lead to a transfer of power or control to 
platform owners on the other. Network effects can intensify and solidify these 
dynamics. 
5 Digitalisation 
This brings us to the next major trend, the Internet of Energy: the 
digitalisation of the energy system which gives an additional boost to 
these changes, helping to further sector and consumer integration and 
overall system optimisation. Digitalisation of energy use and energy supply 
promotes the growing interdependence of the different types of energy use that 
until now were quite separated, e.g. for transport, heating or appliances. 
Digitalisation is starting to penetrate activities, products and services related to 
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smart homes and other smart energy-efficient solutions. Digitalisation could 
help to enhance the management of energy demand, improve grid reliability 
and reduce energy costs, but it could potentially also have a number of 
negative effects. Digitalisation itself requires additional energy (data centres for 
big data), and digitalisation-enabled services could lead to substantial additional 
energy demand — as, for example, seen with the blockchain-based crypto-
currency bitcoin. Digitalisation, once combined with the vast possibilities of 
social innovation, can also create a new situation of information asymmetry for 
prosumers. With the increase in data availability and use, as in other sectors of 
the European economy, concerns over data collection, data control, data 
integrity and data ownership, etc. arise. To get the full benefits of these 
developments in digital technologies in the energy sector, concerns over privacy 
and data security remain. All in all, digitalisation is likely to have a strong 
impact on energy use and GHG emissions, but the direction of change is still 
unclear. Accordingly, R&I is required in all aspects of energy digitalisation. 
6 Service orientation and active consumers 
Digitalisation is making possible a range of new, more integrated 
energy-related services, and allows, if new networks are developed, 
much greater integration between industrial sectors and processes. This 
favours the emergence of novel, potentially disruptive business models 
alongside new job profiles and skill requirements. The respective industries no 
longer just sell goods or deliver energy as a commodity. Instead, they offer 
integrated solutions extending into areas such as home comfort, entertainment, 
or personal security. European energy policies and regulation are largely based 
on a distinction between parts of the energy supply chain that can benefit from 
competition, on the one hand, and natural monopolies that stem from network 
effects, on the other. The question is how to support new value chains, new 
product and service propositions, prosumers, the emergence of platform 
economics and potential related network effects, and innovative small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through the evolution of the existing 
regulatory environment for the energy sector.  This has the potential to see the 
emergence of new products and services, for which R&I is required. 
7 Implementation challenges: combining policies and markets 
The success of the zero-carbon transformation relies on the 
development of credible policies and their integration with well-
functioning markets, as has been the case over the last decades for the 
fundamental changes in the EU energy supply sector, which can be traced back 
to market and policy development. In this regard, the European Commission 
has recently presented the Clean Energy for All Europeans policy package, 
which aims to provide a stable legislative framework to facilitate the clean 
energy transition. Private companies can only develop new business models and 
technologies if there is credible long-term commitment to market designs and 
policy environments that set the right incentives. The decarbonisation of the 
energy supply will only happen if there is credible commitment to a sufficiently 
high CO2 price or other strong policy signals and supportive regulations. The 
success of new storage technologies, demand flexibility and sector-coupling, as 
well as that of innovative SMEs in general (as important carriers of new 
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technology and solutions to the market), hinges on regulation not impeding 
these new developments. 
The importance of robust policy design was clearly demonstrated in the 
past decade, when the large-scale uptake of new renewable energy in 
different EU Member States was initiated through strongly supportive 
policies. The exact design of these policies determined their effectiveness as 
well as their cost-efficiency. As an example, the feed-in-tariffs in Germany and 
Spain proved very effective in stimulating PV deployment but the policies were 
not designed robustly. For instance, they did not contain quantity safeguards — 
faster-than-expected production cost reductions led to unsustainably fast 
growth and substantial excess costs. The resulting retro-active policy changes 
in Spain have had a long-lasting effect by contributing to increased business 
risk and reduced investor confidence in policy stability.   
Similarly, the interactions between different policies at EU level, 
national level and regional level need to be better understood in order to 
guide the transformation and prevent unwanted interferences. The EU 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) is a main pillar of energy supply 
decarbonisation but over the past decade, the price signal has not yet been 
sufficient to lead to substantial decarbonisation action, partially due to the 
price-weakening effects of additional climate policies (e.g. RES, energy 
efficiency) in addition to a lax emissions cap. While the recent reform has 
strengthened the ETS, it is as yet unclear whether the current design is robust 
enough for future national climate policies such as coal phase-out plans to allow 
a strong price and thus a cost-efficient EU-wide transformation.   
R&I on both policy instruments and market design as well as the 
interaction between the two is crucial to better inform robust policies and 
market regulations that reduce the amount of costly trial-and-error iterations. 
8 The next major issues to solve 
8.1 Early opportunities 
There are a number of changes which could be quickly implemented to 
put us collectively on a credible path to deep decarbonisation along 
with significant societal co-benefits. These early opportunities or low-
hanging fruit do not require technology innovation, and sometimes cut 
emissions and costs, representing win-win opportunities. Improved energy 
efficiency in buildings, industry and transport is a major pillar of EU 
decarbonisation, bringing multiple societal benefits in a cost-efficient manner. 
Integrated energy system transition could avoid costly solutions when more 
market opportunities for new energy supplies are created and zero-carbon 
electrons and molecules can be balanced. In addition, the McKinsey CO2 
abatement cost curve, initially introduced in 2009 and revised several times 
(McKinsey 2010), has identified changes and technologies by their greenhouse 
gas savings and their abatement costs, from the negative costs (cost savings) 
to more expensive options. Energy efficiency measures are amongst the 
negative cost options and are a prerequisite for the decarbonisation of certain 
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demand sectors. Many options, such as LED lighting or insulation retrofitting, 
bring cost savings within a reasonable assumed payback time and depreciation 
rate. Energy efficiency is a key component of the zero-carbon transformation. It 
is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters of this report that focus on the 
demand side (cities, industry, mobility) and on the role of finance.  
However, several factors prevent these early opportunities from 
happening spontaneously, among which are the initial investment, as well as 
regulation, split incentives, demographics and income development in individual 
Member States. Measures and R&I should focus on overcoming these barriers to 
immediate implementation while acknowledging that each region or country can 
have a different merit order of ‘low hanging fruit’. 
8.2 Taking stock of quantified decarbonisation roadmaps 
There is a very broad range of studies commissioned or conducted by a 
number of institutions, including international institutions, European 
research projects, NGOs and the private sector. More concretely, scenarios 
were recently published by the IEA, the European Commission, several research 
projects funded by the European Commission (among which are ADVANCE, 
AMPERE, LIMITS and SECURE), the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA), NGOs, including Greenpeace and the European Climate 
Foundation (ECF), as well as Eurelectric. Further, more detailed scenarios are 
currently being developed in the EU H2020 projects SET-NAV, REEEM, REFLEX, 
MEDEAS, EU-CALC, REINVENT and INNOPATHS. 
The European Commission’s 2011 low-carbon roadmap presents five 
decarbonisation scenarios, assessing five different combinations of the four 
pure decarbonisation options (energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear and CO2 
capture and storage). All of them detail potential developments of the EU 
energy mix to 2050 to allow a decrease in domestic EU GHG emissions of at 
least 80 % compared to 1990. This roadmap and its scenarios need to be 
revised regularly to be made even more ambitious and up-to-date with 
advances in technology and research to be brought into line with the Paris 
Agreement objectives. A more short-to-medium-term update was presented in 
the Clean Energy for All Europeans package and the EUCO scenarios, while 
further updates towards 2050 and beyond are pending. 
The main topics emerging from the European Commission 2011 low-carbon 
roadmap, which are described below, have formulated a concrete framework for 
climate and energy-related policy-making, leading to concrete measures and 
commitments. 
Coal phase-out and CCS are key. The requirement for a near-term coal 
phase-out has been made more obvious and necessary by the commitments 
made at the Paris COP21 meeting at the end of 2015. Several EU Member 
States have already stated their intention to phase out coal and lignite 
completely by a date between 2025 and 2035. Such an objective is of course 
more ambitious and difficult for countries which rely heavily on coal. 
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The 2011 EU roadmap scenarios seem to imply that disregarding CCS and 
nuclear simultaneously would pose challenges for a sustainable pathway to 
decarbonisation for the entire EU. On the other hand, there has been almost no 
progress in deploying CCS or nuclear within the EU over the last seven years. 
Besides fundamental technical and economic challenges, substantial public 
opposition in several Member States contributed to the non-delivery. This is not 
necessarily a problem as different regions or states can still opt for different 
energy technology mixes. From a technology point of view, the outlook on CCS 
has substantially shifted. The recent cost reductions in renewable energies and 
storage have removed expectations that coal-based CCS will be a key pillar of 
decarbonised power systems. However, CCS could be highly relevant and cost-
competitive for i) decarbonising in the short/medium-term a number of industry 
processes with inherent CO2 emissions such as cement production, and ii) the 
production of net-negative-emissions liquid and gaseous fuels from biomass 
combustion. 
‘Energy efficiency first’ remains a key pillar of deep decarbonisation. 
Energy efficiency is a key pillar in facilitating the decarbonisation of the full 
economy, promising substantial emission reductions at comparatively low (or 
even negative) financial costs. Like all technologies, low-carbon technologies 
are bound to have some negative externalities or limitations, such as land 
requirements for biomass or specific materials for wind and solar power. To 
keep these negative externalities to a minimum, it is necessary to reduce the 
total final energy demand by increasing the efficiency of all demand sectors. 
The research needs for policies and technologies to implement and realise these 
efficiency increases will be discussed in the individual focus chapters. 
Innovation and market integration of renewable energy has to be 
supported. Support is necessary to make sure that new energy technologies 
undergo the innovation cycles required to bring their costs down. Some 
renewable energy technologies have already experienced high cost-reduction 
rates which now put some of these technologies on a par with fossil-fuel-based 
power generation. In photovoltaics, for instance, the cost reductions for solar 
panels has been such that the high added value is not in the panels themselves 
but in the system integration, converters, meters, system installation and 
maintenance. This whole set — which partially at least cannot be delocalised — 
represents more than 50 % of the added value, and should be further 
developed with EU know-how and expertise. 
The electricity system has to become more flexible and has to be better 
integrated into the wider energy system since the reliance on variable 
renewables such as wind and solar is increasing. There are several resources for 
flexibility in the electricity system. These resources can be categorised into:  
 flexible, easy-to-dispatch, generation sources, either conventional or carbon 
free; 
 expansion of transmission and distribution for solving local/regional 
integration issues; 
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 demand-side response and management, including electrification of flexible 
energy uses that previously were served by other energy carriers, such as 
provision of heat to industry processes and buildings; 
 storage and integration into the wider energy system. 
Flexible (dispatchable) generation is an enabler of solar and wind 
integration, while it must fit within an increasingly restrictive carbon 
space. As such, a transition from carbon-intensive to low-carbon to carbon-free 
fuels could be pursued. While fossil fuels with CCS constitute a theoretical 
potential, it remains to be seen whether the economics are favourable given the 
relatively low number of running hours each year in a highly renewable 
electricity system. 
Improvements in electricity transmission and distribution provide 
additional flexibility at a relatively low monetary cost but are slow to 
deploy and often face public opposition. They must therefore be started 
early and always be balanced with other options. Demand-side responses 
and management are expected to be an important source provider of intra-day 
and inter-day flexibility. However, for prolonged periods of low wind and solar 
generation, other options may constitute an essential part of the new system. 
With respect to storage, it is crucial to measure chemical electricity storage 
(batteries) against alternatives in the electricity system (e.g. pumped hydro) or 
storage options in the form of clean gases, liquids, heat and other products. 
Higher interconnection of the different parts of the energy system will also 
provide further flexibility. 
It is important to develop market designs and policies that ensure that 
all these flexibility options are used to the full to enable a fast scale-up of 
renewable power and to minimise the need for carbon-intensive fossil fuel 
power plants. When designing new market mechanisms and support policies, 
e.g. capacity payments, it is important that they do not indirectly subsidise 
fossil fuel use and thus slow down their phasing out. 
A holistic approach that is transversal to the sectors as well as 
consideration of non-technical barriers to technology deployment are 
thus required. An integrated energy system transition increases the 
absorption capacity of electricity markets for renewables towards, for instance, 
the low-temperature heat market or industry. Take energy storage and 
conversion for example. A totally new system based on the batteries of electric 
vehicles, connected to a fully-digitalised smart grid, can be used to store 
electricity produced from variable renewables when it is cheap and available 
and, conversely, feed power back to the grid when it is scarce and expensive. 
For prolonged times of relatively low wind and solar availability, especially 
during moments of high energy demand (winter months), additional volumes of 
clean energy can be stored in and sourced from liquid, gaseous or heat forms. 
Technology is not the only component of successful de-carbonisation. 
Deployment of new technologies and solutions also requires attention to non-
technical aspects, e.g. consumer readiness or societal acceptance. This shows 
that decarbonisation requires a holistic approach — the emergence of not only 
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new technologies but also new business models, rules and regulations, in which 
the digital dimension is paramount. 
 
Figure 3: Sketch of a deeply integrated zero-carbon energy system.8 
 
R&I is needed both on the technology side (energy storage and energy 
conversion, at all timescales and looking at all the different technologies) and 
on the management side (connecting the different energy markets and 
infrastructures, setting robust regulation and policies that do not hinder sector-
coupling, addressing barriers beyond technology and market design, setting the 
ground for new business models), with the holistic integrated energy system 
approach emphasised above. More R&I is also needed on networks to include 
spatial issues. 
Bioenergy will play an important role in the decarbonisation of certain 
activities such as aviation or shipping, where currently no other 
decarbonisation options seem economically deployable at large scale. 
R&I should thus focus on finding synergies with agriculture and 
forestry and on removing potential trade-offs. In recent years, impressive 
                                               
8  From an economic viewpoint, it can make sense to still use (relatively low-carbon) natural 
gas while at the same time creating negative emissions through bio-CCS, afforestation and 
soil carbon management to achieve net GHG neutrality. Differences in process costs and 
efficiencies of the various conversion steps (biogas production, CO2 capture from biofuels, 
synthetic fuel production) are the main reasons for this seemingly counter-intuitive 
assessment. 
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cost declines for solar and wind electricity technologies have been observed. Yet 
it should be kept in mind that bioenergy plays an important role in renewable 
energy production in Europe today and will likely continue to do so in future, 
especially in certain transport modes. The versatility and storability of biofuels 
makes them a promising option to decarbonise activities where other options 
such as electrification remain economically unviable. Furthermore, the 
conversion of biomass into gas or liquid fuels can, in combination with CCS, 
lead to net negative emissions when accounting for the CO2 uptake during the 
biomass growth. These negative emissions could be an important contribution 
to compensating residual GHG emissions that are very difficult to mitigate, e.g. 
from agriculture or certain industry processes. 
It should be noted that the energy return per land area is a factor of 10-259 
lower for biomass than for PV, thus land conservation is strong reason against 
using biomass for electricity generation and for enhancing electrification 
wherever possible. 
It is a challenge to find synergies between biofuel production and agriculture 
and forestry. Resources that Europe has in the form of abandoned or set-aside 
land and vast forests could be developed to serve both as carbon sinks and to 
provide energy and job creation. 
The transition can be affected by material scarcity and by new 
externalities. The development and roll-out of new energy technologies imply 
new needs with respect to natural resources as well as positive and negative 
external effects beyond the reduction of direct greenhouse gas emissions.  
Demand for new materials (e.g. rare earths) is rising rapidly and 
creating new markets. The concept of the circular economy should be 
recognised in this respect, in addition to its positive impacts on energy 
savings, as it can help to address the new set of challenges emerging from the 
use of new technology. These challenges are: security of supply of resources 
(global supply chains, strategic sectors, material scarcity), the affordability of 
resources (European industrial competitiveness) and the environmental costs 
(new externalities related to resource extracting and processing industries such 
as cobalt, lithium, polysilicon refining). 
R&I is required to find the optimal use, mix and re-use of resources and 
technology, considering EU and global markets, to develop the 
European circular economy. Challenges related to new technologies and 
potential trade-offs should be understood well in order to assess the various 
alternatives (for instance, hydrogen-based storage options versus lithium or 
cobalt battery solutions). 
Addressing the challenge of climate change calls for a transformative 
transition of the energy system, incorporating all available technologies 
                                               
9  Biomass: 12-28 TJ/km2/yr (IPCC, 2011) vs PV: 60-110 MW/km2 * 1 000-
1 700 MWh/MWp/yr * 0.0036 TJ/MWh = 180-720 TJ/km2/yr (Pietzcker et al, 2014) 
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for negative emissions, electrification, power-to-X and hydrogen. 
Negative emissions need to be introduced in the longer term to compensate for 
current emission levels. To this end, CCS could be applied to biomass-based 
energy (BECCS) to provide net negative emissions. Innovation is also being 
directed towards alternative CO2 removal techniques from other sources than 
renewable fuels or industry process emissions, for instance directly from the air. 
Further research is required for CO2 utilisation techniques to produce synthetic 
liquids and gases for decentralised utilisation. E-fuels or Power-to-X could 
potentially be a major enabling technology for decarbonising the energy 
system, although the high conversion losses along the repeated conversions 
lead to a much lower final energy service yield compared to direct electrification 
(see the discussion of zero-carbon molecules). Higher deployment of hydrogen 
can further decarbonise end uses such as transport and heating or cooling in 
buildings. This should be broadened to R&I that looks at all the carbon-
containing molecules, which can be useful for chemical or other sectors. 
8.3 An inclusive and just transition 
Like any change, the transition towards a decarbonised society will entail 
winners and losers. While society as a whole will benefit from the transition to 
decarbonisation, there will inevitably be countries or regions, industrial sectors 
and people to protect during the transition to ensure that the transition does 
not endanger social cohesion and justice. 
It is quite obvious that decarbonisation will not be a one-size-fits-all 
exercise for the various Member States and regions of the EU, which 
are in very different situations. For instance, there are differences in their 
indigenous fossil fuel reserves and renewable energy potentials, technological 
capacities, energy demand patterns, infrastructure, and labour and capital 
markets. 
Policies should pave the road for an inclusive transition that also comes 
with many opportunities for industrial development, with new sectors 
and yet-to-be-created skills with employment opportunities, often more 
numerous in the new renewable energy sectors than in traditional sectors. Quite 
obviously, these new jobs do not necessarily have the same characteristics as 
the ones they will replace. For example the labour requirements of coal mines 
might be substituted by personnel for the design and implementation of RES. 
Hence training and education are required, with more emphasis in these 
countries and regions which will be more impacted by the phasing-out of 
traditional fossil-fuel-based activities. Overall, the low-carbon transition can 
lead to job creation, especially when the entire value chains of new and old 
technologies are taken into consideration, revealing the more labour-intensive 
production patterns of decentralised low-carbon energy systems. Beyond an 
adapted decarbonisation trajectory and objectives, it is in these countries and 
regions that most of the new job opportunities should be pushed to materialise. 
Citizen involvement is an important part of the decentralised energy 
system. Each European citizen could play an equal part in the solutions 
as an increasing number of citizens act as prosumers and participate in energy 
cooperatives. Social innovation must be enabled through a new legislative 
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framework. R&I is needed on how to turn consumers into prosumers and finally 
advocates of decarbonisation, and in a second step to develop solutions that 
increase transparency, efficiency and engagement as well as ensure that 
citizens are protected (cyber security, privacy, data protection, use of the 
market power of new emerging businesses in a digital economy that may be 
characterised by classic network effects). It is also important to note that 
digitalisation increases the need for electricity. Energy efficiency in digitalisation 
is an important point for consideration here. 
It is necessary to address energy poverty. The EU Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU SILC) estimates that 54 million European citizens (10.8 % 
of the EU population) were unable to keep their home adequately warm in 
2012, with similar numbers for the late payment of utility bills (Pye et al., 
2015). 
The decarbonisation scenarios and pathways could impact the level of 
energy poverty in the Member States, and thus the affordability of 
decarbonisation pathways must be a key parameter in the decision-
making process. It is essential that this problem is recognised and addressed, 
as ensuring basic energy services is critical to ensure that communities do not 
suffer negative health impacts, do not become further entrenched in poverty, 
can maintain a good quality of life, and above all remain globally supportive of 
the transition. To enable good policy making and allow progress to be tracked, 
data collection on energy poverty needs to be enhanced and affordability must 
be assessed through quantitative tools and careful evaluation of taxation 
policies. 
Attention shall be paid to carbon leakage. From a sectorial point of view, 
industrial sectors which are at risk of carbon leakage because of the nature of 
their activities also require some form of protection. This is to protect the jobs 
that they provide in European Member States against the prospect of 
externalising their production, which would simply displace emissions to outside 
the EU. 
Efforts to achieve a framework for a symmetric global mitigation action 
are key to tackling this issue, along with short-term concession-type 
measures or specially designed trade measures. This effort could also 
start with international cooperation of the ‘willing’ regions or even on a sectoral 
level. Other approaches to prevent carbon leakage range from well-known and 
already applied measures such as the free allocation of emission rights in the 
ETS (in ways that simultaneously incentivise energy efficiency in these sectors) 
to well-known but politically-difficult and contentious measures such as border 
adjustment taxes on high-carbon-content products produced outside the EU (in 
compatibility with the World Trade Agreement rules, notably Art. 20, which 
relates to the environmental protection aspects of international trade) to 
potentially innovative new concepts such as carbon allowance contracts-for-
difference or a carbon-reduction investment fund. 
Investing in R&I for advanced and highly efficient production practices 
can create opportunities to increase competitiveness in zero-carbon 
technologies and techniques. Energy-system-integration approaches could 
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help to create more markets for new energy technologies, but also help 
industry to contribute to overall energy efficiency.  
The global green technology market is estimated at EUR 5 trillion. The 
EU is well-positioned on de-carbonisation technologies and business solutions 
and has the potential to address this market. ‘Green production’ labels or 
certification, supported by standard EU lifecycle assessment schemes, and 
corresponding trade and tax regimes can support EU industrial leadership. 
The EU still has the potential to capture global market shares in 
emerging zero-carbon equipment and services. The demand for these 
sectors is constantly growing as more countries are taking up more efficient 
production methods. An emphasis in R&I can lead to cross-sectoral knowledge 
spillovers, while learning by doing and learning by research dynamics can 
increase the EU’s comparative advantage. Wind turbines are a positive 
example, and other technologies, such as storage and network infrastructure, 
can follow. New markets can be pursued not only in equipment and materials 
but also in the services and financing sectors. 
9 Recommendations for R&I 
The integrated energy system transition requires that more sectors than only 
the power sector should become involved, and requires all actors in the energy 
domain to contribute to making the energy transition happen. In this respect, it 
is necessary to urge industry, utilities, oil and gas majors and others to assume 
their responsibilities. This also means they must be involved in the pathways 
that the EU is going to develop. 
In the context of the full transformation to a zero-carbon energy 
system, R&I is key. It can provide the knowledge needed to design and 
guide the transformation, the technologies required to enable this 
transformation, and the instruments to deploy these technologies and 
implement the transformation. More specifically, investments in R&I are needed 
to: 
 realise the full potential of integrating the energy system and 
linking the development of low-carbon power markets to low-carbon 
liquid and gas markets (transportation, low and high temperature heat);  
 pursue deep electrification of energy services for industry, 
transport, and buildings.  
For the second, there exist a wide range of electrification options with varying 
capital intensities and efficiencies. Better understanding of advantages and 
disadvantages is required for a successful implementation, including how to 
reap synergistic benefits and facilitate the integration of variable renewable 
energies. 
This calls for a next generation of quantitative models with an integrated 
representation of all energy networks (e.g. electricity, heating, transport) 
while considering system stability restrictions and market operation features, 
 48 
accounting for full life-cycle impacts on resources, the environment and the 
economy. 
It is important to develop improved policies and market designs (including 
empirical case studies and step-by-step implementation recipes for regulators) 
to ensure robust policies and market regulations that reduce the amount of 
costly trial-and-error iterations. This includes a focus on: 
 market designs that facilitate RES integration, enable prosumer 
participation and incentivise demand flexibility to achieve fast power-
sector decarbonisation; 
 making policies robust against negative interactions with other 
policies on EU, national and regional levels, e.g. the weakening of 
the ETS price signal due to national decarbonisation policies; 
 deeper understanding of dynamic transition processes, innovation 
dynamics and energy market developments (instead of static 
analyses); 
 a wide array of tools, from large-scale quantitative models 
incorporating sophisticated market mechanisms and consumer 
behaviour to empirical case studies, to step-by-step 
implementation recipes for policy-makers, regulators and 
administrations. 
Potential technological solutions also exist: 
 Bring technologies for ‘zero-carbon molecules’ to market 
readiness, such as biofuels with CCS, hydrogen, and other 
synthetic fuels. A dedicated mission — including full-scale 
demonstrator projects — would ensure that the most promising 
technologies are identified and developed so as to be ready for large-
scale deployment by 2030. 
 Develop energy storage and conversion technologies at all time 
scales: batteries, heat storage, Power-to-X. 
 Improve intelligent networks and infrastructure for electricity, 
heat and gases to include spatial issues and benefits of pooling. 
 Identify and overcome non-technical barriers to otherwise market-
ready technologies, e.g. consumer readiness or societal acceptance. 
Continued support to innovative companies, in particular SMEs, to 
scaling up and addressing global markets is also required. 
Another priority is to design a zero-carbon energy system based on 
a full understanding of the co-benefits and externalities of new 
technologies and new energy system configurations. This would encompass 
a number of aspects: 
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 Investigate the full range of LCA aspects, such as material resource 
needs and indirect CO2 emissions from construction, as well as air 
pollution, land and water use.  It also includes materials scarcity 
issues, as the development of whole new systems will require different 
resources. It is essential to consider this from the perspective of 
advancing the EU circular economy. 
 Carry out an evidence-based socioeconomic assessment of 
employment and trade dynamics for zero-carbon sectors and 
practices, emphasising new skill requirements and EU competitiveness 
aspects along with growth dynamics through knowledge diffusion. 
 Implement the energy digitalisation through the development of 
an ‘Internet of Energy’ to integrate the energy system and connect 
supply and demand, with a focus on governance and citizen involvement 
to ensure that prosumers as well as traditional consumers are 
empowered as well as protected, and negative rebound effects are 
minimised. 
 Advance open source data collection and provision, as well as open 
energy modelling to represent the changing and low-carbon energy 
systems. This includes developing integrated open models that cover 
the interactions between technologies, market operation, policy 
instruments, the economic sphere, the environmental sphere, and 
innovation processes. 
 Ensure long-term-funding and coordination of open databases. This 
will allow the Commission to better monitor the transformation process, 
become less reliant on third-party data collection, and enable Member 
States and/or research institutions to emulate analyses and do their own 
research.
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Figure 4: Possible R&I roadmap towards a decarbonised energy supply sector. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DECARBONISING THE TRANSPORT SECTOR IN EUROPE, 
CLEANING ROAD, RAIL, SHIPPING AND AVIATION MOBILITY 
SERVICES 
1 The contemporary state of transport in Europe  
Transport services within the EU-28 Member States were responsible 
for 26 % (895 MtCO2e) of total domestic CO2 emissions in 2015 
(European Commission, 2018). Adding emissions from international aviation 
and marine navigation (in sum, 274 MtCO2-eq) increases the full share of 
transport to 31 % of total EU-28 CO2 emissions. CO2 emissions from aviation 
(international and domestic) increased by almost 80 % between 1990 and 
2015, which is far higher 
growth than emissions 
from any other transport 
mode. Across all domestic 
transport services in the 
EU-28, CO2 emissions 
increased by 17 % 
between 1990 and 2015. 
The major share (82 %) of 
national CO2 emissions 
(domestic emissions and 
those from international 
aviation combined) is 
attributable to road 
transport (Figure 5)10. 
Passenger transport 
services were responsible 
for about two thirds of the 
national transport CO2 
emissions, with cars being 
the major source of these 
emissions. Besides 
emissions from cars, 20 % 
of the national transport 
sector CO2 emissions were 
emitted by heavy-duty 
trucks and buses, and 
10 % by light duty trucks. 
                                               
10 In this figure, the reporting of emissions by transport mode refers to statistical data based 
on DG ENER (EU Commission, DG ENER, Unit A4, Energy datasheets: EU28 countries, 
updated 14.02.2018) in which emissions from international maritime transport (134 
MtCO2, or about 4% of total EU GHG emissions) are excluded from quantity reported as 
national total emissions (incl. international aviation). A discussion of emissions mitigation 
related to international maritime transport is covered in section 2.3 of this chapter. 
  
Figure 5:  EU-28 national transport sector CO2 emissions (including 
international aviation) in 2015. Sources: European Commission, 
2018; UNFCCC, 2017; European Environment Agency, 2018. 
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Transport services and transport-related industries are essential 
sectors for Europe’s economy, enabling growth and prosperity as well 
as employment in the EU. Transportation services alone constitute 2.9 % of 
total EU-28 VA. If manufacturing of transport equipment is also included, this 
share increases up to 5.1 % of total VA11. Further including support activities 
for transportation and postal services brings the overall contribution of the 
transport industry to 7.2 % of total EU-28 VA in 2015 (European Commission, 
2016). Respectively, the transport industry represents 6.4 % of total employed 
persons (14.6 million persons), while employment in transportation services 
accounts for 3 % of total EU-28 employment, and manufacturing of transport 
equipment about 1.4 %. This indicates that land transport services employ 
more people than the overall manufacturing of transport equipment, while they 
produce roughly the same VA in the European economy. 
While European manufacturers are established as major players for 
transport technology worldwide, new markets with new equipment 
producers are growing rapidly in emerging economies. With around 22-
23 million units in 2016, about 25 % of the total global light vehicle engines 
and gearboxes were produced in over 90 production locations across Europe 
(including Russia and Turkey), worth about EUR 65-70 billion. Even though 
more than 95 % (global figure for 2016, KPMG, 2017) of the production 
involves internal combustion engines (ICEs) without electrical hybridisation, the 
major growth area is electric vehicles. Globally 1.2 million cars (battery electric 
vehicles (BEV) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV)) were sold in 2017, 
with half of this amount sold in China (EV-Volumes, 2018). Production 
capacities for electric vehicles have grown rapidly in China, which was able to 
produce 95 % of the electric vehicles sold domestically, assisted by very 
restrictive policies towards foreign BEV manufacturers. Conseuqently, China is 
not only dominating the electic vehicle (EV) retail market but is also a leading 
production centre. 
Despite the tremendous efforts made in the past, the transport sector’s 
environmental performance is below expectations, not only for GHG 
emissions but also concerning other environmental and health impacts 
from pollutant emissions. While the carbon monoxide (CO) and non-methane 
volatile organic compound (NMVOC) emissions declined by more than 80 % 
from 1990 to 2015, NOx and SOx emissions decreased by 40-50 % in this 
timeframe and PM2.5 emissions dropped by 40 % between 2000 and 2015 (EEA, 
2018). Even so, the transport sector is the main source of the EU’s NOx 
emissions, with more than 55 % (2015) resulting from domestic and 
international transport activities. Over the last two decades, air pollutant 
emission reductions from road transport have been lower than originally 
anticipated, partly resulting from higher growth in the transport sector than 
expected. This was compounded by accelerated growth in diesel-based vehicles, 
which cause higher specific NOx and PM emissions than petrol-fuelled vehicles, 
in particular considering that diesel cars produce more pollutant emissions than 
they were supposed to. 
                                               
11  Transport sector-related figures for VA depend on the sectoral accounting schemes applied, 
i.e. whether equipment manufacturing and support postal services are included or not. 
Here, we provide disaggregated values depending on which businesses are included. Since 
different sectoral accounting schemes are used across different literature sources, 
comparability might be limited. 
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Beyond particle emissions, which are currently monitored and whose 
environmental and health impacts are well understood, there is increasing 
concern about severe health effects from ultra-fine particles. These particles are 
found in the exhaust of petrol-operated internal combustion engines. Due to the 
small particle size (<100 nano-meters) they are not measured with traditional 
instruments. However, they can easily enter the human body and cause 
substantial health damage. In general, emissions of air pollutants are the most 
significant environmental cause of premature death in the EU, and lead to 
respiratory diseases, major healthcare costs and lost working days. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) attributes a significant share of the 100 000 
premature adult annual deaths due to air pollution in Europe to transport 
(World Health Organization, 2018). Other negative external effects caused by 
transport systems are related to noise, fragmentation of ecosystems, land 
occupation and accidents. Road congestion plays a critical role in this because it 
has social, economic and environmental implications. Delays caused by 
congestion, in particular in urban areas, not only reduce the quality of mobility 
and hence quality of life but also represent economic damage estimated for 
2013 at over 1 % of the EU's GDP (European Commission, 2017). 
Without substantial regulatory intervention a rapid reversal of the 
developments observed over the past seems to be unlikely. An indication 
of future developments for the transport sector under the condition that no 
additional policies were to be implemented after 2020 is provided in the EU 
Reference scenario 2016 (Figure 6). The Reference scenario 2016 should not be 
interpreted as the most likely outcome; it merely presents a trajectory of the 
energy system if policy action remained frozen. According to the projections of 
the PRIMES model, CO2 emissions from the transport sector would remain 
broadly stable until 2050. Some autonomous progress of the energy efficiency 
of vehicles along with a low penetration of advanced car powertrains are offset 
by the increase in the transport activity. The majority of the emissions would 
still be generated from cars, heavy-duty trucks and aviation. In the absence of 
additional policies and measures for the period beyond 2020, slow technological 
progress is assumed to take place (mainly resulting in low cost declines for 
electric vehicles). At the same time, electric vehicles recharging infrastructure 
develops slowly, as a result of absence of policies and low technological 
Figure 6: Evolution of EU-28 national CO2 emissions to 2050 by mode in the EU Reference Scenario 
2016. Source: PRIMES model, Reference Scenario (European Commission, 2016). 
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progress. Under this framework of assumptions, the Reference scenario shows a 
tentative uptake of electric vehicles (battery electric and plug-in hybrids); their 
share in the total fleet of cars does not exceed 6% in 2030. As a result, 
conventional diesel and gasoline cars remain the dominant vehicle technology. 
2 Transport sub-sectoral decarbonisation opportunities  
With a focus on technology, this section highlights the main decarbonisation 
options on a sub-sectoral level. New mobility patterns, including demand 
reductions and modal shift, are in the last section of this chapter. 
2.1 Land-based transport 
 Passenger transport  
Low- and zero-emission vehicles need to become the default option for 
new car purchases, enabled by the broad roll-out of the corresponding 
charging and re-fuelling infrastructure. According to (UNFCCC, 2017) 
850 Mt CO2 were emitted by road transport vehicles in 2015, which corresponds 
to 95 % of the EU-28 domestic CO2 emissions of the transport sector. The 
majority of road transport is due to passenger transport, in particular related to 
private cars. To reduce these emissions, one promising approach is the 
transition from vehicles with ICEs to electric drive trains operated as BEVs, 
PHEV or FCVs, accompanied by low-carbon electricity generation. This transition 
has just started, representing a small market share with average annual sales 
of BEVs and PHEVs in Europe12 of 168 000 vehicles between 2013 and 2017 
(EAFO, 2018) and on average 580 units of hydrogen FCVs in this time period 
(Hybridcars, 2018). Compared to the total car sales in 2017, BEVs and PHEVs 
represent a market share of around 2 %. Barriers to the transition are the 
higher capital costs of EVs, the limited product portfolio of BEVs, lacking 
hydrogen infrastructure and concerns related to the density of charging 
stations, while shorter travel ranges of BEVs compared to conventional cars 
could constrain the quality of existing services provided by EVs. Referring to 
current records for 2018, there are about 155 000 public electric charging 
positions in Europe (EAFO, 2018). To fuel hydrogen FCVs, there exist about 106 
hydrogen refuelling stations across Europe (FuelcellWorks, 2017). To scale up 
EV market penetration to about 7 % (roughly 20 million cars) by 2025 in 
Europe, around two million publicly-accessible charging points are required 
(European Commission, 2017b). Policy can support and incentivise investments 
in charging infrastructure through setting targets for the number of available 
stations in buildings, public roads and urban areas. One particular issue refers 
to missing charging infrastructure for people living in multi-family houses where 
installation of sufficient charging stations has often a low priority with house 
owners or planners. Legislation has addressed this issue with the adopted 
revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EUR-Lex, 2018), which now 
includes EV charging-related requirements for certain types of buildings. 
Besides residential buildings (new construction and major renovation of existing 
buildings), non-residential buildings are also captured through the revised 
directive. 
                                               
12  EU-28, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey 
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However, BEVs’ market penetration is still marginal, and supporting 
policies would be needed to facilitate a broader deployment of EVs and 
other low-carbon transport options. Such policies could either provide 
incentives to mitigate the market barriers which new technologies face (e.g. in 
terms of competitiveness compared to conventional technologies or related to 
acceptance by consumers) or policies can be prescriptive (e.g. a forced phase-
out of ICEs). Norway represents an outstanding example of a successful uptake 
of EVs throughout the last five years. In Norway, the gap between technology 
readiness and poor market penetration was bridged using strong economic 
stimuli, including subsidies for charging infrastructure and substantial 
registration tax benefits for electric vehicles over gasoline and diesel engine 
cars (IEA, 2018). 
For a broad roll-out of EVs across Europe, a number of issues related to 
technical, regulatory and economic aspects, system integration and 
standardisation, and consumer behaviour need to be better understood 
and resolved. Charging plugs for passenger electric vehicles have been 
required to be standardised under Directive 2014/94/EU, and plugs for buses 
are expected to be standardised in 2019. However, in practice, and in particular 
for e-mobility users travelling longer distances, difficulties arise due to the 
broad spectrum of EV charging system hardware, service providers, standards 
and protocols, and different payment systems. Compatibility of different 
systems as well as cross-national collaboration between infrastructure service 
providers and regulatory bodies to use charging infrastructure more efficiently 
could lead to a broader and faster roll-out of e-mobility (NeMo, 2017). 
Moreover, it needs coordination between stakeholders in electricity systems 
(e.g. distribution system operators, meter data managers, meter operators) 
and mobility service providers to remove market barriers for EV usage (NeMo, 
2017). For instance, to optimise the interconnection and communication of EVs 
with power and energy storage systems, R&I actions should address innovative 
communication between or within battery management systems, leading 
ultimately to advanced standards for integrated battery systems. 
Smart and digitalised systems are key to reducing the impact on the 
electricity network, reducing requirements for network capacity 
reinforcement and expansion and improving services for the passenger 
transport industry. Digitalised services facilitate integration of batteries 
embedded in e-mobility within the electricity system (e.g. via vehicle-to-grid 
technology), control data traffic and transport capacities, empower autonomous 
driving and enable bi-directional data exchange on different devices (e.g. EVs, 
batteries, management systems). These services are expected to improve the 
abilities to better manage EVs in the electricity system and to contribute to an 
advanced operation of the distribution grid by reducing the peak load or 
reducing the need for network reinforcements. Digitalisation can improve users’ 
and consumers’ experience with EVs and new transportation methods (e.g. 
autonomous driving). However, there is a risk of assuming that digitalisation 
will automatically lead to environmentally friendly mobility systems. This is not 
the case, and decarbonisation of the transport sector fails if R&I related to 
digitalisation just addresses enhanced convenience of mobility services or if it 
even leads to an increase in transport demand (rebound effect) with marginal 
improvements in environmental performance. Clearly, digital solutions need to 
be developed with the specific goal of providing mobility services at lower 
energy consumption and reduced environmental impacts. Moreover, it remains 
to be investigated which advanced digital applications contribute to effective 
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avoidance of transport of goods or passengers and to lowering the overall 
transport demand. 
Building up the battery manufacturing industry and battery recycling 
processes is ‘a strategic imperative for Europe in the context of the 
clean energy transition’ (European Commission, 2018). Batteries are at the 
heart of the EV production chain. To prevent technological dependency on 
Europe’s competitors, and to capitalise on jobs and economic growth, Europe 
needs to ensure an adequate market share in battery technologies. This 
requires a set of concrete measures to support the development of an 
innovative and sustainable battery ecosystem for both existing and new battery 
technologies. When it comes to new battery technologies, R&I should cover the 
full value chain and development should be compatible with innovative 
changing systems. Innovative charging of batteries comprises, for instance, 
ultra-fast plug-in chargers, and wireless inductive charging with its advanced 
possibilities of dynamic electric vehicle charging (DEVC), which allows charging 
while driving. R&I efforts should aim at quickly reaching a higher technology 
readiness level of all-solid-state lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries (e.g. with polymer 
or ceramic electrolyte). For existing technologies, Europe needs to promote 
scaled European battery cell manufacturing and a full competitive value chain. 
First steps in this direction have been initiated by the European Commission 
with a number of measures, including the foundation of the European Battery 
Alliance. Based on information from the European Institute of Innovation and 
Technology, the European Commission states that ‘from 2025 onwards Europe 
could capture a batteries market of up to EUR 250 billion a year, served by at 
least 10 to 20 gigafactories’ (European Commission, 2018). 
Large-scale deployment of battery electric cars raises the question of 
the availability of critical raw materials and the sustainability of 
batteries (European Commission, 2018), which calls for R&I related to 
advanced battery chemistries, as well as innovative production and re-use 
concepts for Europe. Key areas for improvement are the following:  
 Improving existing battery chemistry as well as development of batteries 
with new battery chemistries: Current Li-ion battery systems use cobalt (i.e. 
cobalt oxide) as a cathode material, which is a raw material only available 
worldwide in a few regions (mainly the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
China), often ones with poor records in environmental protection and human 
rights. New battery cathode material compositions under investigation are, 
for instance, lithium-nickel-manganese-cobalt and lithium-nickel-cobalt-
aluminium oxide, which both aim to reduce the cobalt amount. Further R&I 
efforts need to focus on an enhanced TRL for batteries with alternative 
materials for transport applications or new battery technologies such as 
redox flow and high temperature batteries. 
 Establishing European raw material sources: R&I is needed to map and 
explore available raw material resources in Europe and other world regions. 
To ensure sustainability while exploring new resources, development of 
efficient measurement criteria for assessing the environmental and societal 
impacts of mining activities could facilitate this process by accelerating the 
permission process essential for opening new mines. Outside the scope of 
R&I, EU diplomacy is an important aspect in securing the supply of raw 
materials. 
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 Battery recycling: Recycling of automotive Li-ion batteries is not yet 
established. However, only a decade after the roll-out of e-mobility, large-
scale dismantling and recycling would need to be in place. Little R&I is 
performed on the development of pilot lines for dismantling and sorting 
processes suitable for large volumes of batteries. The collecting and recycling 
processes need to be improved to recover new materials used in batteries. 
Intelligent process designs and labelling of batteries could allow automatic 
sorting of different battery chemistries. 
Sustainability of battery usage can also be enhanced through second-use of 
batteries, possibly through the quantification of second-life criteria and 
assessing battery reliability, safety and performance at the end of first use. The 
development of a standard platform for intelligent management of batteries in 
both first-life and second-life application is a research area which has hardly 
been investigated so far. 
Hydrogen fuel cells represent an alternative power supply for electric 
drive trains (i.e. compared to battery systems). The importance of hydrogen 
fuel cell EVs comes into focus when considering that battery EVs alone could not 
satisfy all the needs of the whole market. Initiatives such as the Fuel Cells and 
Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU) and the H2020 research programme 
support the development of hydrogen fuel cells in Europe. Still, integration of 
fuel cell systems and on-board hydrogen storage into a passenger vehicle 
remains a challenge due to requirements of passenger vehicle safety, 
occupancy factors and current cost levels. The current approach for on-board 
storage focuses on high-pressure hydrogen storage. Alternative storage 
technologies available in the future (beyond 2020) could operate at lower 
storage pressure enabled through cryogenic systems or novel bonding materials 
(metal hydrides and sorbents) while improving safety and costs. The US 
Department of Energy has formulated ultimate storage targets of 
USD 266/kg H2 by 2025, which compares to about USD 500/kg H2 today 
(Stetson, 2016). Furthermore, current technology for measuring the accuracy 
of metering hydrogen is at best +/-3 %, when for better public billing purposes 
higher accuracies, for example +/-1 %, are required. Further challenges related 
to hydrogen supply concern the reliability and costs of hydrogen compressors, 
as well as ensuring the quality of hydrogen gas at the nozzle and satisfying high 
requirements of fuel gas purity levels for automotive fuel cell applications. Apart 
from technological development, new business models are needed to influence 
positively the competitiveness of hydrogen technologies in the market. 
Hydrogen also represents an option to decarbonise rail transport where 
further electrification is not economic. Around 53 % of the EU rail network 
is electrified. With electrification costs around EUR 2m/km (costs for the 
Midland Main Line in the UK as presented by Dickerson, 2018), electrification is 
not a cost-efficient solution for routes with low traffic. The choice of technology 
in non-electrified routes depends highly on the speed of the service and 
distance of the route. While battery electric trains are a more suitable 
decarbonisation option for non-electrified routes with lower average travel 
speed and short travel distances, hydrogen fuel cells can meet the 
requirements where speeds and range are higher — 160 km/h and 260 km/h, 
respectively. Hydrogen fuel cell trains are also more expensive than diesel ones 
(+30 %) because their energy costs are currently higher and they are less 
efficient than electric trains. However, their GHG emissions are 45 % lower than 
diesel, even if hydrogen is produced via steam methane reforming. These 
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emissions can decrease to almost negligible levels when using green and low-
carbon hydrogen. Hydrogen rail is an area that can contribute to economic 
growth due to the leadership of EU rail manufacturers. In addition, new rail 
technologies based on magnetic levitation and reduced pressure tubes are 
being investigated for commercialisation (Hyperloop). The EU can still capitalise 
on the opportunities that this presents by researching critical materials relevant 
in magnetic levitation systems, human factors, health and safety, as well as 
other engineering designs and improvements. In turn, this could shift demand 
from aviation and other transport modes for long distance travel and freight 
transport to rail. 
 Freight transport 
Heavy-duty (including buses) and light-duty vehicles respectively represent 
around 25 % and 11 % of all domestic transport-related CO2 emissions of the 
EU-28 (UNFCCC, 2017). Steered by relevant policies and regulations, 
decarbonisation options in freight include a combination of operational 
strategies, new business models, driving behaviour changes, low-carbon 
technologies and modal shifts. 
Improvements in operations can yield substantial energy and carbon 
savings which can already be achieved in the near-term. Examples of 
these technologies include the use of telematics for real-time routing and 
scheduling software, intelligent transport systems and innovative business 
models. Often logistics fleets provide reverse logistics services to avoid empty 
back-haul trips (23 % of heavy goods vehicles ran empty in 2015, European 
Commission, 2017). Lifestyle deliveries provide flexibility around deliverers’ 
availability, and at least in urban areas, most of these use very low-carbon 
transportation modes such as walking, cycling or biking. Beyond the new 
operation modes for transport systems resulting from different lifestyle 
approaches and consumer needs, driving behaviour can reduce fuel usage and 
hence emissions. Avoiding harsh acceleration and braking can be promoted via 
driver training or with driving assistance technologies. Connected and highly 
autonomous vehicles (level 5) are expected to yield the best driving 
performance possible while enabling new vehicle designs resulting in lighter, 
more aerodynamic vehicles with larger loading capacity. In the meantime, lower 
levels of automation such as vehicle platooning and predictive cruise control can 
produce more moderate benefits. In the long run, logistics services with 
connected and autonomous freight vehicles (level 5) might increase fuel 
economy, reduce CO2 emissions and improve operational efficiency and profit 
margins as the lack of human drivers will exempt these vehicles from the EU 
Working Time Directive. As no recreation breaks will be needed for drivers and 
longer journeys might be possible, vehicles could be operated 24/7. In some 
cases, freight vehicles will collect multiple loads on route and deliver them in 
transit, minimising the need to return to distribution centres to park vehicles 
overnight. This will result in lower mileage and associated emissions. 
Challenging the demand for freight services presents great potential. 
Collaboration in the supply chain reduces the need for redundant freight 
services. An outcome of the growth of e-commerce is the entry of new e-
retailers that often have poor vehicle utilisation in last-mile deliveries (Allen et 
al., 2017. Similar to the mobility-as-a-service trend, the logistics sector is also 
experiencing an ‘uberisation’, where customers can share vehicle capacity to 
reduce costs and reduce the carbon intensity of freight by using apps that 
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facilitate those arrangements (crowd-shipping). It is necessary to continue 
research on the interactions of logistics flows with mobility as a service (MaaS) 
in urban areas, product as a service business models and the influence of the 
circular economy in logistics flows due to their potential to reduce GHG 
emissions. 
The opportunities to decrease emissions using low-carbon technologies 
are multiple and comprise vehicle technologies, decarbonisation of fuels, 
powertrain technologies and, depending on the vehicle sector, alternative 
transport refrigeration systems (Velazquez Abad et al., 2017). Among the first 
are all technologies that influence aerodynamic drag, rolling resistance, 
acceleration and gradient. There is a broad range of very-low-carbon fuels (e.g. 
first- and second-generation biodiesel, bioDME and biomethane) that can make 
a significant contribution to reducing GHG emissions from freight transport. 
However, none of these can entirely eliminate air pollutant emissions from 
combustion. Battery electric powertrains seem well suited to low loading 
capacity and low mileage as there is a compromise between range and vehicle 
payload due to the size and weight of the batteries. This might suffice in an 
urban context but is clearly insufficient for long-haul freight. In contrast, 
hydrogen proton exchange membrane fuel cell vehicles can currently deliver 
similar operational characteristics to those of diesel trucks in terms of torque, 
power, range and refuelling time (Staffell et al., 2018). 
In the near term, both the hybridisation of powertrains and dual fuel vehicles 
are good interim solutions to overcome operational constraints on the way to 
full electrification. Promising hybrid technologies for trucks are diesel/electric 
drivetrains and fuel cell range extenders for electric vehicles, while dual-fuel 
technologies mainly refer to internal combustion engines operated on 
diesel/biomethane and diesel/hydrogen. An alternative to battery-based 
electrification would be partial electrification of highways with overhead lines or 
a conductive in-road electricity supply, as is currently being field-tested in 
Germany and Sweden (Moultak, 2017; ERoadArlanda, 2018). With such 
systems, no large-scale batteries are necessary for long-distance transport 
purposes. Small batteries or combustion engines would be needed only to travel 
to and from the electrified highways. Depending on the electrification system, 
and in particular if in-road or on-road systems are used, smaller vehicles, such 
as cars, could benefit from the electrification of roads, in addition to large 
vehicles (trucks and buses). 
Promotion of modal shifts from road to maritime shipping, inland 
navigation and rail saves emissions. Road is the main mode of freight 
transport in the EU, representing over 51 % of all tonne-kilometres transported 
in 2016, while sea represents almost 33 %, rail 12 %, inland waterways 4 %, 
and air transport a mere 0.1 % (European Commission, 2018). As other modes 
are less carbon-intensive per tonne kilometre, a modal shift from road to rail, 
inland navigation or shipping is always environmentally beneficial if 
operationally feasible. The EU has set a goal of a 50 % shift of medium-distance 
freight journeys to rail by 2050 (European Commission, 2011). To achieve this 
goal it is necessary to deploy transhipment terminals in ports and multimodal 
terminals in rail and inland navigation. However, a segment of the deliveries 
(e.g. port to road, road to rail) almost always requires road haulage and the 
changes between modes can be time consuming. Often the waiting time of 
trucks in ports is excessive. Reliability is another of the big challenges in modal 
shifts as passenger rail transport has priority over rail freight when congestion 
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on the network occurs. R&I efforts need to address enabling factors for modal 
shift in freight transport further and to develop better multimodal solutions for 
long-distance transport of goods. 
Similar to the mandatory maximum average CO2 emissions for new cars and 
vans in the EU, the European Commission has just published a CO2 standards 
proposal to increase fuel efficiency and reduce emissions from new heavy-duty 
vehicles. By 2025, average CO2 emissions from new HDV will have to be 15 % 
lower than in 2021, increasing to 30 % by 2030 (European Commission, 2018). 
Setting mandatory targets for road freight vehicles in each vehicle class will 
steer innovation from truck manufacturers, in a similar way as the Euro 6 
emissions standard has done to reduce air pollutants. Regulations permitting 
longer and heavier combination vehicles can also decrease the carbon intensity 
of deliveries. Several trials have been carried out around Europe, which is 
particularly important to increase the penetration of battery electric trucks, due 
to the volumetric and gravimetric penalty of batteries on vehicle payload. 
2.2 Aviation 
With a share of 13 % of the CO2 emissions related to domestic and international 
transport services in the EU-28, emissions resulting from aviation are about one 
fifth of the emissions attributable to road transport. However, compared to road 
transport, aviation emissions have grown much faster over the past two 
decades (about 50 %) and are forecast to grow by a further 45 % between 
2014 and 2035. With just 7 % of the world’s population, European flights 
account for around 25 % of global air traffic. In terms of overall impacts on 
climate change of aviation, it needs to be considered that the impact of 
emissions due to aircraft operation in the upper troposphere and lower 
stratosphere is higher than the impact of the same amount of emissions on 
ground level (Fuglestvedt et al., 2010). This additional impact can be quantified 
by a so-called CO2 uplift factor, which takes into consideration the net climate 
contribution of present and future aviation emissions as a multiplication factor 
for the climate forcing contribution associated with the respective CO2 
emissions. However, there is no universal uplift factor, due to the different 
atmospheric impacts of aviation emissions resulting from different engine 
technologies and atmospheric conditions, for instance (Dessens et al., 2014; 
Cox et al., 2018). 
Enable advanced and sustainable biofuels to become competitive on fuel 
markets to support cost-effective decarbonisation of aviation. In addition to 
enhanced technologies and higher-performing operations, ‘drop-in’ liquid 
biofuels or biojet fuels are an effective option for decarbonising the aviation 
sector as other forms of renewable energy are not suitable for powering large 
aircraft over the forthcoming three decades. Compared to today’s production 
costs of over USD 1/litre for conventional jet kerosene, biojet fuels are more 
expensive (2-4 times, depending on process and production capacity). While 
the technological feasibility of alternative jet fuels is proven, reducing cost, 
increasing availability and feedstock sustainability remain important 
prerequisites for successful market uptake. A full shift from kerosene to biofuels 
for just today’s consumption in the aviation sector would require five times 
more biofuels than the current biofuel production for road transport. This 
illustrates the fuel supply-related challenges of using biofuels for decarbonising 
aviation. It is important to underline the necessity of compliance with high 
environmental and social standards on the global scale when producing 
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biofuels, with regard to emissions from land use change, water usage, soil 
degradation, biodiversity, land and labour rights and food security. European 
policy is promoting global market-based measures currently being negotiated 
under the umbrella of the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization, and 
pursues internationally harmonised policies reflecting suitable and acceptable 
sustainability criteria. 
Beyond biofuels, other options for the decarbonisation of aviation are limited 
and refer mainly to the usage of alternative low-carbon synthetic fuels, 
efficiency improvements and alignment of measures between demand and offer 
in order to tackle the increase in air traffic. Improved aviation efficiency relates 
to weight reductions, advanced engine concepts, new aircraft designs, improved 
air traffic management, ground level operations and cruise speed reduction. 
Future aircraft weight reductions are expected to be quite significant, due 
mostly to the further replacement of metals with carbon fibre reinforced 
polymers. A relative weight-related share of composite material of more than 
50 % is expected to be deployed in 2050, reducing the average airplane weight 
by 23 % compared to the 2004 fleet (Cox et al. 2018). Advanced airplane 
concepts, such as blended wing body aircrafts, would not only require the re-
design of ground-level infrastructure but also analysis of consumer acceptance 
of such novel airplane technologies. Compared to the car industry, for instance, 
the time needed to introduce new technology is longer for aircrafts. The time 
for development of a new aircraft is around 10 years and their introduction in 
the marketplace — for a significant percentage of the fleet — will spread over a 
period of around 20 years. 
Measures to reduce emissions in aviation must extend beyond current 
technology efforts to include fiscal and behavioural measures addressing air 
traffic demand, such as carbon travel budgets for industry and governments 
(see also the section on mobility patterns). Current fuel taxation schemes 
favour aviation over other transport modes, making air traffic comparably 
cheaper. Adjusting aviation fuel taxation to be comparable to the taxation of 
other transport services provides a first step towards a shift to more 
environmentally friendly transport modes. With life-cycle CO2 emissions per 
passenger and kilometre of high speed rail being lower by a factor of about nine 
compared to air transport (Gao at al., 2016), a modal shift from aviation to 
high-speed rail could be a valid option for many European countries. 
2.3 Maritime transport and ports  
Along with aviation, maritime transport is a transportation sub-sector that is not 
only rapidly growing but that thus far has received limited attention in terms of 
its CO2 emissions impact. One reason is that, as with aviation, implementing 
low-carbon technologies is more intricate and costly than in other (sub-)sectors 
(IEA, 2017). Domestic and international shipping accounted for 13 % of the EU-
28 transport-related emissions in 2015, with about 90 % of all energy used in 
shipping activities attributable to international marine navigation. The vast 
majority of shipping activity derives from the transportation of goods in large 
sea vessels, as opposed to passengers in ferries and cruise liners, but cruising 
is a rapidly expanding branch of tourism, with concomitant environmental 
impacts. Most shipping relies on the use of heavy fuel oil, which is both carbon-
intensive and highly polluting in terms of emissions of e.g. particulate matter 
and SO2. Progress in strategy formulation to reduce GHG emissions was made 
in April 2018 with the agreement of all member countries of the International 
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Maritime Organization (IMO) to halve CO2 emissions from international shipping 
by 2050 in comparison to 2008 levels (IMO, 2018). Yet the details of this 
decarbonisation strategy urgently need to be specified, including in terms of 
how and when to achieve a carbon-neutral shipping sector. Besides measures 
to reduce energy and emissions intensity of shipping activities, new demand 
patterns and coherent international policies are required to limit emissions in 
this sector (see also the section on mobility patterns). 
First initiatives for reducing the carbon footprint of shipping would be 
to reduce the speed of ship transport. This may be an effective measure 
that could be immediately deployed if additional ships can be operated to 
ensure a constant transport capacity at lower speeds. However, an in-depth 
analysis should be performed with regard to how speed measures against scale. 
According to the International Transport Forum in 2018, 27 % of fuel 
requirements could be saved if speed was reduced by 10 %. Other effective CO2 
mitigation options concern efficiency improvements, among which are drag 
reduction and propulsion optimisation, and the use of low-carbon synthetic fuels 
such as ammonia, hydrogen and biofuels instead of heavy fuel oil. To let 
shipping reach its required contribution to achieving global climate change 
control, it will ultimately need to be decarbonised entirely. For that purpose, 
many more approaches need to be investigated, including more speculative 
ones such as adding the use of sails to propelling machines. Merit-order 
research is required to map decarbonisation alternatives and determine time 
intervals for their optimal implementation. 
Options for achieving a zero-carbon shipping sector abound, but all 
bear intrinsic drawbacks and hurdles to be overcome. Options include 
advanced biofuels, electric propulsion with electricity stored on-board in 
batteries, nuclear power, fuels cells with hydrogen or other synthetically 
produced (renewable) fuels stored on-board. Among technological measures, 
propulsion improvement devices are expected to provide the most significant 
fuel savings (up to 25 %), followed by an improved slender design (10-15 % 
fuel reduction) and light-weight materials (up to 10 %) (International Transport 
Forum, 2018). Alternative approaches to reducing the carbon intensity per ton-
mile travelled are possible by designing bigger vessels. If the current 
international marine fleet is replaced by bigger vessels, emissions could be 
reduced by up to one third on a global level (International Transport Forum, 
2018). Estimates indicate that a 50 % increase in a ship’s cargo capacity 
increases the fuel consumption by only one third. A factor of major concern 
related to shipping technology innovation is the fact that vessels are designed 
for a typical lifetime of 30 to 40 years, which begs the question whether a large 
part of the current fleet requires retrofitting to improve energy efficiency or, 
alternatively, should be retired early if we are to meet the goals of the Paris 
Agreement. Further measures to decarbonise the shipping sector concern the 
ship-port interface, including the reduction of waiting times and the 
electrification of ports to enable ships to be connected to the grid when moored. 
Aside from efforts to reduce GHG emissions from ships themselves, due 
attention needs to be given to decarbonising all activities in and around 
ports between which the vessels navigate. Equipment for loading and 
unloading as well as other harbour infrastructure can be decarbonised by 
electrification and usage of biofuel-run engines or hydrogen-fed fuel cell devices 
and vehicles. This could allow all (dis-)charge activities in ports to become zero-
carbon. Given their large surface areas, ports are often also well suited for 
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hosting a large range of possible renewable energy technologies, such as solar 
thermal stations, PV panel fields and wind turbines, to mention just a few. 
Clearly, much more techno-economic, socio-economic and logistics research is 
required to investigate the technologies as well as the policy tools that enable 
reduction of the GHG footprint of shipping and ports across Europe.  
Electrification is to play an earlier role in the decarbonisation of 
domestic shipping than in that of international marine navigation. 
Depending on different purposes (freight versus passengers) and distances 
travelled (national or international) different technologies and fuels may enable 
shipping to be rendered carbon-neutral. While for some purposes (e.g. local and 
regional passenger ferry transport or inland navigation) electrification by the 
use of batteries may prove to be the optimal choice, for other purposes (e.g. 
intercontinental cargo shipping) hydrogen with fuel cells, biofuels, liquid 
biomethane or synthetic or renewable fuels — or a mix of these options — may 
be the cost-efficient solution. From a technical point of view, electrification of 
short sea shipping and inland navigation is a feasible decarbonisation option, 
but further investigation of the operation of batteries is needed in view of the 
safety requirements for waterborne transport. For some long-distance marine 
navigation purposes, nuclear propulsion could be imagined as this option can 
rely on a submarine and icebreaker experience base. Drawbacks, however, 
include the production of radioactive waste, accident risks and concerns over 
proliferation of nuclear materials (von Hippel, 2016) as well as negative 
attitudes and perceptions of  society. Hydrogen fuel cell ships can also be a 
solution for isolated regions with a surplus of renewables and poor connections 
to gas and power networks 
3 Transport sector decarbonisation: systemic implications and 
new mobility patterns 
Beyond sector-specific mitigation options as described in the previous section, 
this section highlights the transformation of the transport sector from a 
systemic perspective, considering interdependencies with other sectors of the 
energy system and the wider economy as well as innovative mobility concepts 
leading to new transport demand patterns. In general, it needs to be kept in 
mind that introducing and promoting new vehicle technologies and alternative 
fuels needs to be evaluated from a life cycle perspective — i.e. taking into 
account vehicle production, operation and end-of-life — to quantify climate 
mitigation potentials and resulting co-benefits and potential trade-offs. Results 
of recent research illustrate the substantial differences in the overall 
environmental benefits of electrification of transport activities with either 
battery electric or fuel cell vehicles depending on the CO2 intensity of electricity 
and hydrogen production (Bauer at al., 2015; Ellingsen at al., 2017; Berrill at 
al., 2016). Since production of batteries and fuel cells is currently associated 
with substantial environmental burdens, it is also of high importance to 
decarbonise manufacturing processes and the power sector as such, not only 
from a European but from a global perspective (Cox, Mutel et al., 2018; 
Ellingsen et al., 2013). Complex fuel supply chains, e.g. synthetic fuels 
generated from hydrogen and CO2, can exhibit very low overall energy 
efficiencies and therefore lead to comparatively low GHG reduction as well as to 
high demand for renewable electricity (Zhang et al., 2017). 
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3.1 A roadmap towards a zero-emission EU transport 
Model-based decarbonisation scenarios, quantified by the PRIMES energy 
systems model as part of the EU release of the Clean Energy for All Europeans 
proposal, have explored synergies between transport and the rest of the energy 
system (including power generation, agriculture, etc.). These scenarios deliver 
an 80 % reduction in total GHG emissions in 2050 compared to 1990. 
Transport-related CO2 emissions decrease by 60 %, which is compatible with 
the targets proposed in the strategy for low-emission mobility (European 
Commission, 2016) (compare upper panel in Figure 7). The GHG emission 
reduction in transport is driven by a significant uptake of low-emission private 
vehicles as a result of more ambitious targets for car manufacturers, timely 
development of recharging and alternative fuel infrastructure and further 
reduction in battery costs. Enhanced production and optimised harvesting, 
supply chain logistics and mobilisation of potential of advanced biofuel 
technologies, thanks to effective R&I, deliver biofuel quantities for the road 
freight and aviation sector. While these scenarios are placed at the lower end of 
emission pathways that are consistent with the long-term target of 2 °C (van 
Soest et al., 2017), further emissions reduction would be necessary to go well 
below 2 °C climate stabilisation, as indicated by the Paris Agreement. However, 
significant amounts of unabated GHG emissions in transport were found to 
remain by 2050. In the near term, improvements in ICEs will provide a bridge 
or extend the transition to real, long-term sustainability. The only real solution 
is a non-fossil, zero-(net)-carbon energy carrier that can be produced and 
delivered and then carried and used in a vehicle with acceptable characteristics 
(e.g. range) and cost. Traditionally, battery electric and hydrogen fuel 
cell vehicles have been considered as competitive options. Nevertheless, 
dedicated market segments in transport can accommodate both options. The 
complementarity between hydrogen and electricity needs to be unlocked to 
bridge the gap to totally curb unabated GHG emissions that would otherwise 
remain in the transport sector by 2050. The use of hydrogen as a fuel for the 
heavy-duty vehicle market segments could help to overcome the technical 
constraints of electricity while at the same time decreasing GHG and pollutant 
emissions. Hydrogen would need to be produced via low-carbon pathways such 
as electrolysis from renewable or nuclear power or through alternative 
hydrogen production processes (e.g. biomass gasification and carbon dioxide 
capture and utilisation or storage (CCUS) or thermochemical water splitting) to 
ensure a minimal emissions impact on a well-to-wheel basis. The large 
penetration of intermittent renewable energy resources, as part of the 
decarbonisation of the power generation sector, implies that excess renewable 
electricity may be produced at certain times within a day. Transforming 
electricity produced from renewable energy into hydrogen to be used in demand 
sectors (including transport) highlights the role of hydrogen as an electricity-
based storage option. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of the EU-28 transport sector CO2 emissions in the basic decarbonisation scenario 
delivering a 60 % emissions reduction in transport and in a 100 % transport decarbonisation scenario. 
Sources: PRIMES model, ASSET study on sectoral integration — long-term perspective in the EU energy 
system (De Vita et al., 2018). 
 
Using hydrogen in heavy-duty vehicle segments will free up significant 
amounts of biofuels which otherwise would need to be blended with 
diesel to power those vehicles. Under such a strategy, biofuel production 
could be used to fuel entirely the most inflexible transport sectors such as 
aviation and, to a lesser extent, shipping. Targeted production of a single 
biofuel product (i.e. bio-kerosene) instead of a diversified portfolio of products 
could unlock significant economies of scale, rapid technological progress and 
reduced risk for the investors.  
Considerable uncertainties exist though regarding the future evolution of 
hydrogen fuel cell investment costs, which depend on economies of scale. 
Studies suggest that the total cost of ownership of fuel cell vehicles can reach 
parity with battery electric cars by 2030. Uncertainties also exist regarding 
hydrogen refuelling and distribution infrastructure, as well reliability of fuel cell 
systems in new niche markets such as rail and heavy goods vehicles. The 
affordability of the new vehicle technology and fuel options is a prerequisite to 
ensuring that citizens will continue to enjoy personal mobility. A shift from 
OPEX to CAPEX is expected to take place in the long-run, since the new vehicle 
options are more capital intensive but offer significantly reduced running costs. 
However, new business models such as mobility as a service and collaborative 
logistics have the potential to reduce transportation costs. A recent model-
based analysis (De Vita et al., 2018) depicts the importance of a hydrogen-
based sectoral integration in the most promising sectors, including transport. 
This pathway can lead to an almost 100 % reduction in transport-related CO2 
emissions by 2050 by effectively combining three main energy carriers — 
electricity, hydrogen and biofuels. Under such a stringent decarbonisation 
scenario, where all sectors largely deploy their emissions mitigation potential, 
the importance of electricity to decarbonise energy demand increases 
substantially, leading by 2050 to more than a doubling of today’s electricity 
consumption in Europe. In the decarbonisation scenario, around 600 TWh are 
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needed in the transport sector in 2050 to fuel electricity-based mobility 
technologies directly, while even 10 % more is supplied to the transport sector 
as hydrogen, which is mainly produced with electrolysers.  
  
 
 
Transport decarbonisation should not negatively influence the 
competitiveness of EU businesses. Inflated freight costs would drive 
consumer prices upwards and increase the costs of intermediate consumption in 
the domestic production of goods. Price-induced modal shifts from road to non-
road freight transport modes would need to be carefully designed to avoid over-
taxing specific sectors. The inclusion of heavy-duty trucks in the EU ETS has 
often been discussed but never implemented. There are doubts as to the 
feasibility of such implementation due to high transaction costs (Aarnink et al., 
2013).  
A recent analysis on the impacts on employment of the penetration of 
electric vehicles shows that the number of jobs will increase, provided that 
the manufacturing of batteries takes place in the EU and not outside the EU 
(Hill et al., 2018). However, most of the current and near-term manufacturing 
capacity is being deployed in China and Korea. In fact, new low-carbon 
transport technologies may trigger positive economic effects in other sectors, 
such as the upstream sector. According to Smith et al., 2017, a positive cross-
sectoral economic effect was found for the case of the UK when shifting the 
British automotive sector from fossil fuels to hydrogen while replicating the 
strong domestic upstream supply linkages of the current UK gas and electricity 
supply sectors. 
Besides possible positive macro-economic and employment effects, 
decarbonisation of transport services offers substantial environmental 
co-benefits. The ultimate switch from ICE to electric motors (using electricity 
from the grid or produced from a fuel cell) in road transport will almost 
completely eliminate relevant air pollutant exhaust emissions such as 
particulate matter and NOx and improve air quality in cities. Even if exhaust 
emissions are removed completely, some pollutant emissions remain from 
vehicle operation, e.g. because of breaking and abrasion of tyres. The positive 
externalities (e.g. fewer medical costs, increased productivity) associated with 
Figure 8: Fuel mix in the     
EU-28 transport sector in 
the basic decarbonisation 
scenario delivering a 60 % 
emission reduction in 
transport and in the 100 % 
transport decarbonisation 
scenario. Sources: PRIMES 
model, ASSET study on 
sectoral integration— long-
term perspective in the EU 
energy system (De Vita et 
al., 2018). 
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the reduction in pollutant emissions need to be factored in when accounting for 
the benefits of the transport decarbonisation strategy. 
Decarbonising transport has very large consequences on the EU trade 
balance through reduced imports of crude oil and oil products. Under a 
‘well below 2 °C’ decarbonisation scenario, the transport sector would 
complement fossil fuel substitution in other sectors, leading to an overall 
reduction in energy import dependency from 56 % in 2015 to 27 % in 2050 (De 
Vita et al., 2018). Oil products would only be needed as feedstocks for 
industrial production processes and non-energy purposes. Comparing imports of 
oil products between the basic decarbonisation scenario and the 100 % 
transport decarbonisation scenario (Figure 8) reveals that import expenditure of 
about EUR 93 billion can be saved. As such, the reduction in fossil fuel imports 
resulting from energy sector decarbonisation significantly improves Europe’s 
energy security situation. 
3.2 Tightened coupling of the transport and the power sector 
Often, in the past, the interrelations between different sectors of the energy 
system were either limited or non-existent. However, the situation may change 
remarkably in view of the effort needed to curb energy- and transport-related 
GHG emissions, with electricity being an important resource for the transport 
sector, either used directly or indirectly as input for hydrogen production. A 
sectoral integration strategy needs to be pursued, where combined actions in 
more than one sector would lead towards a low-carbon transition and at the 
same time exploit new synergies and opportunities that may arise. 
Developments in the transport sector, as regards market uptake of 
electromobility, would need to be closely aligned and coordinated with 
the effort from the power generation perspective (i.e. increased 
renewable energy penetration). Electromobility stands as the most 
promising solution to lead to the decarbonisation of private transport mobility. 
Using electricity as an energy carrier in transport is expected to generate 
additional demand for electricity in the system and compensate, at least partly, 
for a decrease in electricity consumption from households, resulting from 
energy efficiency obligations. At the same time, the electricity which would 
power electric vehicles needs to be produced at the lowest possible carbon 
emissions. This requires not only building new power plants but also 
implementing smart grids, demand-side response approaches and enforcing 
electricity interconnectors among EU countries. Policy action that will ensure 
market coordination among the various actors involved (e.g. car manufacturers, 
power generators, consumers, providers of infrastructure, etc.) will need to be 
set in place already well before 2030. A continuous policy presence in the 
horizon up to 2030 is needed to ensure the successful interplay between the 
relevant market actors and lay the ground for a broad transport transformation 
process up to 2050. 
The integration of grid electricity-based EVs in the European electricity 
systems requires coordinated efforts to build up the corresponding 
electricity infrastructures (i.e. enforcements in the distribution grid) as well 
as electricity market structures that allow smart system integration and 
improved system flexibility. This will bring up new cross-sectoral linkages, for 
instance at grid level through vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology, with the 
potential to expand transport services to energy management services. To do 
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so, there is a need for a power market that allows the integration of storage 
systems embedded in EVs into the grid, including appropriate measures for 
vehicle owners to compensate for battery degradation due to more frequent 
charging cycles. More R&I is needed, for instance to develop bi-directional 
chargers to support the rollout of V2G solutions and to enable ultra-fast 
frequency responses. In addition, power system dynamics and appropriate 
market designs and regulation should be investigated in more detail to better 
understand network operation and business models that create long-term 
products for electricity supply and balancing services. This includes analysing 
the influence of dynamic pricing on market, as well as assessing the 
aggregation of EVs in all energy market timeframes and the empowerment of 
market players with balancing responsibilities. 
For an effective GHG emissions reduction over entire transformation 
pathways, a systemic approach is needed for electricity as well as for 
other energy carriers. From the perspective of non-private transportation, 
batteries for long-distance road freight transport and aviation may prove 
insufficient due to technical constraints (e.g. low range, autonomy, weight, 
etc.). Biofuels produced from non-food feedstocks — ‘advanced fuels’ — are 
acknowledged as major candidates for mitigating GHG emissions. The 
technological maturity of production processes and the availability of ligno-
cellulosic feedstock in sufficient quantities are currently the main barriers that 
need to be overcome in the future. Strong policy action will be necessary to 
trigger investments and decrease associated risks. R&I will hold a fundamental 
role in delivering advanced biofuel technologies. Enhancing feedstock supply, 
reducing conversion costs and improving the efficiency of the biomass system 
supply chain through R&I are expected to support the transition to a sustainable 
bioenergy system. Measures that set mandates on the production of biofuels 
from non-food based sources and caps on the maximum production from food 
crops can provide some certainty to the investors. 
3.3 New mobility patterns 
Beyond the multiple technology options for substituting fossil-fuel 
based mobility services with clean transport, a change in demand 
patterns for mobility services is needed to attain deep emissions 
reductions in the transport sector. In this context, the European 
Commission’s concept for the development of sustainable urban mobility 
planning (SUMP) should be regarded as a model approach for comprehensive 
local or regional transport planning13. This means, on the one hand, reducing 
demand for transport of passengers and goods, and on the other hand, shifting 
the choice of transport modes towards systems with lower climate impacts. 
Demand for mobility is influenced by lifestyle and the values consumers attach 
to transport services as well as the trade-offs with other values. Developments 
over the recent past indicate several trends, including growing urbanisation, 
accelerated globalisation, and an increasing role of digitalisation in daily life 
activities with implications for the transport sector. 
                                               
13  The SUMP concept is complemented by Commission guidelines and comprehensive 
information on SUMPs in the 'Mobility Plans' section of the Eltis urban mobility observatory: 
http://www.eltis.org. It includes, inter alia, a self-assessment tool for cities, information on 
national frameworks, a SUMP city database and best practice examples. 
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Digitalisation can enable smart transport systems, with opportunities 
to reduce emissions but also with the risk of re-bound effects. For 
individual mobility with cars, there are several possibilities to operate the traffic 
system in a smarter way. Through intelligent transport system solutions, where 
cars communicate with each other and with a central traffic coordination 
system, travelling routes and car parking can be optimised. Increasing attention 
is currently given to the development of autonomous driving systems, be it with 
partial, conditional or even full automation. Even though such intelligent 
transport systems with optimised traffic control could reduce congestion and 
environmental impacts, there is a potential risk of re-bound effects creating 
additional traffic in urban areas and leading to a similar level of congestion as 
without smart traffic control. Nevertheless, intelligent transport systems offer 
the possibility to facilitate the operation of surface-bound public transport 
(trams and buses) by prioritising public services over passenger car transport. 
This would slow down the average car speed in cities and could even double the 
average effective travelling speed of buses, which is about 15 km/h today in 
urban areas, which then translates into increased passenger transport 
capacities for public transport (Kurrer and Tarlton, 2017). 
An emerging mobility option, particularly in urban areas, is the concept 
of MaaS, which allows bundling of different transport means, public and 
private, into one easy-to-use package for the customer. This service addresses 
the demand for intermodal mobility, where consumers can book services 
involving multiple transport modes. The service is provided to the customer via 
mobile applications and payment is handled via a digital wallet. In railways, 
several of these options are already available but can still be integrated in a 
smarter manner, for example using train traffic control, ticketing, security and 
passenger counting. The transition within the European economy from goods-
producing industries towards service-oriented businesses also increasingly 
affects car manufacturers, which are becoming providers of mobility services 
where customisation is key to success. Car manufacturers have identified MaaS 
as an upcoming business opportunity to retain share in a changing mobility 
market. Since MaaS is only possible with user-friendly digitalised applications, 
car manufacturers are partnering with ICT and telecommunication providers to 
tailor their MaaS products. According to Accenture, the German MaaS market 
could reach 20 % of total individual car transport by 2027 (Accenture, 2017). 
The large-scale deployment of MaaS would result in reduced private car 
ownership. However, overall transport system and market implications, as well 
as related emission reduction potentials need to be researched more 
extensively. In principle, shared mobility offers the advantage of higher 
occupancy rates and intensified usage of transport technologies, which allows 
quicker stock turnover and positive implications for the deployment of 
innovative low-carbon technologies. 
Beyond novel motorised transport systems in cities, urban planning 
allows urban mobility infrastructures to be rethought and space needed 
for transport (roads, parking space, etc.) to be freed up for other 
services and activities (e.g. businesses and leisure) to make cities 
better places to live. There is an opportunity to design cities with a focus on 
the quality of transport, potentially with more space for walking and cycling 
complemented by a well-functioning public transport infrastructure. Co-benefits 
of more physical mobility activities are related to increasing public health and 
well-being. With increasing urbanisation, where congestion of roads in cities is 
becoming (or is already) a serious limitation in the quality of life, reinvigoration 
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of public transport is a must, complemented by other shared mobility. To 
increase the convenience of non-motorised light traffic, the digitalised 
availability of information on different transportation connectivity options is 
important. For instance, current apps allow people to find places of interest in 
city centres, using digital map information in most advanced cities. Information 
on which local train to catch and in which trains bicycles are allowed is a service 
offered in many towns and by many local train operators through personal 
smartphones. 
With a growing population in cities, R&I on urban spatial planning can 
facilitate the indentification of urban structures that allow a reduction 
in mid-distance commuting, which represents a significant amount of 
passenger transport and, hence, source of GHG emissions today. In order to 
assess different city approaches, multiple criteria have to be considered such as 
business location and employment, housing demand, travel speed, 
transportation network structure and urban emissions stemming from 
commuting. Some of the criteria may have opposing effects. Denant-Boemont 
et al., 2016, observe direct benefits for big cities of the value of induced travel 
savings for an unchanged residential location, while job decentralisation 
modifies residential choice due to deceases in average land rents, which 
reinforces urban sprawl. They state that ‘a polycentric city is not necessarily the 
most desirable urban topology to promote’ because the spatial extension of the 
city has a significant impact on commuting flows and transport-related 
emissions. Since cities have different characteristics, there is a need for careful 
policy implementation to ensure a city’s sustainable development. In a case 
study on an urban area in Germany, Schwarze et al., 2015, arrive at the 
conclusion that centralisation (densification) has positive effects on the energy-
efficiency of the transport system. Comparing the impacts of different urban 
city layouts, they identified a higher relevance of policies making car driving 
more expensive or slower and policies making public transport, cycling and 
walking more attractive in improving the mobility system’s sustainability. 
Related to (urban) freight transport, innovative ideas and solutions 
need to be further developed to identify collaborative and integrated 
business models that increase loading factors in logistics and reduce 
transport-related emissions without sacrificing the quality of their 
services. Examples of emerging concepts are as follows: 
 platforms that allow pooling of vehicles (e.g. trucks) used for freight, such as 
Pamyra (Pamyra, 2018); 
 enabling urban rail-based freight transport using a combination of trains and 
cargo trams with the existing infrastructure, as demonstrated for the VW 
production site in Dresden; 
 underground automated freight transport systems for delivery between 
urban freight hubs, as well as including intermediate storage of goods (Cargo 
Sous Terrain); 
 zero-emission last-mile deliveries by utilising zero-emission vehicles for local 
logistics, such as cargo bikes and potentially also autonomous cargo delivery 
robots and drones; 
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 for long-distance freight transport between Asia and Europe, a shift from 
shipping to railway transport could be one future option, supported by the 
joint development of a trans-Eurasian railway system (International 
Transport Forum, 2018). 
Apart from the ambition to improve the environmental footprint of 
transport services, a critical question relates to the possibilities to 
avoid further increases in transport demand or even to reduce 
transport demand in future to limit climate change impacts. This is of 
particular importance for transport services with substantial expected growth 
rates in the future and long technology development lead times, as is the case 
with aviation and shipping. If GHG emissions reductions in other sectors of the 
European economy are not to be equalised by emissions increases related to 
aviation and shipping, measures to reduce the amount of transport services for 
these modes need to be deployed. This requires exploring alternatives to these 
transport services, as well as corresponding market interventions that promote 
a shift towards the alternatives. In general, aviation demand is subject to high 
price elasticity. That not only means that higher prices will significantly reduce 
aviation demand, it also shows that many flights taken have low economic 
value. This implies that at least price equality of aviation fuels with other fuels 
should be pursued, but also tackling aviation with carbon pricing. Such policy 
measures are lacking at the moment, and other demand developments can be 
observed. Looking at current trends and future prospects for airborne transport, 
an increasing emergence of new business models with improved convenience 
for travellers can be observed. Examples are subscription-based aviation, 
frictionless travel experiences, air taxi services and flight-sharing (Duncan and 
Bragadish, 2017). Complementary to pricing and taxation mechanisms for air 
traffic, R&I would be needed to identify and design real alternatives to aviation 
in Europe which offer the same or even better service and travel experience. 
One systemic alternative is a pan-European high-speed rail network, which 
might turn into the most powerful integrating factor for our continent in the 
decades ahead. Related to the avoidance of transport demand, digitalisation will 
play a key role offered by new businesses capturing immersive 
telecommunication and additive manufacturing, for example. Concerning 
passenger transport, one has to acknowledge that mobility has considerable 
personal and social benefits which need to be addressed when developing 
digitalised alternatives, in particular based on telecommunication (Mokhtarian, 
2009). Having adequate alternatives in place which increase people’s freedom 
to choose non-travel alternatives would be essential in addition to a change in 
attitude towards air travel and long-distance goods transport. Behavioural 
aspects of consumer choices need to be understood much better to establish 
schemes that raise awareness of the externalities of aviation and shipping, as 
well as to implement effective regulatory measures. Such schemes could refer 
to a minimum-distance rule for aviation or a personal air-travel budget, for 
instance. 
Dedicated policies would be needed to facilitate a shift in transport 
patterns and to promote the uptake of lower-carbon automotive 
technologies for freight transport, including mandatory targets for synthetic 
fuels and hydrogen within the EU Renewable Energy Directive and national fuel 
obligations, compulsory targets for alternative fuel and recharging 
infrastructure in the Directive 2014/94/EU on the deployment of alternative 
fuels infrastructure more stringent targets for GHG emissions and air quality 
emissions standards for heavy good road vehicles. Similar approaches could be 
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applied to the maritime sector and aviation to steer technology innovation. 
While the EU ETS applies to intra-EU aviation, shipping is currently excluded 
(Carbon-Pulse, 2017). The enlargement of cap-and-trade schemes to capture 
further transport modes could steer innovation if a sufficiently high certificate 
price level exists. Also, adjustments in, fiscal policies can have a strong impact 
on shifting demand from fossil fuels to low-carbon fuels. Compared to fuels for 
road transport, the ‘red diesel’ used by non-road mobile machinery (e.g. port, 
airport, farming and railway vehicles) is less taxed. Increasing taxation from 
these freight modes improves the business cases for implementing lower carbon 
solutions. 
Given the international dimension of the aviation and shipping sectors, 
strong coherent international policies are needed to decarbonise these 
sectors. International commitments capturing the main regions involved in 
providing or demanding sea and air transport services are required. For EU 
policymaking, addressing emissions from international aviation and shipping 
requires coordination with other large emitters outside Europe, as well as 
engaging with corresponding international umbrella organisations. For aviation, 
new efforts should complement existing measures such as the International 
Civil Agency Organization’s Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA), which encourages aircraft operators to offset 
emissions over and above their average emissions from 2019-2020. Related to 
the emissions from international shipping, IMO has arrived at a major 
achievement with the agreement to cut emissions by half by 2050 compared to 
2008 levels. The current medium-term emissions intensity goal (-40 % carbon 
intensity improvement in 2030 compared to 2008) appears to be rather modest 
given that in 2015 the carbon intensity of international shipping already 
dropped by more than 30 % from 2008 levels, due to the global economic 
downturn. Going beyond the individual sectoral approaches for aviation and 
shipping, policies on GHG emissions from aviation and shipping could be 
enforced and aligned under international climate policy agenda. For instance, 
emissions from international aviation and shipping could be directly captured by 
the countries’ nationally determined contributions as stipulated in the UNFCCC’s 
Paris Agreement, and be subject to the national mitigation measures and 
countries’ long-term global climate change mitigation strategies. 
4 Recommendations for R&I 
Clustered into four main domains (society/consumers, technology, 
systems/sector integration, and policies) are R&I recommendations addressing 
future transport sector decarbonisation options that need further investigation. 
For R&I on technology, EU funding instruments such as the Future and 
Emerging Technology (FET) Flagships could be of particular potential relevance. 
R&I on society and consumers should address the linkage of mobility and 
lifestyle/business models as well as individual and societal impacts in decision 
making. How does consumer behaviour and the way businesses are run impact 
future demand for transport services and how is the choice of transport 
technologies influenced by social norms and individual behaviour? Possible 
topics are as follows: 
 Analysis of future mobility demand patterns and understanding of 
lifestyle impacts on individual choice of transport services, modes and 
technologies: This includes, for instance, the development of high-
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resolution urban spatial planning techniques for modern low-
carbon/low-traffic city layouts, the analysis of drivers of different 
transport demand patterns and potential rebound effects of clean 
transport), as well as R&I on behaviour/behavioural change on the 
basis of consumer-centred policy pilot projects. 
 Advanced methods for integration of consumer behaviour in techno-
economic assessments: These would allow an integrated assessment 
of the interplay between consumers, their needs and technology 
requirements from a systems perspective. 
 Investigation on how digitalisation can change transport demand 
patterns and energy consumption: These could include telework, 3D-
printing, increased online shopping, ICT-enabled smart traffic control 
and usage of truck transport capacities (5G), (semi)autonomous 
driving and car-sharing. 
 Development of consumer-dedicated information measures and tools: 
These would increase consumers’ awareness of the availability of low-
carbon mobility options and alternatives to transport services in 
general. 
R&I on transport technology is required to improve the competitiveness of 
low-carbon transport technologies and to design technologies to allow for their 
proper system integration and to comply with consumers’ requirements. 
Specific R&I topics concern the following areas: 
 R&I is needed not only related to the electrification of common 
land-based transportation systems (e.g. passenger cars) but also 
for the segments that receive less attention, for example the 
decarbonisation of industrial vehicles (yellow machines), trucks (e.g. 
overhead lines) and the electrification of ports & short distance 
water-based transport (e.g. ferries). For electric vehicles, R&I 
should also address the standardisation of charging systems to 
overcome adaptation barriers on the consumer side. 
 New battery chemistries as well as the re-use and recycling of 
batteries should be explored to improve their life cycle sustainability, 
reliability, safety and cost performance. An aim could be to lift 
batteries from TRL 4 (all-solid-state lithium technologies) to TRL 7 
within the next decade. 
 Assuming battery electric vehicles will be largely rolled out for 
individual passenger road transport, R&I is needed to identify efficient 
hydrogen carriers (e.g. liquid hydrogen organic compounds) to enable 
hydrogen in other mobility market segments that are difficult to 
electrify such as rail, road freight, emergency vehicles and shipping. 
What would the corresponding business cases look like, and what is 
the trade-off of in using hydrogen in vehicles directly versus producing 
synthetic fuels based on hydrogen? 
 R&I on new ships and airplanes is needed to further reduce the specific 
fuel consumption per transport unit. This comprises development of 
new airplane and ship designs to increase transport capacities 
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as well as new materials (e.g. composite materials) and improved 
aerodynamic designs. Furthermore, R&I should focus on the 
sustainable production of biofuels and synthetic fuels as 
equivalent substitutes for fuel oil and jet fuel. In particular, R&I is 
needed to ensure and enhance the EU production of lignocellulosic 
feedstock through investment in new crops, the identification of 
efficient agriculture, waste and forestry management techniques, 
optimised harvesting and supply chain logistics; 
 Analysis is needed of international and transcontinental transport 
infrastructure requirements and new technologies to substitute 
short-distance EU air traffic with high-speed rail as well as to shift 
long-distance freight transport based on road or ship to rail freight 
transport. 
R&I on systems/sector integration needs to be strengthened, given the 
interdependencies of the transport sector with other sectors of the energy 
system as well as with the wider economy and its importance for the future of 
industrial development in Europe: 
 Investigation should be carried out on what is needed to make an 
energy system with very high shares of renewable energy and high 
shares of e-mobility work, including research on electricity grid 
enforcements on a spatially detailed level (i.e. distribution 
network) and digitally supported smart integration of EVs in the 
power grid to unlock the potential of e-mobility to provide flexibility 
to the electricity system, e.g. through vehicle-to-grid options. 
 Research is needed on the design of electricity retail markets with 
large shares of embedded e-mobility and novel markets for shared 
mobility, including innovative tariff models for EVs. 
 R&I should be developed on sustainable hydrogen supply, 
comprising production, storage and transport to address the 
specific question on how the conversion efficiency (over the entire 
conversion pathway) can be improved to use as little energy as 
possible to produce H2/synthetic fuels, including new materials such as 
MOFs as catalysts, for instance. It is relevant in this R&I field to gain 
knowledge and experience on the realisation of sector coupling 
projects along with H2 and CH4 network design and operation, 
i.e. to build new hydrogen networks versus using the existing gas 
network versus decentralised production. A spatially detailed analysis 
would allow consideration of different consumer groups (e.g. 
industries) and their requirements in terms of gas supply and gas 
quality. 
 Under the question ‘What would be needed so that EU industries 
benefit from the decarbonisation of transport?’, R&I related to the 
implications of new mobility structures in a macro-economic context is 
recommended, taking into consideration new transport service 
business models as well as new production chains for transport 
equipment production. The latter could be facilitated by a value chain 
mapping of automotive supply chains and the EU vehicle 
manufacturing industry, including hydrogen supply chains and 
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battery R&D. This could ultimately serve to develop an advanced 
production line for battery and car manufacturing. R&I could be 
dedicated, for instance, to the development of modular battery storage 
packages, suitable both for EV and for stationary storage. Given the 
deployment of new transport technologies and equipment 
manufacturing in Europe an assessment of the international raw 
material availability would be needed, including the investigation of 
material streams under global climate change mitigation efforts in 
order to ensure globally sustainable production cycles. 
 From a macro-economic perspective, research on employment 
effects associated with the transformation of the transport 
system should receive more attention and should also consider 
changes in the labour market resulting from increasing digitalisation 
and automation (e.g. autonomous vehicles) of mobility. 
R&I on policy measures should complement the other three R&I areas to 
develop effective mechanisms and instruments to enable development of 
intellectual property, commercialisation and thus realisation of low-carbon 
transport structures. Possible specific topics and criteria for policy-related 
research comprise the following: 
 How to improve and implement comprehensive urban policy 
packages (including urban planning, congestion taxing, public 
transport provision and many more) that transform urban spaces and 
urban transport, with a focus on increasing public health and well-
being while reducing CO2 emissions. 
 Research on full internalisation of all transport-related externalities as 
well as synergies and conflicts in air pollution policies and CO2 
mitigation. 
 Analysis of effective measures to reduce air travel and shipping 
demand (carbon accounting policies, carbon emission quotas for 
airlines, campaigns to promote alternative transport modes): This 
closely links to the questions of consumer behaviour and new business 
models for air-transport and shipping companies to enable a shift from 
aviation and sea-born transport to (high-speed) rail where feasible. In 
addition, research and innovative regulatory measures should be 
investigated to promote a modal shift of freight transport from road to 
waterways within and across the European countries. 
 Assessing and designing the policy landscape with a technology neutral 
approach, correcting counterproductive existing policies (e.g. fuel 
subsidies, incentives for commuting; ‘flat tax’ for highway use instead 
of ‘pay per demand’) and avoiding discrimination between particular 
powertrains and energy carriers. 
 Research on the re-configuration of the taxation scheme and fiscal and 
capital market implications as the transport sector shifts from an 
energy-intensive towards a capital-intensive market when deep 
decarbonisation is pursued. 
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Figure 9: Possible R&I roadmap towards a decarbonised transport sector. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INDUSTRIES: TACKLING PROCESS EMISSIONS, INCREASING 
ENERGY AND MATERIALS EFFICIENCY AND HARVESTING 
DIGITALISATION FOR DECARBONISATION 
1 Introduction and context 
According to the UNFCCC inventory, in 2016, industry represented 
21 % of the EU’s total GHG emissions, of which slightly more than half 
came from direct fuel combustion and the rest from industrial 
processes and product use. In addition, electricity consumption in 
European industries accounts for 36 % of total consumption, indicating 
the sector’s high indirect emissions. European business and industry are 
making steady progress towards decarbonisation, with direct GHG emissions in 
2016 falling by 38 % from 1990 levels, due in particular to reductions in fossil 
fuel consumption in energy-intensive industries. Industrial energy management 
systems, participation in the EU ETS framework and the adoption of new, 
advanced technologies have all contributed to the sector’s emission reductions. 
Furthermore, decarbonisation of the energy sector is contributing to lowering 
the indirect emissions of the European industrial sector. Overall, such 
improvements cannot be attributed simply to the delocalisation of production to 
non-European countries. 
Novel lower-carbon production technologies, fuel switching, and 
material and energy efficiency improvements are contributing 
significantly to the downward trend in emissions. Indeed, European 
companies are exploring business opportunities for low-carbon investments, 
while capitalising on the technological trends shaping their industries, such as 
digitalisation (e.g. Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing), energy storage, 
automation (e.g. robotics and artificial intelligence), advanced materials, and 
more. Among these firms are several prominent European companies across a 
range of diverse sectors. For instance14, car manufacturers such as BMW are 
leveraging new technologies, including vehicle electrification, new lightweight 
materials, renewable energy, material reuse and mobility-as-a-service. Logistics 
companies such as Deutsche Post DHL Group are deploying cleaner vehicles 
across their fleet and embracing digitalisation to better plan and improve 
process efficiency. Energy companies like Engie are seeing digitalisation (e.g. 
smart grids) across hardware, software and infrastructure across Europe as the 
driver for change in their sector. Private investment firms such as SUSI 
Partners or the Green Investment Bank are providing green financing for 
renewable energy, energy efficiency and energy storage projects. 
However, current mitigation efforts in the industrial sector need to be 
accelerated to first achieve compliance with the Paris Agreement and 
then to bring European industries to carbon neutrality. As indicated in the 
Roadmap to 2050 (European Commission, 2011), almost 25 % of the remaining 
emissions of the decarbonisation scenario in 2050 come from the industry 
sector. Obviously, this poses important challenges for industrial sectors in 
                                               
14  For the four examples mentioned in the text we acknowledge and are grateful for the 
participation of top officials from these companies in the HLP discussion session dedicated 
to industry. 
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to industry. 
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general, and for energy-intensive industries in particular. While the trend in the 
reduction of industrial emissions is moving in the right direction, it is falling 
much shorter than it should if it is to be in line with the Paris Agreement. 
Furthermore, decarbonisation challenges need to be pursued not in a vacuum, 
but rather together with other SDGs. The issue of industry decarbonisation is 
complicated by the fact that companies operate in an environment that is 
characterised by disruptions and pervasive uncertainty, as well as by the need 
to enhance European competitiveness, employment and economic growth. 
Furthermore, businesses currently face the challenge of operating in a post-
crisis environment, in which investors are becoming more risk-averse. In this 
context, the business cases for investment in energy efficiency have limited 
attractiveness. Notwithstanding the significant differences among the many 
industrial sectors, investments in energy efficiency tend to be less appealing 
than core process investments for European companies since they are 
characterised by longer payback periods. 
Yet, the deep decarbonisation challenge for European industrial sectors 
can be turned into an unprecedented opportunity if existing green 
technologies are more consistently deployed and R&I investments are 
strategically targeted towards the development of breakthrough, zero-
carbon industrial technologies and business models. The development of 
a circular economy can be harnessed to transform the way in which we make, 
source and consume products and services. Examples of circular design, use 
and recovery include businesses such as product and process design, tracking 
facilities, support for life cycle, sell and buy-back, lifetime extension, product as 
a service (based on delivering performance rather than selling products) and 
sharing platforms (Carra and Magdani, 2016). In this respect, both public R&I 
programmes and policy play a key role as they cannot only focus business and 
industry on decarbonisation but must also consider solutions that allow for deep 
decarbonisation while enabling employment, prosperity and stability through 
growth. To this end, even European energy-intensive industries can benefit 
from the market expansion of products that enable emission reductions, such as 
insulation materials, efficient lighting and lightweight materials. This is a prize 
many businesses are positioning themselves for, with the aim of promoting 
export from and growth in Europe. 
Employment in eco-industries has increased by 20 % in Europe since 
2000 and now provides 4.2 million jobs (European Commission, 2017a). 
The link between green growth and business opportunities or job creation can 
be illustrated by the case of the Netherlands. Using expert judgement on future 
trends in resource prices, and an increase in reuse, collection, and recycling of 
products and waste, it has been estimated that the circular economy can create 
an additional value of 1.4 % of GDP a year corresponding to 54 000 new jobs – 
or 0.6 % of overall employment (TNO, 2013). Similarly, the EU bioeconomy has 
great potential: in 2010, it had a turnover of nearly EUR 2 trillion and employed 
more than 22 million people, corresponding to 9 % of total EU employment 
(European Commission, 2012). Green production/products can also be a 
springboard for EU economic competitiveness. Despite the overall trend of the 
growing presence of emerging economies, most notably in China, in the global 
market of clean energy technologies, Europe has maintained large shares in 
specific technologies, such as wind turbines, and has the potential to dominate 
in others. Nevertheless, European R&I initiatives must accelerate urgently in 
order to enable gains from first-mover advantages as EU competitors are 
already increasing their R&I expenditure significantly (Paroussos et al., 2017). 
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For example, while battery packs for electric cars are largely imported from 
Asia, thereby limiting the value-added Europe can get from the deployment of 
electric cars and electricity storage, a positive prospective can be developed as 
new battery and component plants are announced in Europe. 
A noteworthy aspect of the decarbonisation of European industrial 
sectors is gaining the support of both employers and workers through 
the development of educational formats as well as best practices. The 
Paris Agreement includes a commitment to the ‘imperative of just transition’, 
because governments acknowledge that the transition to a low-carbon economy 
will only go fast enough when the world of work – employers and workers – is 
behind it. Similarly, unless the actions to deliver the Paris Agreement also 
deliver social benefits that leave no one behind, it is unlikely to gain the public 
support necessary to urgently mobilise. High on the European business agenda 
is the concept of the ‘future of work’. In this respect, it is crucial to highlight 
that future profitability and employment will be impacted not only by structural 
changes from climate action in Europe, but also from other technology and 
disrupting societal developments, which include automation, digitalisation and 
artificial intelligence. All of these aspects should be appropriately accounted for 
in future decarbonisation strategies. 
Business-enhancing decarbonisation should be promoted through a 
well-rounded, fact-based and effective strategy addressing the short-, 
medium- and long-term challenges faced by the European industrial 
sectors. Decarbonisation objectives should be drafted, including considerations 
on future global markets, and should be deeply embedded in European 
industrial policy. Another very relevant issue for European businesses is to 
assess the economic opportunities emerging from tackling the dual challenges 
of Paris and the SDGs. A 2014 McKinsey study (McKinsey, 2014) found that 44 
% of business leaders of organisations with a strong sustainability focus on 
their corporate social responsibility strategy cite growth and new business 
opportunities as reasons for tackling sustainability challenges. In addition, the 
adoption of advanced processes and technologies enables long-term cost-
savings by industries and improvements in energy security and trade balances 
through reduced imports of fossil fuels at the EU level. Innovation is a key 
enabler. 
The EU should structure R&I actions for the decarbonisation of 
industrial sectors around four key pillars: energy efficiency and 
material savings, deep electrification, embedding industrial processes 
in the circular economy, and innovation in zero-carbon breakthroughs 
for process-based emissions industries. These priorities, which are 
discussed in detail below, represent a more ambitious plan than that described 
in the recently released report highlighting the joint contribution from 11 
European Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) to the European Commission’s 
strategy for long-term EU greenhouse gas emissions reductions (Institute of 
European Studies, 2018). Indeed, we believe that it is necessary to raise the 
bar in terms of innovation efforts to sustain the energy transition in the 
industrial sector. We believe that industrial sectors need to be deeply engaged 
in all phases of the innovation process, promoting the deployment and diffusion 
of new technologies leading to carbon neutrality. Only in this way can we 
ensure that European industry can reap all the co-benefits associated with such 
a deep structural transition and avoid being locked into technologies which, in 
the long term, may not be fully aligned with the deep decarbonisation target. 
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For example, while battery packs for electric cars are largely imported from 
Asia, thereby limiting the value-added Europe can get from the deployment of 
electric cars and electricity storage, a positive prospective can be developed as 
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through reduced imports of fossil fuels at the EU level. Innovation is a key 
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The EU should structure R&I actions for the decarbonisation of 
industrial sectors around four key pillars: energy efficiency and 
material savings, deep electrification, embedding industrial processes 
in the circular economy, and innovation in zero-carbon breakthroughs 
for process-based emissions industries. These priorities, which are 
discussed in detail below, represent a more ambitious plan than that described 
in the recently released report highlighting the joint contribution from 11 
European Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs) to the European Commission’s 
strategy for long-term EU greenhouse gas emissions reductions (Institute of 
European Studies, 2018). Indeed, we believe that it is necessary to raise the 
bar in terms of innovation efforts to sustain the energy transition in the 
industrial sector. We believe that industrial sectors need to be deeply engaged 
in all phases of the innovation process, promoting the deployment and diffusion 
of new technologies leading to carbon neutrality. Only in this way can we 
ensure that European industry can reap all the co-benefits associated with such 
a deep structural transition and avoid being locked into technologies which, in 
the long term, may not be fully aligned with the deep decarbonisation target. 
 80 
Specifically, in the short term, two objectives should be pursued: 
increased energy efficiency through the deployment of already 
available low-carbon technologies, and the deep electrification of 
industrial processes. Electrification will contribute to lowering emissions 
insofar as the electricity is produced using a zero-carbon energy source. 
Important energy savings can result from the deployment of a wide range of 
existing technologies, while continuous R&I can further improve energy and 
carbon efficiency and reduce capital costs and the respective payback period. 
Examples of such commercially available technologies and processes include 
waste-heat recovery, coke-dry quenching, combustion system improvements 
and more. Such short-term strategies should target not only major industrial 
firms, but also the many and diverse SMEs in Europe that carry out 20 % of 
total R&I (IEA, 2015). SMEs typically have larger reduction potential than the 
large energy-intensive companies (Saygin et al., 2010). This potential can be 
approximated with generic efficiency improvements, such as efficiency and 
decarbonising power and heat. 
In the medium term, industrial processes must be deeply embedded in 
the circular economy, namely in the slowing, closing and narrowing of 
material and energy loops. This will have to be achieved through, for 
instance, long-lasting design, maintenance, repair, reuse, remanufacturing, 
refurbishing, recycling and upcycling. Putting emphasis not only on the supply 
side (e.g. efficient processes) but also on the demand side (e.g. for raw 
materials), by extending product lifetime can actually reduce industrial 
emissions by almost 56 % by 2050 (Material Economics, 2018). Supply-chain 
redesign, waste-to-energy, circular business models, reduction of waste and 
recirculation of materials are all essential parts of the roadmap towards carbon 
neutrality in the difficult-to-decarbonise sector of heavy industries. Innovation 
is a key enabler of moving towards a cost-efficient circular economy, making IT, 
microsensors, automation, robotics and chemical catalysts components of 
everyday production processes. Circular economy R&I priorities should be firmly 
incorporated in the low-carbon agenda. 
In the longer term, breakthrough zero-carbon industrial technologies 
need to enter the market. These should be promoted and fostered through 
concerted, long-term R&I public and private investments as well as higher CO2 
prices. This is particularly relevant for process-based industries, such as 
chemistry, steel and cement, which face particularly hard challenges with 
respect to decarbonisation, as cost-efficient, near-zero-carbon technological 
options and processes are currently not available on the market. A promising 
development in this respect is the use of green hydrogen in steelmaking, 
ammonia production and refining. Specific R&I programmes need to be 
designed to target the development of disruptive technologies which can 
decouple production from process emissions in energy-intensive sectors. 
2 Priority 1: Energy efficiency and material savings 
Although a wide range of low- and zero-carbon technology options are 
currently available for industry, many have yet to be sufficiently 
deployed. This is clearly demonstrated by the McKinsey abatement cost curve 
analysis (McKinsey, 2009; Figure 10) which shows a range of technologies with 
negative abatement costs that can simultaneously bring both emission and cost 
savings. Examples include efficient lighting, motor systems efficiency and 
clinker substitution by fly ash. To better understand the priorities, the 
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abatement curve should be updated and elaborated on specifically for Europe. 
As an example, the IEA (2013) finds that in the short to medium term (to 
2025), steady progress in implementing incremental improvements (e.g. best 
available technology, BAT) and deploying best practice techniques (BPT) could 
provide substantial energy savings and emissions reductions in the chemical 
industry compared to business as usual practice (IEA, 2013). Improvements in 
efficiency across several types of industries can be achieved by greater 
electrical equipment and the implementation of captive cogeneration units. 
Certain commercially available technologies, like advanced-process control in 
the petrochemical industries and immersion cooling, also present a quick 
payback period. Low-carbon technologies — including the deployment of bio-
based chemical facilities and improved performance of catalysts and related 
process technologies — can also reduce emissions. To summarise, although the 
potential to reduce energy, cost and emissions is vast, the available 
technologies have yet to be fully employed. 
Many of these technologies have not yet reached significant levels of 
market penetration due to a large number of market and non-market 
barriers. These include access to finance, awareness of benefits, long-term 
policy frameworks, and volatile energy prices. For instance, in many cases, the 
initial investment can be a barrier even if the life-cycle costs are reduced, as 
requested payback periods can range between one to three years. This is 
particularly the case for SMEs which face difficulties in accessing financial 
resources and have limited in-house skills and expertise to identify 
opportunities and available techniques. 
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Figure 10: McKinsey abatement cost curve. Source: McKinsey, 2009. 
R&I programmes need to identify such barriers for the industrial 
sectors and devise effective ways to overcome them. Properly designed 
R&I can help overcome barriers linked with, among others, misleading 
perceptions (including costs and benefits, but also safety), the development of 
proper skills, the design of new business models, and cost reductions in existing 
technologies that will enable lower payback periods. Technology maturity is 
another barrier which can be overcome by providing funding for demonstration 
projects and reducing risk aversion from management. Finally, R&I programmes 
will help to shrink the knowledge gap, which is linked to assessing the extent to 
which commercial claims regarding efficiency improvements are true. Here, it is 
important that the EU provides unbiased assessments of the performance of 
certain low-carbon and energy-efficient technologies. 
R&I programmes can also help address issues linked to strategic and 
financing constraints. Policies which increase the predictability of long-term 
cash flows (e.g. delinking low-carbon energy prices from volatile fossil-fuel 
markets) will spur more rapid deployment and reduce prices for energy 
consumers. However, additional efforts will be required on de-risking, e.g. to 
make up for the incompatibility of the venture capital (VC) mode of operation 
with innovation in deep tech which requires patient capital. Corporate tax 
structures that affect the depreciation period of investments may be a 
disincentive to replace existing equipment and are an additional area for 
research. Furthermore, innovative financing mechanisms, including green bonds 
and energy-performance contracting schemes, can address existing market 
failures. The effectiveness of other types of incentives, such as accelerated 
depreciation on R&D assets, R&D tax relief, and patent-related incentives, 
should also be explored. 
 
83 
SMEs, which account for the majority of the European economy’s 
productive activity, also face significant barriers to the development 
and deployment of low- and zero-carbon solutions15. For SMEs, equally 
important to VC funds are traditional R&D investments, such as the H2020 
programme, and supporting the establishment of centres of expertise (eco-
systems) for taking these innovations to the market. As shown in its interim 
evaluation (European Commission, 2017b), the H2020 programme has already 
gone a long way in improving access to finance for innovative SMEs. 
Simplification has also progressed, but efforts need to be continued. 
R&I is also needed for continuously improving the energy efficiency of 
existing production processes as well as exploring lower carbon energy 
pathways. This is not limited to energy intensive sectors. Many technologies 
are available today, but the potential for cost reduction remains, enabling more 
companies to adopt them. R&I programmes should be geared towards cost 
reduction, improving performance and reliability of close-to-market 
decarbonisation technologies in order to scale up their deployment. Advanced 
analytics and other energy management enabling technologies should also be a 
key priority. High-efficiency motors reducing energy demand, as well as 
dependence on rare-earth metals, innovative pumps and compressors, pre-
heating and drying processes are also constantly developing and can reap cost 
benefits from dedicated R&I. Other priorities for short-term cost reductions 
include condensing heat exchangers, electric arc furnaces, and more. This 
requires an update of the abatement curve to inform policymakers as to which 
are the most promising technologies. 
In this context, there is large scope for supporting public policies, including but 
not limited to R&I investments. In this respect, resources should be devoted to 
the study and design of policy measures, such as, for instance, a framework 
ensuring a long-term high CO2 price that will support decarbonisation in 
industry. Research into the potential, efficiency, costs and impacts of industry 
decarbonisation policies should be continued. Particular attention should be paid 
to issues such as strengthening the ETS and complementary policies to make 
the CO2 price more stable and higher, but also to financial instruments 
facilitating industry to move capital at scale. Other market-based mechanisms, 
such as white certificates, can also be assessed as they can target energy 
savings directly. Accounting/fiscal rules to support investments in energy 
efficiency (off-balance sheet vehicles) should be implemented, and support 
provided for basic research and capital-intensive developments in sectors of 
strategic importance for Europe (e.g. artificial intelligence). The comparative 
effectiveness of incentives such as cash grants, low interest loans, tax 
allowances and tax exemptions could be further investigated. 
Support is needed for public-private partnerships in innovation hubs for 
testing, prototyping and demonstrating these high TRL (4-7) 
decarbonisation technologies. As described by the IEA (2018), there are 
many examples of innovative technologies at the pre-launch stage for all 
energy-intensive industries. To name but a few, top gas recovery blast furnace 
                                               
15  All but 0.2 % of enterprises which operated in the EU-28 non-financial business sector in 
2016 were SMEs. They employed 93 million people, accounting for 67 % of total 
employment in the EU-28 non-financial business sector, and generating 57 % of value 
added in the EU-28 non-financial business sector. Almost all (93 %) of the SMEs were 
micro SMEs employing less than 10 people (European Commission, 2017a). 
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and advanced smelting production processes are close to commercialisation in 
the steel sector, advanced grinding technologies in cement production, and 
black liquor gasification in the paper sector. 
3 Priority 2: A programme of deep electrification of industrial 
processes 
The second, short-term step towards successful decarbonisation 
requires a radical transformation of some European industrial sectors 
where it is possible to convert some of the energy input for processes 
to electricity use. Given the large decarbonisation which will characterise the 
energy sector, the electrification of industrial processes will ultimately 
substitute on-site fossil-fuel combustion with zero-carbon electricity. Advanced 
system and process innovation can deliver high levels of electrification 
substituting carbon-intensive, heat-related demand. Hence, electrification needs 
to be the focus of immediate action and should be developed in line with plans 
for a wider energy system in Europe. Large-scale opportunities can offer long-
term solutions to sectors which are difficult to abate, such as hydrogen use 
through electrolysis to replace coke in the iron and steel industry, and as 
feedstock in the chemical industry. 
Electrification would significantly reduce emission reductions in 
‘classical’ sectors like steelmaking with electric furnaces. Indeed, one of 
the key challenges for energy-intensive industries concerns heat-related 
processes such as, for instance, clinker processing of Portland cement in 
cement kilns. Power-to-heat can provide solutions for both high- and low- 
enthalpy process heat (e.g. electric arc furnaces and plasma heating, 
respectively), while existing technologies like heat pumps can be used for the 
thermal upgrade of ambient and waste heat. Compared to conventional 
heating, power-to-heat can substantially reduce final energy demand, and R&I 
efforts can further improve these efficiency rates. Beyond energy savings, these 
processes can also improve overall process efficiency (e.g. through time-
saving), production costs and working conditions (e.g. through secure, 
automated processes). A wide variety of technologies are now in early or more 
mature technological stages, and are applicable to most industrial sectors, from 
food and textiles industries to metal and equipment products. 
The fact that such a large proportion of industrial GHG emissions come from 
heat and power production where clean alternatives are currently available 
indicates the importance of R&I as well as deployment investment which would 
enable the provision of these carbon-free solutions at competitive costs. 
Indeed, the reduction in costs of solar and wind power in particular have driven 
the EU’s declining carbon footprint and can be expected to continue to be key 
drivers for industry, too. Biomass energy is another important source of process 
heat for industry. Conversely, the costs of carbon capture and storage (CCS), 
which is another technological option, remain uncertain and application/site 
specific (Global CCS Institute, 2017). A significant drawback to CCS technology 
is the reduction of the overall efficiency of the process and the associated 
increase in energy demand. While early CCS value chains are unlikely to be 
economical without public support, the prospects for more efficient CO2 capture 
and transport networks is a goal that some EU Member States are actively 
supporting (Global CCS Institute, 2017b). In contrast to many other mitigation 
technologies, CCS is completely dependent on the price of carbon. As such, 
early investments that can help bring down the cost of capture will depend on 
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CO2 use and R&I investment in applications where the CO2 is embedded over 
the long term, such as mineralisation, should be incentivised. 
R&I programmes should focus on promoting the further electrification 
of heat-related industrial processes in order to make use of low-carbon 
electricity. Power-to-heat technologies, electromagnetic radiation, electric 
boilers, mechanical vapour recompression, and clean hydrogen for metal and 
chemical production are examples of close-to-commercialisation or already 
mature but expensive technologies with large emission abatement potentials, 
while pilot options for electrification in industry, such as power for separation 
and replacement of steam drive with mechanical ones, are expanding rapidly. 
Large sectors which have started such a large-scale conversion already exist in 
countries where carbon-free electricity is available, like Norway, which is 
characterised by a significant penetration of hydropower. 
4 Priority 3: Embedding industrial processes in the circular 
economy 
In the medium-term, energy efficiency improvements, materials 
savings and electrification should be part of a broader, longer-term 
strategy of embedding industrial processes in the circular economy. The 
medium-/long-term strategy should aim at developing economies which are 
both ‘circular’ (closed-loop supply chains and resource-efficient business 
models) and based on ‘sharing’ (more efficient ownership models of assets) 
(Energy Transitions Commission, 2017). The existing stock of materials can be 
recapitalised, waste can be used as a resource, while business models can 
optimise material use and find new ways of sharing existing resources. Material 
recirculation, increasing materials efficiency and sharing business models have 
been found to have an impressive potential for emission reductions while 
related important economic co-benefits remain untapped. To this end, the 
redesign of products and processes that are in line with win/win circular 
principles can and should be applied more broadly. 
This vision implies that most material fluxes currently supporting the 
economy are converted from linear processes into closed loops. Material 
recirculation implies very high recycling rates, allowing for only a small input of 
new materials in the entire industrial metabolism to replace degraded or lost 
materials. For example, if downgrading and contaminating steel with other 
metals is avoided, almost 85 % of European steel demand could be met by 
secondary production, thereby minimising the demand for raw materials and 
emissions adjacent to the energy-intensive steelmaking process (Material 
Economics, 2018). Another example refers to construction, where adopting a 
whole life-cycle approach and working collaboratively from design along the 
entire construction value chain offers additional opportunities for carbon 
emission reductions beyond the cement manufacturing boundary. Optimising 
the use of concrete in construction by reducing waste, encouraging reuse and 
recycling, maximising design life and increasing co-working spaces and the 
overall utilisation rates of the buildings stock are key strategies in this area (IEA 
and CSI, 2018). The public sector should also lead the way through public 
procurement design that promotes circular processes. 
R&I programmes should be geared towards circular and biobased 
feedstocks in industry. R&I is a fundamental pillar of the regenerative and 
restorative production and consumption process envisaged in the circular 
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economy paradigm. Nevertheless, to date, efforts have been allocated more 
towards the decarbonisation of the supply side or energy efficiency and not to 
reducing the demand for materials. R&I will enable this systemic change by 
providing solutions for new processes, business structures, policy and financial 
schemes. For instance, this is the case for R&I efforts on biobased raw 
materials in the chemical sector, which need to be continued and increased to 
enable the transition to sustainable chemistry. Furthermore, attention should be 
devoted to reducing the production costs of low-carbon chemical building blocks 
which are high compared to those for fossil-fuel feedstocks. 
Industrial sectors should prioritise research into product design 
targeted at waste minimisation, longer lifespans and recyclable 
materials. The EU can support these efforts through investment in R&I to 
promote the harmonisation of waste management and processes and by 
framing a harmonised, ambitious and effective policy framework for waste 
management. In this context, the construction industry should make strong 
efforts to reduce consumption of resources and materials. For example, the 
construction and operation of the built environment consumes 60 % of all 
materials in the UK, and construction and demolition waste account for over a 
quarter of all waste created in the EU (Carra & Magdani, 2016). Therefore, R&I 
investments in urban design and optimisation of the built environment are 
critical to reduce GHG emissions, given that cities consume three quarters of 
global primary energy and the same percentage of the world’s production of 
natural resources. R&I programmes for advancing the circular economy should 
particularly target sectors such as buildings, plastics, electronic equipment, 
steel production, food and water management, and sharing economies. These 
efforts can benefit substantially from the further development of IT tools such 
as common platforms (aka material market places) (WBCSD, 2018). 
R&I programmes should also focus on industrial clustering and 
industrial symbiosis. Industrial waste-heat recovery is a key technology in 
clustering. Recent developments in heat networks show a shift to multiple 
source, multiple user heat networks. As numerous potential studies have been 
carried out on heat networks, R&I funding should be directed to demonstration 
pilots, demos and facilities. R&I in industrial clustering should also focus on 
renewable hydrogen production, storage and use. Another industrial cluster 
proposal put forward by the EU Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH 
JU) relates to the concept of hydrogen valleys. These are industrial clusters 
where hydrogen supply chains are developed with the aim of supporting the 
regional or local economy. This is built around sector coupling which links 
hydrogen production to the energy, heating and transport sectors and is a key 
concept in decarbonisation of the economy (EPS, 2018). 
Further R&I efforts can include the development of carbon capture and 
utilisation (CCU) technologies that may constitute an additional 
dimension to the concept of a circular economy. CCU can provide the 
chemical and plastics industry with solutions to permanently store CO2 
emissions by using captured emissions as a feedstock for polymers and other 
chemicals or by trapping carbon in cement. R&I can improve the techno-
economic performance of CCU and can also derive new ways of using carbon as 
input to several production processes outside of current practices, ensuring that 
the carbon is stored permanently and that the processes do not result in a lock-
in in fossil-fuel-based technologies. 
 87 
5 Priority 4: Targeting zero-carbon breakthroughs in process-
based emission industries 
Process-based industries such as chemistry, steel and cement face 
particularly hard challenges with respect to decarbonisation, as cost-
efficient, near-zero-carbon technological options and processes are 
currently not available on the market. In these sectors, it will not be 
possible to reach net-zero emissions without further R&I in breakthrough 
technologies and processes because the emission reductions necessary to 
achieve deep decarbonisation and zero-carbon production far exceed the 
capacity of current BAT. Achieving successful deep decarbonisation means that 
by 2050, even the energy-intensive industries of cement and steel will have to 
be carbon neutral. Similarly, all plastics should be renewable and sustainable. 
To ensure the competitiveness of European industries, the same targets should 
apply on a global scale. 
Specific R&I programmes need to be designed to target the 
development of disruptive technologies which can decouple production 
from process emissions in energy-intensive sectors. For instance, 
renewable hydrogen use, production, conversion, distribution and storage are 
likely to be game changers in many industrial heat-related processes, in 
addition to the impact they can have in the transport and power sectors. Low-
carbon and green hydrogen can be a key energy carrier which could replace the 
combustion of natural gas and use of coke in many industrial processes, with 
potentially minimal GHG emissions. R&I funds should be directed, in particular, 
at improving green hydrogen production technologies (including new materials 
and catalysts as well as new processes) and methods (e.g. plasma methods), 
finding more efficient hydrogen carriers (e.g. solid storage, liquid hydrogen 
organic compounds) and materials that will enable tanks to store hydrogen at 
higher pressures (e.g. composites). The potential of hydrogen storage to 
improve the energy security of the European energy market should be 
investigated, as should the role of batteries. Similarly, power-to-gas and gas-
to-power technologies should be built into whole energy system models to 
understand the flexibility, resilience, energy security and societal benefits that 
hydrogen, synthetic gases and renewable power can provide to different 
industries. 
R&I programmes should promote low-carbon and zero-carbon 
innovation by SMEs. The future energy and industrial systems required in 
Europe will need to draw on R&I by SMEs. SMEs should be seen as integral 
contributors to concepts such as Mazzucato’s ‘Mission-driven innovation’ or the 
approach of open innovation, open science, open to the world (European 
Commission, 2016). Many of the critical future breakthrough technologies will 
be developed and utilised by these companies. To boost innovative start-up and 
scale-up across Europe, the European Commission and the European 
Investment Fund (EIF) have launched a pan-European Venture Capital Fund-of-
Funds programme (VentureEU) with an investment of EUR 2.1 billion in 2018-
2020, expected to trigger an estimated EUR 6.5 billion of new investment 
(European Commission, 2018a). SMEs are adopters and providers of 
(innovative) decarbonisation solutions as well as creators of economic growth, 
jobs, and European industrial leadership. They hold the potential for disruptive 
innovation, both creating new solutions and even completely new markets (blue 
ocean vs. red ocean, Kim and Mauborgne, 2017). Identifying high-growth start-
ups (‘unicorns’) is a worthy challenge, although not sufficient in itself. 
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Appropriate support for scaling high-growth business and, very importantly, 
retaining the value creation in Europe requires a broad suite of tools, around 
markets (harmonised European Single Market as a means to compete with 
much larger markets, e.g. in the USA or China), finance (Capital Markets 
Union), but also skills and, of course, technology innovation. 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the early stages of R&I, and 
specifically in the development of breakthroughs in reducing process 
emissions, should be promoted. PPPs are an effective and efficient policy 
mechanism to increase the involvement of industry in R&I and address more 
effectively the complex challenge of eliminating process-based emissions, 
market failures, and accelerating the time-to-market of innovations (de Heide 
et al., 2016). Many countries in Europe have seen an increase in more 
strategic, long-term, large-scale and multi-disciplinary PPPs (OECD, 2014)16.  
PPPs are mostly relevant in the pre-competitive stage of innovation, and in 
helping industry to cross the technological and commercialisation ‘valleys of 
death’ (de Heide, 2016). PPPs trigger innovation by firms, as they address the 
willingness of a company to invest in research activities by providing access to 
expensive research infrastructure and expertise, access to know-how and 
networks, thereby increasing an innovation project’s probability of success, as 
well as further insight into the potential impact of the innovation process on a 
company’s result. PPPs require a complex financing structure, which depends on 
the stage of development and activities. The funding mix can include EU 
funding (H2020, European Regional and Development Fund, European Institute 
of Innovation and Technology), national and regional funding (e.g. innovation 
vouchers, R&D tax, subsidies, grants) as well as private funding (e.g. VC, angel 
investment, loans). While PPPs require long-term public funding, as the 
partnership develops public funding will need to be phased out, with private 
investments and contractual research taking over. Critically, PPPs use public 
funds to leverage private investment and enable scaling-up technologies to 
first-of-its-kind application and proving replicability. 
Long-term zero-carbon technology development needs to be fostered 
alongside strategies for decarbonisation through digitalisation. By 2025, 
Industry 4.0 will have become business as usual, harnessing digitalisation and 
artificial intelligence to drive efficiency and decarbonisation. European industry 
has the capability of playing a leading role at the global level in Industry 4.0. 
The potential for emission reductions through implementation of solutions such 
as mobile connectivity, IoT, cloud computing, and automation have not yet 
been fully assessed, but indications are that there is great potential depending 
on the policies in place to guide deployment. For example, the Global e-
Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) estimates that mobile communications 
technology is currently enabling a total reduction of 180 million tonnes of CO2-
eq per annum across the USA and Europe (GeSI, 2015). This amount is greater 
than the annual carbon emissions from the Netherlands and equivalent to 1.5 
% of all GHG emissions from the USA and Europe. Equally applicable to the 
industrial sectors is the use of cutting-edge sensors, additive manufacturing 
(e.g. 3D-printing, rapid prototyping), data processing and analytics to bring 
                                               
16  Examples of PPPs include the Dutch Joint Innovation Centres, Field Labs and Top Sector 
approach, the Catapult Centres in the UK, the Centres of Competence in the Czech 
Republic, etc. The Digital Innovation Hubs, which act as a one-stop shop by offering 
businesses access to knowledge, methods and software, technology platforms and testing 
facilities, are an interesting example at the EU level. 
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production into the digital age and enable further optimisation and efficiency. 
The European Commission already invests significantly in the digitalisation of 
industry through the Factories of the Future programme, which was established 
in 2008 under the European Economic Recovery Plan. Such efforts should be 
grounded in the broader deep decarbonisation strategy for Europe. The impact 
of Industry 4.0 on the labour market still needs to be fully understood to 
ascertain that all dimensions of sustainability are satisfied. Within this, the EU 
should intensify its efforts to foster the development of a European clean-tech 
ecosystem and topic-specific ‘clean-tech Silicon Valleys’ (e.g. around power 
electronics). The establishment of a leading European research cluster on 
artificial intelligence for basic research and applications should be considered. 
Such cluster should be developed in the form of a network between existing 
actors and capabilities currently working on future innovations. This should also 
serve as the basis for the fruitful exchange of lessons learned. 
In this long-term framework, supporting policies needs to be put in 
place, above and beyond R&I programmes. In this respect, policy research 
to identify the most efficient policy instruments to support the uptake of 
innovative industrial technologies is of paramount relevance. Public policy must 
ensure that businesses face effective economic mechanisms, such as robust and 
meaningful carbon pricing, removal of fossil-fuel subsidies, and provision of 
additional sources of climate solution funding. Credible and reliable regulatory 
and market signals and incentives give business the confidence to invest. 
Furthermore, the internalisation of externalities could improve the business 
case for lower carbon technologies in industry. In addition to carbon pricing, 
other crucial public policy levers include, for instance, market redesign and 
pricing mechanisms, especially in the power market performance standards and 
other regulations, within the frame allowed by state aid rules; continued 
implementation of performance standards and other regulations to drive greater 
energy efficiency; transport systems and urban planning which make it possible 
to grow GDP rapidly while limiting the growth of energy-based services; and 
integrated energy system planning to ensure adequate coordination across a 
diversity of sectors (e.g. enabling much greater use of electricity across 
multiple sectors). 
Innovative funding mechanisms can also contribute to achieving 
economies of scale which, in the long run, will make innovations cost-
competitive with incumbent alternatives. Public effort should be devoted to 
supporting the development of financial instruments to move capital at scale 
(e.g. Clean Energy Investment Trust); adapt accounting/fiscal rules to support 
investments in energy efficiency for both public and private entities (e.g. off-
balance sheet vehicles); use EU procurement guidelines to drive 
decarbonisation (e.g. minimum efficiency standards or public innovative 
procurement); closely monitor the implementation of the ETS reform and the 
resulting rise in the carbon price. Continuous de-risking of investment 
opportunities could also serve as a framing concept for public policy. In this 
respect, several methods, such as blended finance as well as portfolio 
management aspects, should be considered. Existing initiatives to build 
upon/leverage could be the InnovFin financial products provided by the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the SME instrument, or the Pilot Action on 
disruptive innovation in clean energy technologies (European Commission, 
2017c). 
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6 Recommendations for research and innovation 
Europe must speed up the deployment of existing solutions. R&I can 
pave the way to identifying and overcoming non-technological barriers 
to the large-scale deployment of market-ready low- and zero-carbon 
technologies. As the abatement curve shows (Figure 10), although many low-
carbon technologies are available even at negative costs, this potential remains 
untapped and has yet to be identified or implemented by most European 
industries. This means that more R&I funding must be directed to commercial 
pilots and demonstration plants to validate technologies at the industrial scale 
and raise the awareness of European businesses. SMEs have an important role 
to play, which will be enabled when new energy management and financing 
solutions emerge. Public-private shared R&I programmes for technologies close 
to market introduction are of vital importance. 
Deep electrification of the EU industrial sectors should be promoted in 
order to substitute on-site fossil-fuel combustion with demand for clean 
power, particularly in the difficult-to-abate energy-intensive industries. 
R&I programmes focused on promoting the further electrification of heat-
related industrial processes can increase the benefits associated with producing 
electricity from renewable sources. Advanced system and process innovation 
can deliver high levels of electrification, while large-scale solutions, such as 
‘clean hydrogen’, deliver more options for increased electrification. 
In the longer-term, energy efficiency and electrification processes 
should be aligned with the development of a circular economy. Circular 
and shared production and consumption models have large emission-reduction 
potentials. R&I should focus on providing the business models, technologies and 
processes that will enable this systemic change. 
In those sectors where incumbent technologies have reduced 
opportunities for improving energy efficiency, R&I should focus on 
technological breakthroughs. In particular, renewable hydrogen and CCS 
breakthroughs are needed to bring the costs of these technologies to acceptable 
investment levels. R&I actions are also needed in particular for disruptive 
technologies, such as digitalisation, artificial intelligence and energy storage for 
energy-intensive production industries, as mentioned previously. 
Potentially disruptive technologies must be harnessed to advance 
decarbonisation efforts and strategically position Europe in the global 
markets. The economic potential of these technologies can be translated into 
substantial growth and prosperity for Europe. Figure 11 illustrates the R&I 
roadmap for decarbonisation of different industries in the period up to 2050. 
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Figure 11: Possible R&I roadmap towards a decarbonised industry sector.  
 92 
CHAPTER 5 
A CIRCULAR APPROACH TO AGRICULTURE, LAND USE AND 
THE BIOECONOMY: AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE SOIL 
FERTILITY AND DECARBONISE THE ECONOMY 
1 Introduction 
The agriculture, forestry and other land use sectors, collectively known 
as the AFOLU sector, are responsible for just under a quarter (~10–
12GtCO2-eq/y) of global GHG emissions. Europe is the world’s fourth 
largest emitter of GHGs from agriculture and its overall contribution amounts to 
approximately 12 % of global sectoral emissions. In Europe, agriculture 
accounts for about 10 % of overall GHG emissions and in absolute terms emits 
464 million of metric tonnes of CO2-eq, coming mainly from non-CO2 emissions 
(methane and nitrous oxide — N2O). 
Agriculture, 2001-2011: emissions by continent 
Agriculture and land use have a key role in the decarbonisation effort. 
Recent analyses of EU-28 decarbonisation pathways indicate that, after 2050, 
non-CO2 emissions would 
constitute a large share of the 
remaining GHG emissions, thus 
AFOLU is becoming an increasingly 
relevant emissions abatement 
sector. In addition, the AFOLU 
sector could contribute to 
decarbonising the energy sector 
through the development of 
carbon-neutral bioenergy and 
biomaterials as well as to the 
removal of residual CO2 emissions 
through carbon sinks. 
Mitigation in the AFOLU 
sector can be carried out both 
by reducing GHG emission 
intensity per unit of output 
(through improved cropland and livestock management), and by conserving 
or enhancing carbon stocks in vegetation or soils (through 
afforestation/reforestation, bioenergy with carbon capture storage, and 
enhancement of soil carbon content). 
Such mitigation actions in the AFOLU must be carried out in synergy 
with preserving the quality and functionalities17 of soils, which is a 
further sustainability objective strictly interconnected with climate mitigation. 
For example, land degradation is an environmental issue across Europe but 
especially in the Mediterranean region. Several Member States have been 
                                               
17  E.g. agricultural production, vegetation retention, filtration, moderation of water flow, 
energy flow regulation, etc. 
Figure 12: Agriculture, forestry and other land use 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks. Source: FAO, 
2014. 
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impacted by desertification, with Spain severely threatened (up to 49 % of the 
total country area is highly or very highly susceptible to land degradation). 
There are also major concerns for Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania and 
Portugal. Actions to stop and reverse such progressive soil degradation involve 
the implementation of carbon accumulation practices in soil. 
Soil regeneration must start from a responsible use of agricultural land, 
promoting the creation of new integrated agricultural value chains based on the 
diffusion of best practices, on the sustainable use of biomass, and on the 
restoration of organic matter in soils even through the identification of dry 
farming in marginal and abandoned land. Soil regeneration is both a matter of 
below- and above-ground biomass and is thus closely connected to the overall 
environmental management of the AFOLU sector in broader terms, e.g. of forest 
preservation or livestock management. This kind of soil regeneration could 
encourage the creation of new income opportunities for farmers working on 
abandoned or uncultivated land, especially those with negative economic 
margins, and through the stipulation of supply-chain contracts for the 
exploitation of crops. 
Soil is a non-renewable resource, as it takes over 2 000 years to create 
just 10 cm of soil. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, 33 % of global soils are impacted by soil degradation, including 
salinisation, compaction, acidification, chemical pollution and nutrient depletion. 
Furthermore, the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) states 
that 20 % of Europe's land surface is subject to erosion with rates above 10 
t/ha*yr-1 18, while soil sealing (covering the ground with an impermeable 
material) leads to the loss of more than 1 000 km2 of productive land each 
year. 
The lack of European harmonisation, mostly due to the absence of a dedicated 
EU Soil Directive19, has consequences not only for GHG emissions but also for 
soil preservation and regeneration, water resources, intensive breeding and 
antibiotics uses, herbicides and fertiliser use, and compost contamination due to 
plastics and other waste which is known as ‘white pollution’20.  
According to the European Commission, the bioeconomy comprises 
those parts of the economy that use renewable biological resources 
from land and sea — such as crops, forests, fish, animals and micro-
organisms — to produce food, materials and energy. The bioeconomy is a 
cornerstone between agriculture and industrial production of food, feed and bio-
based products that are functional to both sustainable agriculture practices and 
soil protection. 
The systemic adoption of a circular bioeconomy approach at 
governmental, agricultural and industrial level provides the opportunity 
                                               
18  Tonnes per hectare per year 
19  In September 2006, The European Commission adopted a Soil Thematic Strategy including 
a proposal for a Soil Framework Directive which was withdrawn in 2014, due to the lack of 
a favourable decision from the Council. 
20  Plastics in agriculture are widely used especially for protecting root systems, plants, crops, 
forage, soil structure and the water table. While improving agricultural systems in terms of 
productivity, without reliable waste-management practices, agri-plastics can contaminate 
soils causing ‘white pollution’ which risks compromising soil fertility and increasing land use 
with negative effects in terms of GHG, too. 
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to address the multifaceted challenges posed by land degradation. The 
bioeconomy is a key lever for promoting cultural, as well as industrial, 
environmental and social regeneration for a symbiotic society to ensure that the 
efficient use of resources is given the utmost importance. This can transform 
local problems into business opportunities, capable of extracting value from the 
preservation and regeneration of natural and social capital and lending 
significant economic weight to the externalities generated by the various 
production and consumption models. Innovative systems using a combination of 
products from integrated regenerative chains, such as recycled nitrogen and 
phosphorous, clean sludges, compost, stabilised digestate, biobased 
biodegradable materials and plastics, biodegradable mulch films and other 
auxiliary products for agriculture, crop protection bioproducts, biobased 
biodegradable lubricants, readily biodegradable ingredients for cosmetics and 
detergents, all represent key deliverables from the bioeconomy. 
2 Decarbonising European agriculture: levers and challenges 
At the global level, land-based mitigation options, including afforestation and 
land restoration, represent a potentially large share of the total cumulative 
abatement potential, and are therefore important elements in climate 
stabilisation. Mitigations in the land sector must keep pace with emission 
reductions in the fossil-fuel sector, not offset one against the other. 
The vast majority of emission reduction pathways to limit global 
temperature rise to below 2 °C and all pathways for 1.5 °C rely on ’negative 
emissions’ — the removal of carbon from the atmosphere, especially in the 
period after 2050. 
Negative emissions are generally achieved through land-based 
strategies: carbon sequestration in terrestrial sinks (forest restoration, 
reforestation, etc.) or bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), an 
unproven technique, not yet commercialised, which involves burning biomass to 
generate electricity, then capturing the carbon and pumping it into underground 
geological reservoirs. 
Decarbonising European agriculture is challenging as it must be achieved 
in a context of rapidly growing global food demand (between +50 % and +100 
%, according to the latest foresight studies), whilst also coping with the impacts 
of climate change. The fifth assessment report of the IPCC concludes that: (i) 
crop yields in temperate regions could be substantially impacted by climate 
change even for low temperature change; and (ii) the Mediterranean zone will 
suffer from lower precipitation. 
Most agricultural emissions in Europe result from enteric fermentation 
(methane), microbial processes in soil (N2O) from the use of synthetic 
fertilisers, and manure use and management. These emissions have 
gradually decreased since 1985, mainly due to improvements in nutrient use 
efficiency, feed use efficiency, and limited growth in the consumption of 
agricultural products in Europe. 
Land use in Europe is a net sink as European forests are being 
replenished. This trend has been increasing since the 1990s. European land 
use is also responsible for substantial emissions associated with carbon losses 
from drained histosols beneath crop land (~100 MtCO2 according to FAOSTAT). 
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The carbon sink of European forests is threatened by climate change, as it has 
been reported that forests can become a net source of emissions in case of high 
global temperature rise. Therefore, an important axis of the European 
decarbonisation strategy should be to protect the carbon sink in forests. 
Overall, agricultural emissions in Europe are characterised by a large 
share of non-CO2 emissions — methane and nitrous monoxide, which needs 
to be converted to CO2-eq using specific standards. Emissions from the AFOLU 
sector are also difficult to monitor because they are dispersed across a wide 
range of sources. Furthermore, they depend on bioclimatic parameters that are 
difficult to measure and whose biophysical mechanisms are not always well 
known. 
European consumption of agricultural products is characterised by a 
large share of animal-based proteins (60 % of total proteins consumed) 
which are intensive in terms of land and water resources. Environmental 
impacts of meat and milk consumption are important outside Europe as they 
rely mainly on feedstock from imported origins (e.g. soybean from Brazil to 
feed animals).  
Food losses and waste are particularly large in Europe amounting to 280 
kg/person/y, according to Gustavson et al., 2011, the second highest rate of 
food losses and waste per capita in the world. Potentials for waste reduction are 
substantial as most food waste at the household level is avoidable. 
The European contribution to the global mitigation effort of AFOLU 
emissions is both a matter of emissions within EU boundaries and 
induced emissions outside the EU through the global agricultural 
commodity markets. While European international agricultural trade is 
balanced in terms of euros and slightly in deficit in tonnes, it is not clear as to 
the levels of emissions imported or exported from Europe.  
Finally, it is important to take into account the existing regulatory 
environment related to the decarbonisation of European agriculture (common 
agricultural policy, Water Framework Directive, Waste Framework Directive, 
Nitrates Directive, Climate and Energy Package and European Biodiversity and 
Bioeconomy Strategy) to better understand policy interactions and dynamics for 
all low-carbon options. 
3 Decarbonisation strategies: soils as a carbon sink 
3.1 Demand and supply-side options to decarbonise European agriculture 
Supply-side options to mitigate agricultural emissions include: 
improved feed and dietary additives, improved breeds with higher 
productivity, modified livestock diets to reduce nitrogen excreta, 
improved precision of fertiliser application (right amount, right 
fertiliser, right time and right placement), and increasing cropping 
intensity through multi-cropping or inter-cropping. All these options 
improve resource-use efficiency (nutrient, feed, water) which represents an 
important avenue towards mitigating agricultural emissions in a cost-effective 
manner. Additional options may include the treatment of manure in anaerobic 
digesters to produce biomethane and generate heat and electricity and to 
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reduce methane losses from manure storage, thus at the same time providing 
further tools to decarbonise the energy sector and avoid GHG emissions. 
The development of integrated environment/climate/agricultural 
production practices, such as agroecology and organic farming, allow 
crop production to be optimised per unit area, taking into account the 
sustainability aspects. Focusing on soil fertility and closed nutrient cycles, 
these approaches promote crop rotations and favour nature-based solutions 
over chemical-based solutions to treat pest and disease and to enhance soil 
fertility. Whilst they show many potential benefits in terms of biodiversity and 
nutritional value, improved soil and water quality per unit area, and enhanced 
profitability, their feasibility is contested as they may produce lower yields and 
thus require larger land areas to produce the same output as conventional 
production systems. However, yield comparisons with conventional agriculture 
are challenging as agro-ecological or organic agriculture relies on a synergetic 
approach with other crops and the environment, which is not necessarily 
directly or immediately measurable. 
Supply-side mitigation measures imply profound changes in 
agricultural practices and land use.  Access to market and credits, technical 
capacities to implement mitigation options, accurate monitoring of emission 
levels and institutional frameworks and regulations are some of the main 
obstacles. Issues related to rural development and supply-chain organisation 
can be other obstacles. 
Environmental and societal challenges are also becoming increasingly 
important as regards abatement efforts in the AFOLU sector. Large-scale 
bioenergy production raises important issues about possible adverse effects on 
biodiversity, food security, water use and access to land, and the scientific 
debate on the overall benefits of specific bioenergy pathways remains 
unresolved (IPCC, 2014b). The promotion of bioenergy production in Europe 
may imply the conversion of natural ecosystems outside the EU boundaries 
through international trade. This so-called indirect effect has to be carefully 
accounted for in the environmental assessment of bioenergy production. 
Mitigation options may also imply trade-offs between local and global pollution 
(e.g. a bioenergy plant using local wood resources or large livestock facilities) 
and between mitigation and adaptation. 
Consumption-based measures, such as changes in diet or a reduction in 
food loss and waste, offer a substantial mitigation potential (1.5–
15.6GtCO2-eq/y on a global scale), greater than supply-side measures. 
They may enable both a reduced use of inputs and larger areas for 
afforestation/reforestation or bioenergy production. Changes in diet may be 
associated with valuable co-benefits such as improving dietary health. 
A more balanced diet with lower meat consumption would have 
relevant implications on GHG emissions and other environmental issues 
(e.g. water consumption). According to Weber and Matthews, 2008, 
consumption-based measures provide a strong ‘opportunity for consumers to 
reduce their environmental impact due to their high degree of personal choice, 
and a lack of long-term “lock-in” effects which limit consumers’ day-to-day 
choices’. However, they may be difficult to enforce for social acceptance 
reasons linked to habits, taste or cultural representation. 
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Mitigation measures for agriculture and land use, developed within the 
bioeconomy framework, may be associated with socio-economic and 
environmental co-benefits provided they are sustainably implemented. 
Therefore, bioenergy should be integrated in food production, notably 
through suitable crop-rotation schemes, or use of by-products and 
residues. Mitigation options designed to enhance carbon stocks in soils may 
also have a positive impact on food security by improving land quality. Other 
potential co-benefits include, for example, human health and well-being 
through better-adapted diets, clarification of land tenure, synergies with other 
international agreements, including the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD, 2011), or the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 
1992). 
New approaches for transforming and reorienting the role of 
agriculture and business towards land regeneration can have important 
consequences, not only on the social pillar of sustainability, but also for 
GHG reductions. The exploitation of innovative geographic information system 
(GIS)-based tools, smart sensors, precision-agriculture principles and, above 
all, the implementation of circular economy principles could help promote more 
resource efficient and sustainable farming practices that reflect the regional 
diversity of farms across Europe. 
3.2 The role of organic carbon in soil 
Degradation of the Earth’s land surface through human activities is 
negatively impacting the well-being of at least 3.2 billion people, 
pushing the planet towards a sixth mass species extinction, and costing 
more than 10 % of annual global gross product through loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services (IPBES, 2018). Soil degradation is part 
of land degradation and includes, among others, loss of soil through erosion at 
a rate faster than it is formed, and depletion of soil organic matter. Therefore, 
the human pressure exerted on soils is increasingly alarming. The degradation 
of soil is emerging as a fundamental element of global environmental change. 
The world’s soils hold approximately 1 500 ± 230 Gt of carbon down to 
1 m depth (excluding carbon in permafrost), which is twice the amount 
of carbon in the atmosphere. In European soils, 70-75 GtC are stored in the 
first 30 cm of soil. However, close to half of all agricultural soils in the world are 
estimated to be degraded (i.e. depleted in soil organic carbon, among other 
factors), leading to foregone annual grain production which could reach USD 1.2 
billion globally (FAO, 2006). The continuation of this trend could lead to a global 
yield decline of 10 % (FAO and ITPS, 2015). Land degradation poses a threat to 
agriculture, and climate change may accelerate the rate of degradation with 
major impacts on food security and the well-being of small farmers. In recent 
years, loss of organic matter has become increasingly important for the soils of 
the Mediterranean area, for instance. 
Land use conversion and soil cultivation have been major sources of 
GHGs since the onset of settled agriculture. As much as 40 % of the 
planet’s total land area has been converted into agriculture and plantations to 
produce grains, vegetables, fruit, milk, and meat to feed 7.3 billion people in 
2015. Over the past two centuries, soil organic carbon, an indicator of soil 
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health, has seen an estimated 8 % loss globally (176 GtC) from land conversion 
and unsustainable land management practices (IPBES, 2018). 
Thus, enhancing soil organic carbon (SOC) could be key to mitigating 
climate change and contributing to food security. SOC storage in 
agricultural soils could contribute to meeting the joint goal of reducing the 
impact of agriculture on GHG emissions and climate change (UN SDG 13) and 
delivering zero hunger (SDG 2). In March 2017, the jointly organised Global 
Symposium on Soil Organic Carbon by the FAO and its Global Soil Partnership, 
IPCC, UNCCD and WMO highlighted the crucial role of soil carbon in achieving 
food security, especially in future climate change scenarios. 
Smith et al. (2016) estimated that soil carbon sequestration has an 
achievable potential of negative emissions by 0.7 GtCeq/y at the global 
scale, emphasising it has a potentially lower impact on land, water use, 
nutrients, albedo, energy requirement and cost than many negative emission 
technologies. While this actual potential is not sufficient to offset all 
anthropogenic emissions, nevertheless it is substantial and would offset the 
fossil-fuel emissions equivalent of the EU. Large-scale modelling studies have 
estimated a biophysical potential about 0.5-2 f GtCO2-eq in the EU, which is 
storable in a centennial time horizon by applying different sets of agricultural 
practices. 
Changes in SOC content are generally nonlinear. Thus, SOC changes are 
usually fastest during the first years following the adoption of a new practice 
and hardly exceed a few decades until a new equilibrium is reached. In 
addition, the rate of C gain is usually lower than the rate of C loss. In this ‘slow 
in — fast out’ temporal scheme, the quantity of SOC that can be stored in a 
given soil is finite and saturates after a few decades. 
The ability of soils to store carbon depends on many factors, including:  
(i) the intrinsic characteristics of soil (e.g. mineralogy, the abundance of fine silt  
and clay fractions); (ii) type of land use (e.g. forest, pasture, crop land); (iii) 
land management, including agricultural practices; and (iv) climate, through its 
impact on net primary production, respiration and decomposition of organic 
matter. It should be also noted that carbon and nitrogen biogeochemical cycles 
are strongly coupled and that, on average, the carbon-to-nitrogen ratio in soil 
organic matter is equal to 12. 
This means that there is no universal management practice or technology that 
is appropriate for all farming systems. 
Re-carbonisation of soil and the terrestrial biosphere by ‘sustainable 
intensification’ implies producing more food using less land, water, 
chemicals, energy, and minimising GHG emissions. SOC stock is under 
constant changes at different timescales and, if widespread, relatively small 
changes in the flow of carbon into or out of soils could have a significant impact 
on a global carbon budget. 
All these elements have led to the development of several international 
initiatives on soil, including the 4 ‰ Initiative — soils for food security and 
climate (http://www.4p1000.org) — which was launched by France during 
COP21 as part of the Paris-Lima Action Plan and is supported by the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Its overarching goal is to help 
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contributing countries and non-state organisations to develop evidence-based 
projects, actions and programmes, to promote and encourage actions towards 
reducing GHG emissions by protecting and increasing SOC stocks, the target 
rate of a 4/1000 (0.4 %) SOC increase per year being the aspirational goal. It 
aims to avoid loss of organic matter from soils and enhance soil carbon 
sequestration with the ultimate aim of improving food security, and adapting 
and mitigating climate change. The Initiative comprises two parts: an action 
plan and an international research and scientific cooperation programme. 
4 Organic carbon in the soil: not only a carbon sink but also 
meeting the challenges of desertification and land degradation 
4.1 Agricultural practices and avenues for implementing soil carbon 
strategies 
Within the agriculture sector (excluding bioenergy and improved 
energy use), about 90 % of the total technical mitigation potential is 
based on SOC sequestration options. The variations in SOC at the 
ecosystem scale are the results of the flux of organic carbon partitioned below-
ground, the human appropriation of above-ground carbon (e.g. through harvest 
and animal products mainly) and the carbon losses at ecosystem scale (e.g. due 
to soil erosion and fire). Therefore, management strategies to increase SOC 
could fall into three different categories: (i) soil conservation; (ii) carbon 
management; and (iii) agricultural and forestry intensification. 
Soil conservation requires reducing C losses from the ecosystem, e.g. by 
avoiding fires, and reducing erosion and leaching. For instance, no-till, cover 
crops, or direct drilling into mulch can all be used to protect cultivated soils 
from erosion and will have consequences for plant production and harvest, 
through soil moisture and nutrients. 
Carbon management aims to increase the ecosystem carbon balance by 
accumulating above-ground biomass (e.g. in forests, in agro-forestry) 
and by sequestering SOC (in all ecosystems). Protecting SOC stocks 
requires avoiding adverse land use change and management practices (e.g. 
deforestation, ploughing grasslands, soil sealing, etc.), and avoiding drainage 
and cultivation of organic soils (e.g. drained peatlands). Avoiding overgrazing, 
balancing soil organic matter decomposition with the supply of manure, crop 
residues and litter, and increasing mean annual net primary productivity all 
enable an increase in SOC in agricultural systems. 
Agricultural practices which can be used to store additional SOC include crop 
species and varieties with greater root mass and with deeper roots, use of N-
fixing legumes in N-deprived soils, use of cover crops during fallow periods, use 
of crop rotations providing greater C inputs, increased residue retention, and 
the addition of amendments such as compost and biochar. 
The mitigating effect on GHG emissions associated with the use of 
compost in agriculture has been addressed in several studies and in 
experimental research. The available results suggest that compost use 
in the agricultural sector increases SOC and tends to neutralise GHG 
emissions caused by cultivation, thereby increasing soil fertility and 
resiliency. 
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The use of straw for energy generation in parallel with optimisation of 
the cropping system can achieve compelling environmental 
performance showing that a favourable balance can be found between 
the use of crop residues for soil and for energy. 
Experimentation is required at scale, both at the local and then the regional 
level, to explore the potentials of SOC-enhancing strategies and to address 
specific problems or societal challenge under real-life conditions. This could take 
the form of regional demonstrators bringing together farmers, firms and 
academia to foster a systemic approach, while also supporting new 
entrepreneurial initiatives and open innovation. 
The question of creating a specific market for soil carbon should be 
investigated. To this end, inspiration can be drawn from the carbon market in 
Alberta in Canada. This trading scheme has been functioning since 2007. Since 
2014, the protocol for offsetting carbon has included conservation cropping 
which is based on practices that increase carbon storage. This experience has 
shown that finding the right balance between reliability and simplicity in 
monitoring the reduction in emissions is key for the success of this strategy. 
Fostering R&I in this field could help to develop new practices and models able 
to increase carbon storage, while also enhancing the marketability of pre-
existing schemes. 
A connected challenge relates to communicating the benefits of SOC 
sequestration through the consumer supply chain. Creating a new value chain 
should contribute to the general objective of finding the right incentives for 
spurring SOC-enhancing practices. 
Promoting sustainable agriculture is of huge relevance since the 
agricultural sector represents the basis of the bioeconomy. It is no 
coincidence that recent standards, certification schemes and international 
initiatives indicate, among the various requirements, sustainable management 
of organic soil. 
4.2 Synergies and limitations of SOC-enhancing strategies 
In addition to reducing GHG emissions and sequestering carbon, smart 
soil management that increases organic matter and tightens the soil 
nitrogen (N) cycle can yield powerful synergies. SOC plays a fundamental 
role in the fertility and productivity of terrestrial ecosystems, supporting 
important soil-derived ecosystem services such as soil quality, water filtration, 
erosion control, nutrient cycling, habitat and energy for soil organisms. Indeed, 
carbon is the main component of soil organic matter (more than 58 %), which 
is important for maintaining soil fertility and soil quality and their benefits as 
regards providing a range of ecosystem services. SOC sequestration policies 
would generate additional revenues for farmers by increasing yield, keeping 
larger areas of agricultural land in production, and reducing fertiliser needs. 
The demand for mineral fertilisers can be reduced by combining organic 
inputs, thereby cutting the emissions associated with the application 
and the fossil energy necessary for their production. Also, a reduction 
in the use of inorganic fertilisers results in a greater control of 
eutrophication and water quality. 
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However, there are scientific, political, and socio-economic issues with the 
large-scale implementation of soil carbon-enhancing policies, including: 
 scientific evidence of the benefits of increasing SOC across a range of 
different soils, agro-ecosystems and climatic zones is still insufficient; 
 the finite capacity of the soil C sink: the ‘maximum potential’ of SOC 
sequestration corresponds to the ‘soil C sink capacity’ which depends on a 
range of factors including texture, mineralogy, depth of soil, etc.; 
 carbon sequestration tends towards a new equilibrium implying a diminishing 
increment in SOC as time elapses; 
 some limitations to SOC sequestration may occur because of a lack of 
nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus; 
 adoption of management practices (e.g. residue retention, cover cropping, 
controlled grazing, converting agriculturally marginal lands to perennial 
vegetation cover, and soil amendments) would require financial resources; 
 SOC permanence is also a key issue that needs to be addressed from a 
multidisciplinary perspective; 
 one important question is how long it may take to reach the ceiling economic 
potential; 
 greater adoption of adequate practices is also a key issue, especially in 
Europe where they are already widely used by farmers. 
5 The rationale of the circular bioeconomy 
5.1 A circular bioeconomy for a sustainable society 
For more sustainable development, as regards land, soil, water, biodiversity 
and human beings, it is of paramount importance to drastically change 
production processes, consumption models, and recycling and disposal of 
biological resources. 
Integrating the bioeconomy into the circular economy model is key for 
developing a sustainable society, since the circular bioeconomy is the 
cornerstone between agriculture and industrial production of biobased products 
that are functional to both sustainable agriculture practices and soil protection. 
This bioeconomy model includes the ‘sustainable regions’ notion 
introduced by the European Commission’s Bioeconomy Panel. 
Sustainability is not a worldwide concept but it is linked to the qualities 
of local areas, to their specific economic situations, because a solution 
which may be absolutely sustainable in one context may have an 
enormous impact in another. Thus, it is necessary to think in terms of local 
areas, and regions represent the ideal dimension for making a start on the 
problems specific to those areas and transforming them into opportunities for 
development. 
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Reducing food losses and waste at the source, within the bioeconomy 
framework, should be the priority of a sustainable strategy for future 
agriculture, with the aim of avoiding land use and fertiliser emissions 
as well as the many emission sources associated with the supply chain 
(e.g. refrigeration, transport). 
SDG 12.3 focuses on the food-waste sector and sets the target to halve per 
capita global food waste at the retail and consumer level by 2030 and to reduce 
food losses along production and supply chains, including post-harvest losses. 
The management of food waste starts with understanding how much is 
currently produced and what share of it can be prevented. A detailed analysis at 
the European level can be found in the EU FP7-funded project FUSIONS 
(http://www.eu-fusions.org/). In total, 88 million tonnes of food waste is 
generated in Europe per year, the majority (about 53 %) occurring during food 
preparation and consumption at home. Based on these figures, 31 million 
tonnes of food waste would need to be reduced each year to meet the United 
Nations’ SDG by 2030. 
For example, in order to provide 1 kg of apples to consumers, 1.28 kg must be 
produced. Along the supply chain, that 0.28 kg of edible and inedible parts of 
apples are removed for various reasons. Environmental impacts related to this 
0.28 kg of food waste occur during production, processing, retail and 
distribution, consumer activities (e.g. cooking, storing) as well as food disposal 
(e.g. composting, waste incineration). The later in the supply chain food is 
wasted the more environmental impacts are associated with this waste. 
Therefore, reducing food waste by prevention would avoid such impacts. By 
preventing food waste at the consumer level, around 26 million tonnes of food 
can be saved (assuming that 57 % of food waste is avoidable). This would 
result in a potential reduction of 69 million tonnes CO2-eq. (corresponding to 
Finland’s total GHG emissions). However, once (hopefully) food waste losses 
have been reduced, the remaining challenge will be how to handle the 
unavoidable bio-waste. 
Enhanced waste recycling should be promoted. Initiatives for better separation 
of bio-waste are under way in many European countries, and the European 
Food Waste Framework Directive is being amended to promote the 
implementation of food-waste prevention measures. 
Italy is an interesting case study for the transformation of bio-waste 
into compost: the Italian Composting and Biogas Association of 
composting plants (CIC) estimates that, in 2015, about 4 million tonnes 
of municipal solid waste and 2 million tonnes of green waste (from 
parks and gardens) were collected separately in Italy and sent for 
biological treatment (61 % composting and 39 % anaerobic digestion + 
composting). With a population of about 60 million (ISTAT, 2014) inhabitants, 
the organic fraction recovered annually per capita corresponds to about 67 kg 
compared to a potential quantity of about 170 kg/cap/year. This gap of around 
100 kg/cap/year can be easily filled. 
5.2 Biobased products for the regeneration of local areas 
There is considerable room for improvement regarding the capture and 
recycling rate of bio-waste. Specific incentives could be introduced for those 
farmers and companies using compost in their agricultural practices. This would 
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be reflected in an increase in the demand for quality compost and, therefore, in 
greater efficiency of the management of bio-waste. At the EU-28 level, the 
amount of bio-waste produced annually is about 96 million tonnes which is 
around 190 kg/person/year, of which 150 kg/person/year is really collectable; 
Overall, just 33 % of EU bio-waste is currently recycled. 
The quality of compost is key. It is important to consider nutrient 
composition and physical, chemical and physico-chemical properties as 
well as disease suppression. Within the EU Member States, standards for 
compost use and quality differ substantially, partly due to differences in soil 
policies. Thus, a harmonised process would be welcomed. 
Figure 13 shows the recycling of carbon in agriculture, food, biobased products, 
and compost (going back to agriculture) as an example of both the bioeconomy 
and circular economy mimicking the natural carbon cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Virtuous circular economy model for food-waste management, compost and sustainable 
agriculture (rows in bold). Above-ground biomass (crop residues) could be exploited to produce biobased or 
bioenergy or be returned to the soil partially/totally. 
In this scenario bio-based products must be designed in a circular 
perspective in order to address specific environmental issues, such as 
water and soil pollution generated by plastics, lubricants, fertilisers, 
crop-protection products, or the dispersion of cosmetics and detergents 
residues. Properties such as biodegradability and renewability are desirable for 
a significant part of these products. To maximise the effects on climate change 
and guarantee real sustainable development, they have to be the results of a 
bioeconomy conceived as a feature of territorial regeneration in a society 
prepared to choose quality over quantity. 
More specifically for a sustainable society based on local resources, 
biodegradability must be seen in a broader context, applying a circular 
vision based on fair and continuous access and on value creation with use of 
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renewable resources through sustainable processes, respecting the 
environment, society and the territory. The choice of renewable products which 
build up the ecosystems and continuously generate value is one of the key 
issues when regeneration becomes the focus of production processes. 
Biobased products such as biodegradable and compostable bioplastics are 
crucial to promote the better management of organic waste and reduce the 
risks of its contamination. Bioplastics are also fundamental tools to reduce 
pollution in those sectors where there is high dispersion rate, such as 
agriculture or fisheries. The adoption of appropriate standards for 
biodegradation in different specific environments is key to guarantee that a 
product can be reabsorbed if released accidentally. Another crucial aspect is 
that product sustainability/biodegradability is not an excuse for limitless 
growth: if produced in increasing quantities without limits and without passing 
through the appropriate treatment plants, even natural products may pose a 
major threat to the environment. 
In a circular bioeconomy perspective, it is of paramount importance 
that products originate from the development of new local agro-
industrial supply chains, creating new case studies and new regional 
standards and projects. The value chain coming from the regenerative 
management of forest products is another area of opportunity. Some case 
studies within Horizon 2020 already exist at EU level with significant 
investments in infrastructures, and integrated agricultural/forest value chains 
spurring the development of innovative products for feed, generation of organic 
chemicals (biochemicals) via fermentation from crop biomass, starch materials, 
agri-residues, and agro-industrial waste as well as bioplastics. 
Bioeconomy could be a great opportunity in those areas characterised 
by marginal lands, where integrating the cultivation of dry crops with multiple 
sectors will not only enable soil regeneration (through agricultural best 
practices, such as  the use of biodegradable mulching films, bioherbicides for 
the control of infestations or biolubricants) but will also encourage the 
development of multi-product value chains, with the cascading use of biomass 
and creating new opportunities for production and income. The value chain 
coming from the regenerative management of forest products is another area of 
opportunity. This circular approach should make it possible to avoid increasing 
competition of biomass resources with other biobased products such as 
lignocellulosic bioenergy products. 
Every single area is different and is characterised by its own peculiarities. 
Territories have their own production system, culture and biodiversity, which 
could be exploited through interconnected projects with local roots. In this way, 
it is possible to stimulate the creation of a new, local and virtuous value chain 
starting from identifying a product and driving the all-integrated system, 
regenerating resources and rethinking the end of life. 
In conclusion, soil regeneration is a key milestone in the development 
of a more general pattern of regeneration of local areas via the 
establishment of integrated value chains of quality food, feed bio-
chemicals and innovative materials such as bioplastics based on a 
functioning network of stakeholder relationships and cooperation. 
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These prerequisites allow the bioeconomy model to act as an effective 
accelerator for sustainable innovation, transforming the peripheries into 
strategic centres and a driving force for the EU. This model should be 
implemented through the building of the so-called bioeconomy infrastructures, 
establishing a new relationship between the economy, technology and society. 
The goal is to achieve a high-level of diversified quality rather than pursuing the 
undifferentiated quantity, at the same time reconnecting a decarbonised 
economy with society and relaunching the EU’s competitiveness on the basis of 
continuous innovation applied to local areas, taking into account their traditions, 
addressing challenges, and developing opportunities. 
5.3 Supply of and demand for biomass: how to maintain a sustainable 
equilibrium 
 
Figure 14: Comparison between biomass supply and demand scenarios (by biomass sources and uses). 
Source: Nova, 2015. 
One obvious question is: ‘Would agricultural and forestry feedstocks be enough 
to feed the future biorefineries for the production of biochemicals and bioenergy 
without negatively affecting the supply of food, feed and other biomass uses?’ 
An interesting analysis aimed at responding to this fundamental question was 
conducted by Nova Institut in 2015, where five different demand scenarios were 
formulated and investigated. These scenarios highlight how under different 
plausible and consistent assumptions the supply and demand of biomass may 
develop. Leaving out the assumptions and the details of the study that can be 
found here (http://bio-based.eu/download/?did=69849&file=0), the research 
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outcome is well summarised in the Figure 14 above, which shows the biomass 
demand and supply for each sector in 2011 and 2050 (the figures are 
expressed in billion metric tonnes of dry matter). 
All five demand scenarios share the same assumptions regarding the demand 
for food and feed, whereas for the biobased chemicals and materials, bioenergy 
and biofuels sectors different demands were assumed. 
In the LOW supply scenario, the global biomass supply will scarcely change 
from 2011 to 2050, while it will almost double in the business-as-usual (BAU) 
scenario and more than double in the HIGH scenario. Based on these scenarios, 
the range of global biomass supply in 2050 will be between 12.4 billion tonnes 
of dry matter (2011 base year) and 25.2 billion tonnes of dry matter in 2050. 
The results show that the LOW supply scenario would just be able to cover the 
demand for food and feed but hardly any of the demand for materials and 
bioenergy and none of the demand for biofuels or biochemicals. 
In comparison, the BAU supply scenario could cover the demand for 
food, feed, materials and bioenergy and could even leave room for an 
expansion of biofuels of up to 1 billion tonnes of biomass dry matter. 
That would be enough to produce about 25-30 % of biofuels needed to 
reach the 2 °C climate goal, according to the IEA 2012. In contrast, the 
BAU supply scenario — if combined with the biobased or biobased HIGH 
scenarios — cannot quite meet the biomass demand from food, feed, materials 
and bioenergy. The HIGH supply scenario can meet the demand of all scenarios 
and would still leave enough biomass for further applications. It is noteworthy 
that in both the BAU and HIGH supply scenarios a relatively high amount of 
cellulose will be available as the result of greater forest utilisation and an 
increased use of agricultural by-products. This suggests that for the BAU and 
HIGH scenarios the amount of so-called ‘second generation’ raw materials 
(starch, sugar, fats and proteins) will grow in all sectors. 
In both the BAU and HIGH supply scenarios, a relevant net expansion 
of land for arable and permanent crops takes place and concomitantly 
there is a considerable threat of a further reduction in biodiversity as 
well as more GHG emissions from agriculture. Hence, at first glance, these 
scenarios do not appear to be sustainable. 
However, the authors conclude that in the future an equilibrium 
(meeting the ‘safe operating space’ criteria) can be met through 
massive investments in new technologies and system optimisations 
which enable a higher output with less input and, at the same time, 
less environmental burdens (i.e. a well-developed bioeconomy). The 
greening of deserts with deep water recovered by solar energy and fresh water 
through desalinisation of marine water, the introduction of salt- and heat- 
resistant crops, large-scale marine cultivation of macroalgae, tailored 
fertilisation, plant protection and irrigation through precision farming, optimised 
crop rotation and a combination of crops, soil improvement, modern plant 
breeding, storage systems and CCU technologies and more would all help to 
achieve this. This requires consistent political guidance and huge investments in 
new technologies. 
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6 Research proposals 
Three strategic macro-areas have been identified, each targeting the specific 
challenges and the R&I efforts required to address such challenges: 
MACRO-AREA 1: DECARBONISING AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY SYSTEMS 
THROUGH TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES FOSTERING 
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO FOOD, FEED, BIOPRODUCTS AND SOIL 
REGENERATION  
 1.1 Challenge: Rapidly growing global food demand (between +50 % and 
+100 %, according to the latest foresight studies) with increasing pressure 
on farming systems. Agricultural emissions in Europe are dominated by 
emissions from enteric fermentation (methane), microbial processes in the 
soil (N2O) from the use of synthetic fertilisers and manure use, and 
management. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: Sustainable and resilient 
intensification of agricultural and forestry systems while preserving 
biodiversity through the adoption of innovative precision-farming and 
breeding techniques enabled by digital services, input reduction, 
implementation of low-impact management protocols, and the application of 
nature-based and eco-designed solutions (including new sustainable organic 
fertilisers and biopesticides, alternative feeds for breeding to reduce 
antibiotics use, etc.). 
Adoption of a systemic view on the links between crop and animal 
production, animal welfare, ecosystems and human health, interconnecting 
sectors, existing knowledge and innovation. 
 1.2 Challenge: Presence of agricultural, forestry and breeding residues and 
side streams with underexploited potential. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: Developing new processes 
for the conversion of residues, by-products and side streams into systemic 
and regenerative bioproducts, food/feed and high-quality organic fertilisers, 
including the capture and valorisation of CO2 and clean digestate from bio-
refinery and bioenergy plants, to generate negative emissions. 
MACRO-AREA 2: NEW REGENERATIVE MEASURES TO OPTIMISE LAND USE 
AND IMPROVE SOIL QUALITY  
 2.1 Challenge: Use of virgin land to build new industrial and urban areas, 
reducing soil availability. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: New regenerative 
processes for cleaning polluted areas and engineering measures for the 
reconversion of abandoned industrial and urban sites, promoting the 
valorisation of brownfields rather than virgin land. 
 2.2 Challenge: High presence of marginal/abandoned/degraded land across 
the EU in relation to climate change, urban and industrial facilities. 
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R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: Innovative multi-purpose 
cropping systems for the regeneration of marginal/abandoned/degraded 
land, taking into account regional specificities and creating value for local 
areas. 
Enhancement of current agricultural machinery and practices to enable 
farming on marginal/abandoned/degraded land. 
 2.3 Challenge: White pollution and soil contamination related to the use of 
plastics in agriculture. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: Development of low- 
impact, innovative products, as well as soil preservation and regeneration 
schemes, including biobased and biodegradable 
chemicals/materials/products associated with effective risk-management 
strategies. 
 2.4 Challenge: Need for monitoring and evaluating organic matter in soil. 
Emissions from the AFOLU sector are difficult to monitor because they are 
dispersed across a wide range of sources and depend on bioclimatic 
parameters that are difficult to measure and whose biophysical mechanisms 
are not always well known. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: New models and 
techniques to monitor and evaluate soil-organic-matter dynamics in different 
soils and developing tools to plan adequate decarbonisation strategies 
(including the development of international databases where farmers can 
access data relevant for implementing SOC management programmes). 
Assessment of European agricultural emissions embedded in international 
trade. 
 2.5 Challenge: Need for integrated cross-sectorial evaluation systems. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: New methods to assess 
interconnectivity of carbon, nitrogen and phosphorous flows across sectors to 
maximise environmental and socio-economic benefits. 
MACRO-AREA 3: NEW POLICY MEASURES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC MODELS 
BASED ON THE SYMBIOTIC SOCIETY APPROACH 
 3.1 Challenge: Social reluctance to change dietary behaviour and reduce 
food-waste generation. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: Development of new 
models based on symbiotic society approaches in cooperation with social 
sciences and humanities forecasting a proactive role for prosumers towards 
more sustainable food production and consumption behaviour, preventing 
waste and food losses and assessing the impact of changing food patterns on 
the whole supply chain. 
 3.2 Challenge: Fragmentation of standards and certification schemes. 
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R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: Harmonisation of standards 
and development of common certification schemes to facilitate the market 
for new, high-quality and low-impact products from a regenerative AFOLU 
sector. 
 3.3 Challenge: Interconnecting the AFOLU sector with other sectors. 
R&I EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE: Development of new 
business and governance models and training tools interconnecting the 
AFOLU sector with other sectors in a circular economy framework, taking 
into account the regional dimension and fostering the linkages between 
rural, urban and coastal areas to build wider value chains with multiple 
benefits for all the stakeholders involved. 
Promote circular economy initiatives focused on high-quality bio-waste 
valorisation where the latter is biologically recycled through transformative 
technologies aiming to obtain high-quality compost together with other 
chemicals and products, and preventing leakages of CO2 and methane. 
Design and implementation of platforms to improve global governance and 
regional collaboration among actors and across sectors, and to communicate 
the benefits of SOC sequestration through the consumer supply chain. 
Analyse and assess the benefits and modalities of a trading scheme to 
promote the market for soil carbon. 
7 Recommendations for research and innovation 
A drastic transformation of the way biological resources are used in 
production processes, consumed and subsequently recycled is 
necessary to comply with the Paris Agreement goals on climate change 
and for more sustainable development. 
As stated above, Europe is the world’s fourth largest emitter of GHG from 
agriculture – its overall contribution amounts to approximately 12 %. In 
Europe, agriculture accounts for about 10 % of overall GHG emissions and in 
absolute terms it emits 464 million metric tonnes of CO2-eq mainly from non-
CO2 emissions (methane and nitrous oxide, N2O). European consumption of 
agricultural products is characterised by a large share of animal-based proteins 
which use land and water resources intensively, driving important 
environmental impacts both within and outside Europe. In addition, Europe has 
the second highest rate of food losses and waste per capita in the world.  
Land degradation and desertification are major concerns across the EU, posing 
an important societal challenge to Europe and beyond, as soil is a non-
renewable resource. Actions to stop and reverse progressive soil degradation 
and ensure food security involve the implementation of transformative 
technologies and practices enhancing carbon accumulation in soil.  
In the short term, proven best practices on the sustainable use of pesticides, 
livestock and water and nutrient management plans aimed at reducing fertiliser 
use should be boosted by the reformed CAP. The deployment at the EU scale of 
the separate collection and recycling of bio-waste to produce high-quality 
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compost and stabilised digestate and to generate renewable energy will also 
contribute to staying within the EU carbon budget. 
Integrating the bioeconomy into the circular economy model is key for 
the developing a sustainable society.  
In the coming years, the adoption of innovative precision-farming and breeding 
techniques enabled by digital services, and the application of nature-based and 
eco-designed solutions (including new sustainable organic fertilisers and crop 
protection bioproducts, such as biopesticides, alternative feeds for breeding to 
reduce antibiotics use, etc.) will result in the sustainable and resilient 
intensification of agricultural and forestry systems while preserving biodiversity.  
In addition, new models and techniques will be developed to monitor and 
evaluate soil-organic-matter dynamics in different soils. Adequate 
decarbonisation strategies (including the development of international 
databases where farmers can access data suitable for implementing SOC 
management programmes) will be deployed, with substantial financial support. 
The circular bioeconomy is a cornerstone between agriculture and the industrial 
production of biobased products that are functional to both sustainable 
agriculture practices and soil protection.  
In the decade 2030-2040, deployment of new business and governance 
models and training tools connecting the AFOLU sector with other 
sectors in a circular bioeconomy framework, taking into account the 
regional dimension and fostering the linkages between rural, urban and 
coastal areas, will help build wider value chains with multiple benefits 
for all the stakeholders involved. 
Biobased products must be considered in a broader context, applying a circular 
vision based on fair and continuous access and the value generation of 
renewable resources through sustainable processes, respectful of the 
environment, of society and of the territory. Innovative systems using a 
combination of products from integrated regenerative chains, such as recycled 
nitrogen and phosphorous, clean sludges, compost, stabilised digestate, bio-
based biodegradable materials and plastics, biodegradable mulch films, other 
auxiliary products for agriculture, crop protection bioproducts, and biobased, 
biodegradable lubricants, represent key deliverables expected from the 
bioeconomy.  
In this perspective, it is of paramount importance that products originate from 
the development of new local agro-industrial supply chains, thereby creating 
new market opportunities. 
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Figure 15. Possible R&I pathways to decarbonised agriculture, land-use and bioeconomy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ROLE OF CITIES IN DECARBONISATION 
1 The role of cities and state of play of R&I in the 
decarbonisation in EU cities 
Cities are key actors in the fight against climate change. Globally, they 
account for 60-80 % of global CO2 emissions, depending on the estimate. In the 
EU, around three quarters of the population live in cities (European Commission 
2018a) — and this is in the context of growing urbanisation. More people are 
moving to cities every year, both from within and outside the countries where 
the city is situated. 
Cities are the ´melting pot´ where decarbonisation strategies for 
energy, transport, buildings and even industry and agriculture coexist 
and meet. As the density of energy use and infrastructures is much higher in 
cities, there is high potential for cross-sectoral integration (e.g. waste and 
energy, sewage and energy, public transport, etc.) and for complex 
infrastructures like smart grids or multi-energy hubs. Furthermore, more capital 
and know-how are often available compared to rural areas. In addition, in 
contrast with rural areas, cities can leverage economies of scale when adopting 
decarbonisation strategies. 
In the zero-carbon transition, integrated urban planning and cross-
sectoral governance is crucial. Cities have a key role to play in coupling all 
sectors and exploiting their great potential as hot spots of zero-carbon 
innovation — also spurred on by synergetic (and competing) local businesses. 
In fact, cities are already taking their responsibilities: while the EU set itself the 
goal to reduce CO2 emissions by 20 % by 2020, the average commitment of the 
Covenant of Mayors’ signatories was to reduce emissions by 28 % (UNFCCC, 
2018). 
This chapter gives an overview of how decarbonisation can be achieved in 
cities, and suggests some action points for R&I. It starts by defining the key 
drivers of decarbonisation in EU cities, before presenting lessons learned from 
diverse case studies of Stockholm, Barcelona and Warsaw. Finally, it discusses 
the key lessons learned and R&I gaps for the future of decarbonisation in cities. 
1.1 Drivers of decarbonisation in EU cities — technologies and key 
concepts 
Cities are moving towards integrated planning concepts in order to 
integrate technical and social systems for low- or zero-carbon cities. Such cities 
will need to encompass a range of both new and existing solutions. Several 
solutions are currently being developed to help cities lower their 
impact. These include a broad range of solutions from energy efficiency and 
local generation of zero-carbon heat and electricity, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
transport solutions in Chapter 3, community gardening and agricultural change 
in Chapter 5, and broader concepts of smart cities and the circular economy. 
The role of each of these solutions can have a different impact across the EU. 
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One of the key differences among EU cities is the existing building stock. 
Buildings in EU cities are heterogeneous across regions, including 
differences in the ratio of residential to commercial buildings, the average area 
of dwellings, and energy use in buildings. Across the EU, the efficiency of new 
buildings has steadily improved over time. In fact, the EU has set the ambitious 
target for all new buildings to be nearly zero energy by the end of 2020 and all 
new public buildings to be nearly zero energy by 2018 (EUR-Lex, 2018). 
However, most of Europe's existing building stock has yet to be affected by 
energy-performance requirements (European Commission, 2018b). Heating and 
cooling in EU buildings account for a large share of the EU’s energy 
consumption. In residential households, heating and hot water account for 79 
% of total final energy use (192.5 Mtoe) (European Commission, 2018c). 
Strategies to reduce emissions from heating and cooling include: more efficient 
technologies; efficiency in buildings, including climate-smart design and proper 
insulation; renewable heating and cooling technologies such as biomass boilers 
and solar heating; district heating and cooling; and better information and 
control on energy use for heating and cooling. 
Energy efficiency is playing, and will continue to play, a key role in 
reducing the use of electricity and all fuels in cities. Implementing/increasing 
renewable-energy generation in buildings and transport can also reduce cities’ 
carbon footprint. Several renewable-energy-based solutions can be integrated 
into buildings, such as solar thermal, photovoltaic and small-scale wind 
turbines. Furthermore, bioenergy can be produced locally from waste. 
In addition, many cities are embracing the ‘smart’ label to foster the 
uptake of digitisation potential and ICT applications in the urban 
context. Usually, a smart city applies to a one that is technologically 
interconnected through a network of sensors, IT platforms, open data and 
programs that serve to make city life more efficient and smoother. It is thus a 
broad term, including various projects within a city, such as placing sensors on 
roads to optimise traffic flows and allowing for real-time tracking of public 
transport or the availability of parking spaces, and using waste bins that alert 
the city when they need to be emptied. Overall, smart city projects have a wide 
variety of focus areas, such as: (i) optimising infrastructure and physical 
networks; (ii) smart citizens and data-informed decision-making; and (iii) 
improving the learning and transition capacity of city administrations. Smart 
city projects can range from something as complex as using electric vehicles 
within the city to balance the grid as they charge (Latvakoski et al., 2015), to a 
simple app that enables users to report road defects to the municipality in order 
to get them repaired quickly. In transport, smart city concepts can rationalise 
and reduce emissions related to the movement of passengers and goods across 
the city. The sum of these individual projects helps to make a city more 
interconnected and allows its citizens to live in a more efficient way and thus 
reduce their carbon emissions. An important enabler for smart cities is the 
implementation of the IoT, in which everyday devices or household appliances 
are fitted with micro-controllers and the means necessary to transmit and 
communicate information. IoT can be applied to public services (e.g. for 
remotely controlling street lighting) and in households (e.g. so that certain 
appliances only operate during off-peak hours (Bourgeois et al., 2014) or the 
electric vehicle will only charge when household electricity consumption is at a 
minimum (Zhang et al., 2016). 
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Furthermore, the broad concept of the circular economy is also often 
mentioned as a way of improving sustainability in cities. There is no 
consensus on the definition of the circular economy – which is often seen as an 
open philosophy concept. In ‘Conceptualising the circular economy: An analysis 
of 114 definitions’,  Kirchherr, Reike and Hekkert, 2017 provide the following 
definition: ‘A circular economy describes an economic system that is based on 
business models which replace the ‘end-of-life’ concept with reducing, 
alternatively reusing, recycling and recovering materials in 
production/distribution and consumption processes, thus operating at the micro 
level (products, companies, consumers), meso level (eco-industrial parks) and 
macro level (city, region, nation and beyond), with the aim to accomplish 
sustainable development, which implies creating environmental quality, 
economic prosperity and social equity, to the benefit of current and future 
generations.’ There is considerable potential for integrating a city’s 
technological systems through the circular economy. Besides being re-used or 
recycled, huge waste streams can be transformed into heat, electricity, gas, 
fertilisers, food and other products needed in a city. Different estimations exist 
on the role the circular economy could play in the EU. Kalmykova, Sadagopan 
and Rosado, 2017 estimate that implementation of the circular economy could 
save 6-11 % of the energy used to support economic activity, reducing the 
demand for primary energy by around 5-9 %, both worldwide and in the EU. 
The Ellen MacArthur Foundation, (2017) estimates that the circular economy 
could result in a 32 % reduction in primary material consumption by 2030, and 
53 % by 2050 in the EU, compared to today, and could reduce GHG emissions 
by up to 50 %. 
1.2 Drivers of decarbonisation in EU cities — the role of governance  
Governance structures in cities across the EU vary considerably. 
Decarbonisation challenges are equally diverse, and city governments have 
organised themselves differently depending on the country, geographical 
location and other factors. 
The complexity of urban systems stems from the numerous interactions 
and interdependencies in cities. Interdependencies in cities are both 
between scales (cities are part of regional, national and international systems) 
and different layers (such as the subsurface, infrastructure and occupation 
layers). Due to these interdependencies and interconnections, patterns and 
activities within such a complex urban system are only predictable to a certain 
extent, and depend on a range of actors. Therefore, adaptive approaches are 
needed for city planning and governance. 
The notion of ‘governance’ (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Torfing et al., 2012) 
implies that a government is one actor embedded in a network of multiple 
actors. It is this network of multiple actors that takes decisions and actions 
regarding complex and pressing policy issues. Governance starts with a 
holistic view on urban systems and societal challenges. It emphasises the 
importance of dynamic partnerships between public and private actors which 
can cope with the complexity of cities. Holistic approaches for coping with 
societal challenges are rare. Existing actor set-up, finance mechanisms, 
decision-making responsibilities and regulatory frameworks often do not allow a 
break with sectorial silos. A siloed and short-term urban investment strategy 
(either driven by public policy aims or private developers) has a risk of being 
unsuccessful. Planning for decarbonised, circular, smart and inclusive cities 
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requires shared and long-term urban investments that are well embedded in 
the current urban systems and value chains. 
Innovation and urban learning are key to solve pressing societal 
problems in the urban context. Knowledge of new solutions and the working 
of urban systems is scattered among many stakeholders. In some cases, city 
governments, academic partners and industry work closely together to 
demonstrate new solutions and optimise the urban system. Those partnerships 
usually emerge around specific challenges or technical opportunities. Their role 
is to detect innovation opportunities and create the space to develop them from 
pilot to successful upscaled solutions. In this context, governance can support 
strategic partnerships among sectors and silos by establishing test 
environments, setting clear goals and implementing innovative procurement 
strategies. 
Government has a significant task to do in coordinating cooperation 
among different actors to enable both collaborative circular economy and 
smart city concepts. For instance, in smart cities, government has a role to play 
in securing access to IT infrastructures, if technology systems are privately 
operated and owned. They also have a role in managing the data generated in a 
city, both by analysing them to improve governance and by taking care of the 
privacy issues associated with such data. 
1.3 Drivers of decarbonisation in EU cities – the role of citizens 
Broad citizen engagement is key to successful zero-carbon transition in 
cities. In response, cities can become incubators of behavioural and lifestyle 
change. Citizens hold key knowledge on the working of urban systems. 
Consultations can help to identify and co-design more effective zero-carbon 
solutions because the citizens' views and knowledge on what works in reality 
may otherwise be overlooked by expert-driven proposals. Citizen engagement 
is also an instrument for creating the momentum towards zero-carbon 
transition by raising awareness, building acceptance, and encouraging citizens’ 
actions. 
Citizens are the ultimate consumers of energy, goods and services as 
well as the ultimate ‘users’ of the city and its infrastructures. Thus, in 
the future, climate change mitigation outcomes will depend on behavioural and 
lifestyle changes (Riahi et al., 2017), as discussed in Chapter 7. In addition to 
behaviour and lifestyles, citizens can also become active drivers of social and 
technical zero-carbon innovation. In the past, most of the zero-carbon 
innovations in various European and global cities have been driven by municipal 
governments (Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013) and have focused on technical 
solutions in energy and transport. Thus, all other kinds of social and technical 
experiments with zero-carbon solutions that are primarily driven by the citizens 
offer an untapped potential. 
Either as individuals or households, citizens can, for example, produce part of 
the energy they consume using renewable sources, such as building-integrated 
solar systems. They can even become prosumers and feed the unconsumed 
electricity into the grid. Citizens can actively engage in demand-side 
management programmes with smart meters and integrated smart home 
solutions. They can also shift to less-carbon-intensive transportation modes, 
from cars to car sharing, public transport, cycling, walking or telecommuting. 
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Information, economic incentives, policy and regulation can be used to nudge 
citizens towards more active participation in zero-carbon action. 
Citizens can enable zero-carbon innovation by becoming the funders of new 
projects, for example, through participatory budgeting. Citizen-led energy 
cooperatives and associations can support the realisation of medium-size zero-
carbon solutions, such as neighbourhood-level energy projects. Citizen-run 
projects result in and boost various factors, such as awareness-raising about 
the need for and feasibility of climate mitigation, enhance the pride in 
individuals’ neighbourhood or city, and improve community cohesion and 
integration. 
1.4 An overview of other climate change impacts of/in cities 
Cities are particularly vulnerable to climate change. This includes possible 
impacts of rising sea levels, more precipitation and higher temperatures (IPCC, 
2014). Climate adaptation policies for cities will be needed to adapt to different 
levels of climate change. Further, some policies could address both mitigation 
and adaptation aspects — providing benefits for both areas in terms of 
decarbonisation and increased resilience. Examples include local production of 
renewable energy, urban farming and greening of the city. 
1.5 State of play in EU funding for research on decarbonisation in cities 
Today, many EU R&I funding programmes support the decarbonisation 
of cities. A wide set of EU-funded programmes is available for funding 
research, innovation, demonstration, and for supporting the deployment of 
policies or testing new governance approaches. Among them, the Horizon 2020 
programme is the largest, while other programmes are targeting public 
authorities in order to tackle urban challenges (such as the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the URBACT initiative). 
2 Case studies 
European cities differ in size, climate, economic growth, social life, energy mix, 
etc. R&I should support the whole range of different conditions that apply to 
cities. 
There are many examples of European cities with a successful record of climate 
action (Reckien et al., 2018). From these lighthouse cities, lessons can be 
learned that provide insight into the R&I needs for the future. The 
decarbonisation efforts in three diverse cities in different parts of Europe have 
been selected and are described below. 
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A city in the North: Stockholm  
Facts 
The city of Stockholm developed its first action plan to mitigate GHG in 
1997 in response to national environmental targets. Today, emissions are 
37 % lower than they were in 1990 (44 % if measured per capita). Over the 
same period, Stockholm’s population has grown by 37 %. 70 % of the total 
energy supply in the city comes from renewable sources. Its current target is to 
become fossil-fuel free by 2040 and to achieve 2.2 tonnes CO2-eq per inhabitant 
in 2020 (2.5 tonnes in 2016). 
In Stockholm, low-carbon urban planning is at the centre of the zero-
carbon transition. An example is the Royal Seaport eco-district in which zero-
carbon solutions are tested before being scaled up to city level. Favouring 
walking, cycling and public transport over car use is one essential part of urban 
planning. A ‘green parking index’ is used to promote new mobility schemes at 
the expense of private cars. 
The actions for reducing emissions in Stockholm have been centred on 
heating, transport, waste, electricity and gas. The district heating system 
was developed in the 1960s and now provides heat to around 80 % of the 
buildings. Over time, oil and coal have largely been replaced by incinerated 
municipal waste and wood chips as well as heat recovery from the sewage 
system. This waste-to-energy policy is the centre of the city’s circular economy. 
The latest development includes refrigerated stores and data centres as sources 
of heat. The district heating company is now looking into large-scale CCS from 
bioenergy combined heat and power (CHP) in order to create negative 
emissions. Energy efficiency in the city is also an area of work. For instance, an 
insulation programme targeting the large residential areas of the 1960s has 
been started and measurements show that the supply of heat could be cut by 
60 %. 
Location Capital of Sweden, on the Baltic Sea coast 
Population 950 000 inhabitants (1.8 million in the metropolitan area) 
Population density Ca. 3 600 persons/km2 
Ancient history Founded in the 13th century 
Modern history 
Construction of full-scale waste-water treatment, 
metro and district heating in 1930-1950. 
Experienced great expansion in the 1960s. Strong 
population growth since 2000. 
Major business areas ICT, life sciences and clean tech. 
Jurisdiction 
Strong mayoral powers regarding buildings, city 
roads, land use and water. The city owns most land 
and gets its financing from income taxes. 
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The city has promoted biofuel-powered public buses. Further, since 
2006, the Stockholm has a road-pricing system with automatic reading 
of number plates. This ‘congestion tax’ has reduced rush-hour traffic by 20 
%, cut emissions and brought financing to future infrastructure investments. 
This was a controversial measure when introduced, but it is now embraced by 
all actors. A network of filling stations for biogas provides fuel for taxis, freight 
and service vehicles. Electrification is under way, with 700 public charging 
points. The city’s procurement of transport has been used as an instrument to 
stimulate low-carbon development in the transportation fleet, with a 50 % 
share of renewable fuel as a requirement for new contracts. 
 
The city’s waste-management system includes source separation for 
material recovery, energy recovery from incineration and digestion of 
sludge and organic waste to biogas. Only 3 % of the waste is put into 
landfill. In 2017, a pilot plant for producing biochar from green waste was 
inaugurated. The biochar, which is used as a soil improver in the city’s tree 
plantations, is likely to be the world’s first urban carbon sink and its operation is 
economically profitable. 
The environmental programme assumes a strong position in the city’s 
governance. Stockholm’s Vision 2040 is a long-term complete vision for city 
development built around the different aspects of sustainability. All 
environmental sub-targets are reported regularly in the city’s integrated 
management system. The long-term targets are communicated to citizens and 
local enterprises in order to build momentum. 
Stockholm has explored the synergies between decarbonisation and 
digitalisation. Apart from the energy recovery from data centres mentioned 
above, open data is provided for app developers, and there is cooperation with 
the academy and local companies known as Digital Demo Stockholm. Using the 
latest ideas in IoT and Big Data, new applications are being developed and 
tested in practice. 
Figure 16: Historical development of GHG emissions in Stockholm per sector; total emissions are 
down 37 % since 1990. Source: Stockholm local government, 2018. 
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Important success factors include the systematic use of targets and 
measurements, the exploitation of national tax incentives promoting 
renewable energy, the deployment of demonstration projects within 
the EU Framework Programmes, and active dialogue with industry, 
academia and the public. Stockholm was awarded the title of Europe’s first 
Green Capital in 2010 (City of Stockholm, 2015). The city was assessed in 2012 
as an international ‘green leader’. While Stockholm has progressed in many of 
the city’s decarbonisation challenges, some of the key remaining challenges 
include how to reduce emissions from the transport sector and from fossil 
plastic that is incinerated with waste streams. 
A city in the east: Warsaw 
Facts 
Background of action plan, changes and targets 
Warsaw has made significant efforts to become more sustainable 
within a nation that is known for its adherence to traditional methods 
of energy production (Michał Olszewski, 2018). The Sustainable Energy 
Action Plan (SEAP) for Warsaw was published in 2011, presenting a version of 
the EU 20/20/20 goals tailored specifically for the city. When the document was 
written in 2013, GHG emissions in Warsaw were: 78 % from the energy sector, 
15 % from the transport sector, and 7 % from waste management and waste-
water treatment. Within the transport sector, individual vehicles comprised 40 
% of total travel and 80 % of emissions. According to the plan, and taking 2007 
as a base year, in 2020, the maximum energy consumption must not exceed 
22.7 million MWh per year (Infrastructure Department of the City of Warsaw, 
2013). 
The plan promotes action on several issues. As regards the housing sector, 
Warsaw faces a key challenge that many buildings were built in prefabricated 
style from low-efficiency materials. The plan addresses this challenge by setting 
Location East-Central Poland 
Population (2017) 1.758.143 inhabitants  (3.2 million metropolitan area) 
Population density Ca. 3 330 persons/km2 
Ancient history Founded around 1300 
Modern history Rebuilt after WWII, metro lines open in last 20 years 
Major business areas ICT, biotechnology, energy, agri-food, tourism 
Jurisdiction 
Strong local government policy powers and 
ownership over public buildings, transport 
infrastructure, roads and water systems.  
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targets for thermally retrofitting all residential buildings and modernising all 
heat sources, indoor lighting and appliances. The efficiency of the water-heating 
systems will also be upgraded. The plan also sets goals for the public sector, 
including retrofitting of public buildings, modernisation of street lighting, 
replacement of office equipment, and organising information campaigns. 
Within the transport sector, the intention in Warsaw is to both 
modernise transport and road systems and to foster change in how the 
residents travel, by promoting walking and public transportation rather 
than car travel. To achieve this goal, a transit authority in the city has been 
established and several actions are planned, such as the development of trams 
and subway systems, the improvement of railroad efficiency, the replacement 
of rolling stock and integration of transit methods, and the improvement of bus 
transit and optimisation of routes. The local government is promoting public 
transport by expanding its infrastructure and introducing a common ticket for 
public transport. 
Furthermore, the plan sets a roadmap for modernising the district heating 
network, adapting the electricity grid for renewables, and enabling prosumers 
(e.g. citizens producing their own electricity via solar panels) in the city. 
By 2014, the following goals had been achieved (Climate Scorecard, 2018): 
 transportation modernised with electric buses and trams and energy-efficient 
trains; 
 public bikes schemes made available; 
 hybrid rubbish trucks increased to 12.2 % of the fleet; 
 housing sector improved with better lighting, appliances and retrofitting 
insulation. 
Warsaw has made significant efforts to introduce a variety of public-awareness 
strategies to help citizens get involved with decarbonisation efforts. Actions 
specific to the city include: 
 Picnic with Climate: Every year since 2008, the City of Warsaw has organised 
for families to come together to discuss and take quizzes on climate; 
 Tree Day: Every year since 2003, NGO Klub Gaja organises joint tree 
planting based on local involvement, focused in particular on getting children 
involved; 
 Warsaw Recycling Days: Every year since 2006, the day aims to promote 
environmental awareness, when citizens may exchange recyclable materials 
for green items like seeds and flowers. 
Overall, the city has significantly improved its sustainability compared 
to other areas in Poland. Interestingly, public-awareness campaigns and 
changes in citizen behaviour has played a key role in this change. Behavioural 
changes were promoted through targeted incentives, which were well received 
by the local population. 
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A city in the south: Barcelona 
Facts 
Background of action plan, changes and targets 
Barcelona has long struggled with poor air quality, and in recent years 
has sought to strengthen efforts to reduce local pollution – in parallel 
with climate change mitigation action. The city sets out its climate 
roadmap for 2014-2018, which comprises several strategic measures (City of 
Barcelona, 2012). The strategic measures are divided into sectors, namely: 
energy and air, public transit and mobility, climate change resilience, waste 
management, and biodiversity. 
While the climate roadmap is important to set out the city’s vision on 
decarbonisation, in Barcelona, climate action is addressed in all sectors in 
a transversal way across plans. The city is addressing, in particular, 
mobility-related GHG emissions with tailored mobility and innovation plans – 
which are primarily aimed at reducing local pollution (City of Barcelona, 2014). 
The plans address three fundamental aspects of mobility to be improved by 
2018. 
The first is improving the city’s mobile fleet. To accomplish this, Barcelona 
has set out a plan to subsidise citizens who wish to trade their old vehicles in 
for cleaner, newer ones, with the possibility of contributing up to EUR 2 500 per 
vehicle. Similarly, those who wish to purchase electric or hybrid vehicles may 
also receive a subsidy from the local authorities. The plan aims to have 15 % of 
hybrid vehicles in 2020. Furthermore, municipal vehicles are being 
progressively replaced by electric or hybrid variants. 
The second aspect concerns optimising the number of vehicles in the city’s 
streets and traffic flows. The first project working towards this is improving 
Location North-Eastern Spain, on the Mediterranean Sea 
Population (2018) 1.628.936 inhabitants (3.2 million metropolitan area) 
Population density Ca. 16 000 persons/km2 
Ancient history Founded between 5th and 3rd century BC 
Modern history Expansion to prepare for 1992 Summer Olympics 
Major business areas ICT, biotechnology, energy, agrifood, tourism 
Jurisdiction 
The city has strong powers and ownership over 
public buildings and urban land use. However, it has 
limited power over the city’s energy supply and 
partial powers over the transport infrastructure. 
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car-pooling options by setting up a website to inform the population and 
establishing a network of high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) users. This is aimed at 
increasing the coefficient of vehicle occupation in the city in 2020 from 1.18 to 
1.4. Another project is working to improve car-sharing options, aimed at 
establishing a fleet of vehicles throughout the city which citizens can use as 
required, paying a fee for the service and kilometres travelled. Finally, 
optimisation of the current taxi network is also under way. In an effort to 
reduce the amount of time taxis spend in traffic without passengers, more taxi 
stands are being established throughout the city, and users are encouraged to 
book before a drive, to optimise taxi drivers’ routes. 
The third and final aspect is the management of transport. Redesign of the 
bus networks is a key project. Orthogonal routes are being planned together 
with priority roads for buses, and special lanes for buses and HOVs. Finally, the 
schedules and frequency of buses are being reanalysed to optimise traffic flow 
and reduce fuel usage. 
In addition, on 1 December 2017, the city introduced a low-emission zone 
within which cars that do not possess a city-defined environmental label are not 
allowed to go. This is currently valid only when the air quality is poor, but it will 
become permanent in 2020. 
Furthermore, the city of Barcelona has several projects addressing the 
green and circular economy and biodiversity. A range of actions are being 
promoted, such as shifting towards renewable sources, electric mobility, waste 
prevention, increasing green spaces, and support for innovative business (such 
as bycing — the city’s bike-sharing scheme). Barcelona does not only rely on 
public initiatives, but several companies, designed with a circular economy 
perspective, are now emerging. E-sharing motorbikes (ecooltra, mottit, taro) 
are expanding in Barcelona, alongside cooperatives in the farming sector (e.g. 
promoting competitiveness and reducing organic waste in a localised way) and 
in the building sector (e.g. promoting flexible, modular and shared spaces) (City 
of Barcelona, 2018). 
Barcelona is a good example of the co-benefits of decarbonisation. Most 
of the policies designed to reduce emissions in cities do not specifically address 
climate change mitigation, which features as a cross-cutting issue across 
policies, but rather focus on improving the local air quality and the city’s 
liveability. Nevertheless, these are key drivers for cutting local GHG emissions. 
3 Lessons learned and R&I gaps 
3.1 Technologies, smart cities and the circular economy – lessons learned 
and R&I gaps 
As mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, European cities are 
very diverse, both within and among countries. Even within cities, building 
stocks in different areas differ in energy efficiency and level of digitalisation. In 
addition, as noted in the three city case studies presented in this chapter, 
different cities are adopting different low- and zero-carbon solutions — making 
a case for the transmission of knowledge on decarbonisation solutions across 
geographic boundaries to scale up promising solutions in the EU. In this diverse 
context, it is possible to recommend some R&I actions that would be beneficial 
for EU-wide action on decarbonisation in cities. 
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The first recommendation in this context is that there is a need for R&I to help 
develop cities as integrated and zero-carbon systems. To achieve this, 
cities can work as ‘living labs’ engaging every actor, from citizens to academia, 
local businesses and the municipality, to test innovation in practice.  
Many technical systems are controlled by the city. Integrating them provides 
possibilities for more efficient processes, less demand for energy, and greater 
access for citizens to technologies and methods for decarbonisation. To achieve 
this, there is a need for R&I to further develop and test smart cities 
concepts. These are crucial for integrating innovative technologies and ICTs in 
the urban system. Technologies, such as energy-management systems, 
monitoring sensors, and steering algorithms are meant to improve efficient use 
of urban (physical) infrastructures. For instance, smart thermal grids, multi-
commodity grids, mobility-as-a-service measures, as well as smart lamp posts 
and smart bins reduce energy consumption. In the EU context, the 
effectiveness of these measures is continuously being monitored and analysed 
for each specific urban context, in order to find the best solutions to upscale. 
Also, electrical mobility (as described in Chapter 3) can be enabled in cities by 
higher digitalisation of the system. 
Although smart city projects are often driven by infrastructure and technology, 
the major barriers to successfully implementing smart solutions are related to 
governance (i.e. ownership, business models and incentive structures). In 
particular, smart city projects usually develop new, innovative infrastructure 
layers (roads, grids, buildings) within existing urban systems. These new layers 
have to be connected with the existing infrastructure. Here, there is a trade-off 
between, on the one hand, choosing to develop highly innovative new 
techniques that replace existing infrastructures and do not connect well with the 
old system or, on the other hand, choosing less-innovative solutions that do not 
significantly challenge the existing interests and system. Several recent 
examples demonstrate the latter. Due to existing interests and path 
dependency, innovative smart solutions are designed and embedded in such a 
way that they do not fully grasp the innovation and carbon-reduction potential. 
Avenues for future research in smart cities should cover: i) policy aspects 
regarding how to balance the public and private interests of technical and ICT 
operators; ii) data quality and data-gathering issues around big data; and iii) 
ownership and privacy issues in smart cities. 
Part of the integration of low- and zero-carbon technologies and strategies in 
cities will involve exploring smart urban spatial strategies. Both for new 
cities and existing city areas being revitalised or expanded, smart spatial 
strategies will be needed to integrate zero-carbon technologies and strategies. 
These include renewable energy sources, energy storage, green areas and other 
carbon sinks, and would cover cities both underground and overground. 
Furthermore, many technological systems will need to be improved and 
integrated for low- and zero-carbon cities. In the building sector, R&I on 
how to improve the efficiency of the existing stock will be needed. 
Continuous R&I will be required to promote both the refurbishment of existing 
non-efficient buildings and the design of innovative strategies for near-zero-
energy buildings. That will include R&I on the necessary policies, programmes, 
technologies and economics to reduce emissions across the wide array of 
building types in the EU. 
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Further R&I will also be needed to understand the role of cities in 
producing electricity and heat locally. As cities are hot spots of high-density 
energy demand, various energy supply and end-use efficiency improvement 
solutions, from district heating, electrification, local renewable systems, 
electricity and heat storage, or building retrofitting, can be combined. The exact 
solutions will differ significantly among the different European cities. Solar, 
geothermal, bioenergy, waste and wind sources can be harnessed in cities for 
local electricity and/or heat production. Research is needed to understand their 
potential and integration in the urban energy system, while the flexibility of 
different energy systems to be upgraded to avoid path-dependencies and 
technology lock-ins as energy services require change. As for heating, in 
addition to the much-investigated renewable heat sources, such as biomass-
based CHP or solar thermal units, geothermal energy in cities offers a 
substantial source of heat (Hirschberg, Wiemer and Burgherr, 2018). Shallow 
geothermal systems with heat pumps, seasonal underground storages for heat 
and cold, or deep systems that reach to 3-5 km in depth and produce both heat 
and electricity can all contribute to zero-carbon cities with a diversified energy 
supply. Berlin’s Reichstag (German Bundestag, 2018) building and multiple 
geothermal projects in Munich are several examples of successful projects. 
R&I will also be needed to explore the benefits of electrification and biofuels 
in transport (see also Chapter 3). Electrified urban transport gives important 
co-benefits such as improved air quality and lower noise — and integrates well 
with ‘smart cities’. Construction machinery and transport on land and water 
have the potential to be electrified and integrated with smart cities concepts. At 
the same time, there is a need to better understand and utilise the benefits of 
biofuels in the urban transport decarbonisation challenge, thereby also 
supporting the bioeconomy. 
For integrating the above-mentioned systems, circular or semi-circular 
economy can also have several benefits, including less pressure on the 
environment, enhanced security of the raw materials supply, greater 
competitiveness, innovation, local growth and jobs. However, the shift to a 
circular economy poses several challenges, such as financing, understanding 
the needed economic enablers and skills, and the integration of multi-level 
governance. Furthermore, in the integration of the technical system, the 
circular economy should experiment with different technologies, both mature 
and innovative. Broader research will be needed on those technologies that 
enable the circular economy. Waste management, digitalisation, district heating 
and transportation optimisation are some of the topics that best relate the 
circular economy with technology. On the topic of waste management, 
synergies and trade-offs between reuse, recycling and waste-to-energy 
strategies should be further investigated. To overcome the challenges above, 
there is a need to better understand and research how outputs from one 
process can feed another in cities — which also depends on their location and 
size. For this to happen, there is a need to map the efforts towards the circular 
economy in different countries and cities to understand differences and capture 
best practices. 
Finally, to understand decarbonisation efforts in cities, continuous efforts will be 
needed to monitor and collect data on building efficiency, energy usage and 
citizens’ behaviour. Further research will be needed on how IT can act as an 
enabler of different decarbonisation strategies in cities — building on and 
analysing the large amount of data being made available thanks to 
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digitalisation. This will play a key role in collecting and analysing data, and 
further R&I will be crucial for analysing and gathering meaningful data from the 
digitisation processes in cities. Monitoring the effectiveness of climate action in 
cities as a response to new policies and innovations is key for evaluation and 
cross-city learning. R&I is needed to establish shared decarbonisation indicators 
that can be applied across cities to monitor, communicate and benchmark 
progress. Finally, networks of cities could be created to facilitate exchange of 
experiences and best practices. 
3.2 Governance of cities — lessons learned and R&I gaps 
Addressing societal challenges in a holistic and integrated way requires 
cooperation and cross-sectoral alignment. To build on this issue, a particular 
challenge should be addressed — that the regulatory power of cities is limited. 
Moreover, the type of power that cities have varies across Europe. This is 
especially true for the possibility to finance climate action and to stimulate 
private partners and consumers to do so. There is a need for R&I to 
establish how to enable governance of decarbonisation in cities, which 
will include several R&I actions. 
Best practices in zero-carbon urban planning will have to be mapped 
across EU cities. In new districts in particular, urban planning allows zero-
carbon solutions to be tested so that they can then be scaled up to the rest of 
the city. One example of this is the Stockholm Royal Seaport. Transport 
efficiency is a key outcome of such practices. The dense and walkable city, 
where new developments are located around public transport nodes, is less 
energy consuming than cities characterised by urban sprawl and car 
dependency. New and more sustainable mobility patterns can be fostered using 
careful planning, easy access to walking and cycling, and innovative parking 
policies. R&I is needed to better understand how new developments in cities 
can be planned to enable zero-carbon transition. 
Given the diversity of EU cities, R&I is needed to support the development and 
exchange of financing tools, new incentive models and business models 
that can support cities with different powers. Outcomes from such a programme 
may stimulate the upscaling and replication of successful measures and 
solutions in other countries. R&I could be used to understand how procurement 
procedures could be used to support the adoption of zero-carbon technologies 
or to redefine how public-private partnerships might operate. Strategic public 
entrepreneurship can be explored as a means of promoting decarbonisation in 
cities. 
Another important area of R&I emphasises the role of vertical, multi-level 
governance. Cities need national policies and EU directives to be successful. 
This underlines the importance of integrated policy action at the European, 
national and local level. There is a need for R&I to understand this interplay, 
and, most importantly, policy action at the European level to enable cities to 
take action against GHG emissions. EU funding instruments should support 
cities’ specific needs, and should be easier to use. There is also a need to 
coordinate the different instruments. 
Finally, climate is only one of the challenges facing governance in European 
cities. Social sustainability, integration, job creation and health are all important 
aspects for mayors in European cities and municipalities. The city of Barcelona 
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case study is the perfect example — in which the climate mitigation policy is 
highly intertwined with the local air-pollution policy. Further R&I is needed on 
how to facilitate integration of these complex tasks and to find and promote 
synergies. In addition, there is a need for understanding and mapping the 
co-benefits (e.g. with air pollution and health strategies) and trade-offs 
(e.g. costs) of climate action in cities with other development goals in 
order to coordinate policymaking (Fuso Nerini et al., 2018). 
3.3 Citizen engagement — lessons learned and R&I gaps 
Different European cities will need to take very different paths and 
strategies for engaging their citizens in zero-carbon innovation, depending on 
the locally available technical and social solutions as well as the cities’ 
economic, societal and regulatory contexts. As the previous section shows, the 
zero-carbon strategies of Stockholm, Barcelona or Warsaw are very different. It 
is therefore important to understand the differences and similarities among 
European cities in terms of zero-carbon innovation potential and options, as 
well as to observe how innovation emerges, diffuses and can be fostered. 
To truly tailor zero-carbon strategies to every specific city, local citizen 
engagement processes are irreplaceable. In line with the democratic principle 
of involving those who will be affected, and in order to come up with realistically 
implementable and scalable solutions, broad citizen dialogues and visioning 
processes will be key. Very little is currently known about citizens’ visions of 
zero-carbon cities and zero-carbon societies in Europe and how these visions 
could be integrated into broadly legitimised and realistically implementable 
zero-carbon strategies that mobilise citizens’ critical capacity (Creutzig et al., 
2015). Citizen consultations and digital crowdsourcing of citizens’ ideas could 
help develop such an overarching zero-carbon vision. The UK 2050 Calculator  
has proved an effective means of engaging citizens in the deliberations over 
very complex, national-level decarbonisation (Pidgeon et al., 2014). 
Although top-down techno-economic assessments indicate the important 
potential for emission savings through behaviour and lifestyles changes and 
social innovation (Creutzig et al., 2016), there is comparatively little evidence 
on assessing this potential against real-world empirical observations and 
investigating how such potential could be enabled and then scaled up. Large-
scale generalisable empirical studies as well as local case studies, such as living 
labs, are key to unpicking the complexities of zero-carbon actions, including 
citizens’ goals, preferences, habits and norms. Without substantial evidence 
from social and behavioural sciences, it is difficult to say whether European 
citizens will broadly accept and actively embrace their new role in zero-carbon 
cities. 
European citizens will become an integral part of the zero-carbon transition, 
both by embracing the change as well as driving and sustaining it through social 
innovation. Citizens’ perspectives on how their zero-carbon cities of the future 
should look are key for developing strategies that will be supported and 
realistically implementable. New mechanisms for fostering bottom-up 
social innovation and the adoption of zero-carbon lifestyles should be 
experimented with. More research is needed into understanding how 
information, economic incentives, policy and regulation can nudge citizens 
towards more active participation in zero-carbon action. 
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Low-carbon innovations in cities have so far primarily included technical 
innovations in the energy and transport fields (Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 
2013). End-use technologies and social innovations tended to be marginalised 
in past research compared to larger-scale technical solutions (Wilson et al., 
2012). It is therefore key to expand the evidence with R&I on the full range 
of citizen-centric technical and societal zero-carbon innovations in 
cities, including dietary changes, the sharing economy, ICT, participatory 
budgeting, and many others. For example, experiences from successful free 
web platforms for car-pooling, such as AhaCAR in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, 
where the drivers and passengers distribute the travel costs among themselves 
without anyone gaining financially, could help inform sharing solutions in other 
cities or even other zero-carbon innovations. Monitoring and evaluation has a 
key role to play in understanding under what conditions successful initiatives 
emerge and how they are enabled in terms of financial, natural and human 
resources. This evaluative evidence should extend from the behaviour of 
individuals and households to low-carbon peer groups and cooperatives and 
even to networks of European cities. 
Citizen engagement is one part of the overall zero-carbon transition 
governance in cities, whereby multiple stakeholders in local, regional and 
national governments as well as in industry and businesses have a role to play. 
In fact, the analysis of ongoing urban climate experiments worldwide indicates 
that new governance schemes emerge, for example, with deeper cooperation 
between private and public bodies (Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). 
Integrated governance approaches will align and leverage the actions of all the 
stakeholders and citizens for fast and productive zero-carbon innovation. 
3.4 Other areas of R&I 
There is a need to understand the co-benefits of climate action in cities, 
across the full range of SDGs. Climate policies can interact and have synergies 
(or trade-offs) with many development goals (Fuso Nerini et al., 2017). As 
examples, policies to improve liveability and health outcomes in cities can also 
result in decarbonisation, and vice versa. Expanding green spaces in cities can 
enhance the role of cities as ´carbon sinks´. As seen in Barcelona, policies 
targeted at reducing local air pollution can have clear decarbonisation co-
benefits. And climate mitigation in cities can support the mitigation of energy 
poverty in cities, targeting the 54 million European citizens (10.8 % of the EU 
population) unable to keep their homes adequately warm in 2012 (Pye and 
Dobbins, 2015). Actions to improve the efficiency of buildings and the 
management of energy in households can also help to address the pressing 
issue of energy poverty in buildings, whilst reducing GHG emissions, too. 
Finally, there is a need to improve the visibility of R&I funding for 
decarbonisation in cities. There are many EU-funded R&I actions in cities, 
but presented on many separate web pages, with different rules and criteria. 
Local and regional authorities — as well as academics — can lose themselves in 
the information flow. A one-stop shop, where all the tools available for cities 
could be explained (amount, criteria, etc.) could help local and regional 
authorities to navigate this information. To make it as user-friendly and 
intuitive as possible, this should be available in every Member State to allow 
local and regional authorities to access a set of instruments that could fit both 
their needs and their purpose. 
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3.5 From low-carbon achievements to zero-carbon cities in 2050 
A system-level approach, combining all the areas of innovation listed 
above, will have to move from localised low-carbon achievements to 
zero-carbon cities. First of all, strong city governance and vision will be 
needed. The governance will have to set clear zero-carbon targets and 
accompanying strategies to achieve the strategies. For the transition to happen, 
citizens’ buy-in and engagement will be crucial. All zero-carbon technology 
solutions will have to be used and tailored to the local context, and all of them 
combined in a smart city concept. Electricity consumed in cities must be zero-
carbon, which means this challenge will also depend on decarbonisation 
happening in national power systems. Cities will also have to influence the 
power mix by producing renewable electricity locally. Transport and heating will 
also have to become fully decarbonised based on a mix of renewable solutions 
and maximising internal flows. Waste will need to be minimised, and the 
circular economy promoted. To summarise, there will be no single ‘silver bullet’ 
solution for zero-carbon cities, but all the solutions listed above will have to be 
used in conjunction with and tailored to the local context. 
4 Recommendations for research and innovation 
R&I on how to develop cities as an integrated zero-carbon system. R&I 
is needed on how to integrate technical and social systems for low- or zero-
carbon cities. Key R&I questions relate to how renewable energy, electric 
mobility, and efficient and smart buildings can be integrated in a single city 
‘organism’. This should include how the concept of ‘smart cities’ and 
digitalisation can provide the tools for the integration of such systems. R&I 
should also explain how this integration might differ in cities which vary 
according to location, size and existing building stock and transportation 
infrastructure. 
R&I on the circular or ‘semi-circular’ economy in cities. There is a need to 
better understand how outputs from one process can feed another process in 
cities. For instance, urban waste must be used and recycled in the most 
efficient way. Energy, new products and carbon sinks can also be developed in 
new innovative processes, using local resources. For that to happen, the efforts 
towards the circular economy must be mapped in different countries and cities 
in order to understand differences and capture best practices. R&I on this topic 
should also include how the size and density of a city may affect its ‘circularity’ 
and whether or not there is an ‘optimal’ extent to the circularity of a city’s 
systems. 
R&I on how to enable governance for decarbonisation in cities. R&I is 
needed to support strong governance for decarbonisation in cities. The 
regulatory power of cities varies across Europe. Several have limited regulatory 
power for financing climate action and stimulating private partners and 
consumers to do the same. R&I is needed to understand the regulatory power 
that cities require to implement local climate action, and how it interacts with 
national and EU policy. Moreover, R&I is required to support the development 
and exchange of financing tools, new incentives and business models and 
partnerships that can support cities with different powers. Finally, R&I is needed 
to understand how governance can support energy-efficiency interventions in 
the EU’s existing building stock. 
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R&I on how to engage citizens in cities’ decarbonisation strategies. 
European citizens should become an integral part of the zero-carbon transition, 
both by embracing the change as well as driving and sustaining it through social 
innovation. Research is needed to understand the most effective strategies for 
engaging citizens, and how the location and size of a city can influence such 
strategies. Furthermore, R&I is required in order to understand how 
information, economic incentives, policy and regulation can nudge the citizens 
towards more active participation in zero-carbon action. New mechanisms for 
fostering bottom-up social innovation and the adoption of low-carbon lifestyles 
should be experimented with. 
All the above should be addressed through a mission-oriented action to be 
launched in Horizon Europe which should include what is indicated in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Possible R&I pathways to decarbonisation in cities. 
  
 130 
CHAPTER 7 
EU CITIZENS FOR THE DECARBONISATION OF EUROPE: THE 
ROLE OF SOCIAL INNOVATION AND LIFESTYLES 
1 What can EU citizens do and how can they contribute to 
decarbonisation? 
A scientific consensus exists stating that it is difficult to reach the 
targets of the Paris Agreement with technological and policy measures 
alone, without addressing social changes too. While the other chapters in 
this report emphasise the role of technological solutions and policies for the 
decarbonisation of Europe’s economy and society, this chapter focuses on the 
role that EU citizens21 can play in the decarbonisation of Europe and how social 
innovation can provide 'bottom-up' solutions, frameworks and incentives to 
make this change. 
The transition towards a carbon neutral economy and society in Europe 
will require deep changes in its economy, institutions, politics, social 
networks and people’s behaviour. This will create many social challenges 
that should be tackled with innovations in the socio-cultural sphere. EU citizens 
can change their behaviour to reduce their carbon footprint and can start 
initiatives that reduce CO2 emissions — ‘social innovation for decarbonisation’. 
Behavioural change and social innovation both have their own merits and are 
separate concepts, but social innovation can also enforce behavioural change. 
Social innovation creates the social context for adoption of zero- or 
low-carbon technologies, products or services and the context in which 
citizens can change their behaviour. With this, it is an essential element of 
the low-carbon transition that complements technology-driven approaches. This 
emphasises the role of both behavioural/social change and technology and 
brings them together as two sides of the ‘decarbonisation coin’. Social 
innovation activates specifically local social networks for decarbonisation. 
Through its bottom-up character and the fact that it is rooted in the specific 
local context, it complements ‘top-down’ public policies addressing 
decarbonisation. Social innovation, in general, contains two ‘core conceptual 
elements’ (Van den Have and Rubalcaba, 2016): ‘1) a change in social 
relationships, -systems or –structures, and 2) such changes serve a shared 
human need/goal or solve a socially relevant problem.’ 
Social innovation is often contrasted with the business type of 
innovation, but mixed forms of the two also exist. Social innovation is 
always embedded in the specific local context, which emphasises its European 
character and relates to the European capabilities and comparative advantage. 
Because social innovation is seldom a ‘stand alone innovation’, and is often 
realised in social networks and/or in combination with certain technological 
innovations, products or services, its impact on decarbonisation is difficult to 
measure, and not much data on the actual impacts is available. 
                                               
21  By ‘citizens’ we mean people in general, in different roles as consumers, initiators, 
investors and participants in the democratic process. 
 131 
Behavioural change and social innovation cover a rather broad field 
that is not limited by geographical scales, domains or topics/subjects. 
For instance, social innovations can be developed and applied in cities, but also 
in rural areas, where they can play a role in, for instance, combating poverty or 
unemployment or promoting social inclusion or decarbonisation, or 
combinations of these issues. Education can furthermore enforce behaviour or 
lifestyle change, by delivering information on which behavioural changes are 
most effective and how to implement them, and in delivering (social) support 
for the behavioural change. 
In this chapter, the roles of EU citizens in behaviour and lifestyle change and in 
creating social innovations are elaborated. 
2 Behavioural and lifestyle change for fewer CO2 emissions  
A plethora of elements create lifestyles that ultimately contribute to 
climate change — the type and size of housing, comfort expectations for 
heating or cooling, and daily practices in or outside homes. The location of 
housing, work and leisure activities as well as the choice of a car, public 
transport, cycling, walking or aviation for transport lead to very different carbon 
footprints. Increasing consumption of meat as well as fruits and vegetables that 
have been transported over long distances and refrigerated for long periods 
drives emissions upwards. Even more fundamentally, there has been a 
transition towards large air-conditioned shopping malls that are massive energy 
consumers and — in contrast to smaller, local stores — reinforce carbon-
intensive lifestyles. Although there is still diversity across individual households, 
recent decades have evidenced a convergence across countries, cultures and 
households of various incomes towards an energy- and carbon-intensive 
lifestyle. 
Citizens can contribute significantly to fighting climate change in their 
homes. Globally, lifestyle changes could reduce residential emissions by an 
extra 13 % by 2050 — on top of emissions reduction by technological measures 
— as compared to the emissions in the baseline scenarios (van Sluisveld et al., 
2016). This 13 % reduction covers measures such as reducing thermal comfort, 
reducing hot water consumption, capping household size per capita, reducing 
the use of appliances and switching to smarter ones, reducing waste, and 
recycling. If behavioural plasticity is considered (i.e. the share of population 
that could be realistically induced to change), the behaviour changes that are 
associated with heating, ventilation, air-conditioning, hot water and building 
retrofitting in the United States could offer residential emission savings of up to 
10 % in a decade (Dietz et al., 2009). Beyond these integrated studies that 
embed ambitious behavioural change in a whole-system perspective, there are 
only scattered case studies (Creutzig et al., 2016). Some emission reductions 
only depend on behaviour and are hence easier to achieve, for example line 
drying instead of tumble drying, turning off lamps or avoiding stand-by mode. 
Other changes require new infrastructure, such as smart metering, or 
substantial investment, such as building retrofitting. 
Change in transportation choices offers a vast potential too. By 2050, 
lifestyle changes that reduce vehicle use and foster modal shifts could globally 
reduce residential emissions by an extra 35 % as compared to the baseline 
scenarios (also in van Slusveld et al., 2016). A behavioural assessment of the 
reasonably achievable reductions in the United States estimated more cautious 
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emission savings of 8 % in a decade due to purchasing new fuel-efficient 
vehicles, low resistance tyres and improved vehicle maintenance and driving 
behaviour. As aviation is another relevant contributor to climate change, any 
change in lifestyle that avoids or reduces air travel is key (Girod et al., 2013). 
Specific case studies and techno-economic assessments at times aspire to much 
more ambitious reductions, yet they do not offer a full behaviourally-informed 
system-wide assessment. 
Circular, sharing and second-hand economies can increase the overall 
efficiency of using energy, materials and natural resources and hence 
reduce emissions. Although the circular economy is a broader concept that 
crosscuts various activities from consumer to industrial levels, households can 
systematically reduce the flows of energy and materials by means of reducing 
unnecessary consumption, and by repairing, reusing and recycling. Interactions 
across individuals and households as part of the sharing and second-hand 
economy (Frenken and Schor, 2017) could further help to minimise carbon 
footprints. The unused goods could be donated, lent, rented or resold. The 
sharing and second-hand economies not only apply to household appliances or 
small consumer goods. They can reach more fundamentally to the increasingly 
popular car sharing or less common co-housing.  
The diet choices of European citizens also translate into a vast 
spectrum of emission outcomes. Figure 18 shows the variation in the per-
capita carbon footprint of food consumption in European households (Ivanova 
et al., 2017). Despite this variation in local cuisines and habits, transition from 
beef to pork, cod, chicken and, especially, plant-based food offers significant 
emission cuts. For example, replacing a full beef-based meal with a vegetarian 
one cuts emissions by over 10 times per meal (Carlsson-Kanyama and 
González, 2009). Further emission reductions can be achieved by minimising 
over-purchasing and food waste, consuming less food with low nutritional value 
and growing one’s own food or engaging in community gardening.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Household carbon footprint of 
food consumption per capita across Europe. 
Nec = non-classified food. (Reprinted with 
permission from Ivanova et al. 2017) 
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However, the real change in behaviour and lifestyles is difficult to achieve. 
In theory, most of the behavioural measures to save carbon emissions can be 
adopted comparatively widely, easily and rapidly in any European country. Many of 
these changes require behavioural plasticity and are not dependent on regulatory 
interventions or upfront monetary investment. Yet the increasing wealth of 
European families as well as the convergence of behaviour across countries 
currently lock Europe into high-carbon lifestyles. Even if some behavioural 
measures offer monetary or time savings, these savings can then in return be 
spent on new activities or appliances that lead to increasing emissions due to 
rebound effects. 
Top-down policies for behaviour and lifestyle change have been 
typically complemented by public information campaigns. Deliberate 
strategies with a mix of information, regulation, economic incentives/taxes and 
social engagement have proven to work in other areas, such as the reduction of 
smoking or the slow but continuous transition to ‘de-motorisation in cities’ or 
healthier living. There are lessons to be learnt from these experiences for the 
decarbonisation challenge. Behaviour change can emerge quite suddenly, but 
then take years and generations before it diffuses among the wide population. 
There are still knowledge gaps about the contribution of lifestyle and 
behavioural change to decarbonisation. Although consumption plays the 
key role in determining the future outcomes of climate change (Riahi et al., 
2017), there have been relatively few investigations on which behaviour and 
lifestyle changes can contribute most effectively to mitigation. Thus it is 
essential to gather generalisable empirical evidence across behaviour types and 
countries to estimate the reduction of the carbon footprint through specific 
behaviour and lifestyle measures and estimate which measures shall be 
prioritised for the most effective outcomes. Such evidence should include both 
bottom-up data from real-world case studies and ‘living labs’, as well as top-
down modelling assessments of scaling up the potential impact at continental 
and global scales.  
Multiple disciplines need to collaborate in providing the way forward on 
how to scale up behaviour and lifestyle change. Most of the research so 
far has been done in the silos of either technical or techno-economic 
assessments or in the social, behavioural and economic sciences. 
Interdisciplinary research that develops new scientific concepts at the interface 
of diverse scientific disciplines is key. These interdisciplinary collaborations 
should also be extended to active engagements with EU citizens and other 
stakeholders for designing low- or even zero-carbon behaviour and lifestyles of 
the future. 
Reaping the benefits of behaviour and lifestyle changes needs evidence 
on the effectiveness of the policy approaches. There is a tendency in R&I 
communities to refer to the lifestyle and behaviour changes as mitigation 
means that require public acceptance. Indeed, some measures, such as 
reducing the space heating temperature (assuming that the minimum heating 
temperature is ensured), reducing meat consumption or avoiding car or air 
travel, still face acceptance issues. Policies for promoting information 
campaigns, open public discussions, peer-to-peer and community initiatives, 
nudging and gamification can sensitise European citizens to the need for change 
and its impacts. Evaluative evidence should be gathered systematically to 
identify and scale up the most promising policy approaches. This evidence shall 
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come from other fields, such as health or mobility, to reveal the crucial triggers 
that have caused and sustained behavioural change in the past. 
3 New roles for EU citizens  
The energy transition and the liberalisation of energy markets create 
new roles for EU citizens (as consumers but also as prosumers) that 
involve them directly in the energy transition and through which they 
can become important change agents. Social innovation can then foster the 
social organisation of consumers and prosumers, for instance through 
cooperatives. The liberalisation of electricity markets in the EU tends to 
reinforce the power of people as consumers by giving them the choice of their 
supplier. Consumer empowerment in the energy system has become a goal of 
the European Commission, and corresponds to the ability of consumers to 
switch supplier easily, to receive an understandable bill, and to have access to a 
certified comparison tool to make well-informed decisions but also to become 
more active in the energy system. An active consumer in the energy system 
develops into a prosumer who is able to generate, self-consume, store or sell 
electricity. This is a growing trend in Europe which clearly contributes to the 
decentralisation of the energy system. In 2015, there were 4.8 million EU 
household prosumers and 620 000 collectives, and it can be expected that 
around half of EU households will be prosumers (either individually or 
collectively) by 2050. 
Box 1: Social innovation for decarbonisation: the example of 
Elektrizitätswerke Schönau, Germany  
Ursula Sladek started a local citizens’ initiative to generate electricity in a 
sustainable way after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. This initiative was the 
first of its kind in Germany to take over the grid as well as electricity supply 
to the local community, which it did in 1997 (Schönau, 2016). When the 
German electricity market was deregulated in 1998, the initiatative seized the 
opportunity to supply all its Schönau customers exclusively with electricity 
generated from renewable and cogeneration sources. As a result, Schönau 
does not use power supplied from nuclear and coal-fired plants. What started 
as a local initiative has now become the ElektrizitätsWerke Schönau (EWS), 
an energy cooperative with five subsidiaries aiming at sustainable energy 
production and supply, which by the end of 2016 had 5 100 co-operative 
shareholders, 164 462 electricity consumers, 12 718 natural and biogas 
customers, and 110 employees. 
On top of the two classical roles in the electricity system, i.e. producing 
and consuming electricity, a new role for citizens of providing flexibility 
to the electricity system is becoming increasingly important. Flexibility is 
essential to maintain a well-functioning system, with increasing use of variable 
energy sources such as wind and solar. At the household level, flexibility 
(upwards, and downwards) can be provided via energy storage devices such as 
batteries (behind-the-meter, or ‘on wheels’ with electric vehicles) or via electric 
boilers which can adapt their pattern according to the system’s needs, 
increasing and decreasing the level of power accordingly.  
With these new roles, individuals should be able to use electricity in a 
conscious manner, and to alter their behaviour towards efficiency and 
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flexibility. Raising awareness about investing individually or collectively in 
generating assets, but also adopting more flexible patterns of using electricity, 
is needed to trigger this behaviour. Societal Appropriation (as coined by the EIT 
InnoEnergy) aims to raise awareness about energy to progressively lead 
individuals towards a steering role in the energy transition, and to contribute to 
embedding energy in Europeans’ social identities. In the same vein, new 
companies are emerging that are developing personal coaches to guide users 
and provide them with tips and tricks to optimise their consumption, help them 
navigate and choose the offer which suits their preferences, leverage social 
norms via comparison to others, and nudge them towards more efficient and 
more flexible behaviour. 
4 Social innovation through active EU citizens 
Active EU citizens reduce greenhouse gas emissions through social 
innovations such as grassroots innovation and social entrepreneurship 
that create local capacity and forms of professionalised or 
commercialised organisations to support local communities in 
decarbonisation. Social innovation is rooted in the specific local social system 
and its needs, and is fuelled by local initiators who act on social needs and are 
skilled in finding novel ways (business models, ways of collaboration, funding 
mechanisms, etc.) to solve issues. The social process that is initiated in this 
way fosters at the same time the local capacity to solve the issue. To get social 
innovation off the ground requires a lot of energy, knowledge and skills from 
the initiators. Local businesses, start-ups, community developers and crowd 
funding mechanisms also have a role to play here and can create local jobs. 
Social innovations are not domain specific, unlike policy fields. Social 
innovations can therefore create a tension with existing policy silos and 
related policies. For this reason, social innovation is often neglected by policy 
and policymakers and not seen as a means to reach policy goals. This explains 
the very low awareness of social innovation among most policymakers. 
However, social innovations could support many different actions or 
complement regional- or local-level policies related to the decarbonisation 
challenge in different fields. Social innovation could be directed towards ‘an 
inclusive and just transition’ through empowering and activating the local 
population in creating new jobs related to energy efficiency and sustainable 
energy, or through establishing new energy providers (see Box 1). Social 
innovation could also create new mobility services that meet local mobility 
needs, and that create a low-carbon footprint. It could also be directed towards 
changing food patterns towards a lower carbon footprint. Social innovation is 
therefore an enabler of low-carbon footprints in different fields, such as energy, 
mobility, food, business and, last but not least, cities, although it is also 
relevant for the decarbonisation of rural areas (see Figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Topics dealt with in social innovation and their relation to societal challenges, based on an 
analysis of 1 000 world-wide social innovation cases. Source: Howaldt et al., 2016. 
       
As social innovations are developed in a specific local (social) situation, 
replication to other localities and upscaling of social innovations is a 
challenge. Specific business models, new forms of organisations or 
cooperatives, cooperation with businesses and public authorities, and 
development of targeted replication and upscaling strategies can help to solve 
this issue. 
Grassroots innovation is ‘a network of activists and organisations 
generating novel bottom-up solutions for sustainable development and 
sustainable consumption that respond to the local situation and the 
interests and values of the communities involved’ (Seyfang and Smith, 
2007). Grassroots innovations differ from mainstream innovation in that they 
possess different types of sustainable development and forms such as 
cooperatives, informal community groups, social enterprises and voluntary 
associations (Martin et al., 2015). They face many challenges related to funding 
and finance, regulations, binding initial members, finding skilled people, 
connecting to research institutes and diffusion of their innovations (Hossain, 
2016). As the innovations are small scale, and very locally situated, they 
generally have difficulty getting attention from policy makers. Another possible 
reason for this difficulty is is the lack of actual outcomes that policy makers can 
use. Setting grassroots innovation higher on the policy agenda through 
communicating attractive outcomes is therefore one of the main challenges. 
There are examples of grassroots networking organisations relevant for 
decarbonisation, such as the Transition Network22 and the European ECOLISE 
network23. Grassroots innovation could be strengthened by smart public policies 
empowering non-governmental (NGO), civil society (CSO) or even non-profit 
(NPO) organisations, who by their nature involve ordinary people in delivering 
locally needed solutions. 
                                               
22 https://transitionnetwork.org/about-the-movement/  
23 http://www.ecolise.eu/about-ecolise/  
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Box 2: Social innovation for decarbonisation: the example of Fundacja 
Łąka24, Poland 
Fundacja Łąka is a Polish social enterprise that is empowering citizens to take 
an active role in the ‘greening’ of cities. Increasing urbanisation has led to a 
loss of biodiversity and deterioration in the natural environment. The few green 
spots in cities have low biodiversity. Fundacja Łąka stimulates citizens to 
establish flowery meadows in cities among blocks of houses or in empty places, 
aiming to reduce CO2 through natural absorption by plants, reduce local 
temperatures and increase biodiversity within local communities. Fundacja Łąka 
sells seeds and ‘insect hotels’ to interested citizen groups, trains them on how 
to seed and maintain the ‘city meadows’ and is involved in educational projects 
with citizens and CSR activities in cooperation with large companies and 
corporations. 
Social entrepreneurship contains several sub-concepts, which are 
identified as i) social value creation, ii) the social entrepreneur, iii) the 
social entrepreneurship organisation, iv) market orientation and v) 
social innovation (Choi and Majumdar, 2014). The individual, the social 
entrepreneur, plays a key role in developing innovations that create (local) 
social wealth. These individuals are able to ‘find innovative solutions to social 
problems of his/her community that are not adequately met by the local 
system’. Several international organisations such as Ashoka support and 
promote social entrepreneurship to solve social problems with innovative 
concepts, creativity and entrepreneurial skills25 26. UN organisations support 
social innovations: UNDP through its Global Centre for Public Service Excellence 
Innovation, and UNIDO through the Entrepreneurs for Social Change 
programme for young social entrepreneurs.  
Social innovation has the potential to develop into new businesses on a 
local, national and even international scale. Market orientation is an 
integral part of social innovation (Martinez et al., 2017). As a social innovation 
develops further, and the organisation becomes more mature, professionalised, 
or commercialised, it can develop into a business-like organisation. Many social 
innovations shift from a marginal to a commercial organisation over time 
(Hossain, 2016). Businesses themselves can also develop social innovations, 
which is sometimes seen as a further development of corporate social 
responsibility (Mirvis et al., 2016). It has been found that social innovations 
influence the sustainability of big companies, so the interaction between social 
innovation and corporate (sustainability) strategies of (big) companies is an 
interesting topic for research (Hockerts and Wüstenhagen, 2012).  
  
                                               
24 https://www.laka.org.pl 
25 https://www.ashoka.org/en/about-ashoka 
26 https://www.ews-schoenau.de/ 
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Box 3: Social innovation for decarbonisation: the example of DORÉMI, 
France27 
A social entrepreneur, Vincent Legrand, pioneered a large-scale operational 
approach, the DORÉMI solution, for renovation of houses in a carbon friendly 
way. The DORÉMI solution relies on a two-pronged strategy: 1) train 
independent builders in sustainable renovation techniques and 2) group them 
locally to better negotiate with materials manufacturers and package a simple, 
global renovation offer to homeowners at a reasonable cost. The solution 
unlocks the market. Builders reduce their costs and are willing to explore 
sustainable renovation as a new economic opportunity, owners have access to a 
simplified, reasonable-cost offer, and a maximised environmental impact is 
generated by replacing incremental renovation with a global renovation process. 
Partnerships with local authorities enable external stimulation of demand. With 
DORÉMI, regions overcome the complexity of the issue and support a highly 
efficient solution for the environment, reducing heating consumption by four to 
six times. 
Although much knowledge has been developed about social innovation 
in the past years, there still exist some important knowledge gaps. The 
actual impact of social innovation on reduction of CO2 emissions, dependent on 
the followed approach, is still not very well known as many social innovations 
have been researched on process rather than on outcome. Therefore, there is a 
need to evaluate relevant past projects and monitor saved CO2 emissions of 
social innovations related to decarbonisation. 
Many social innovation initiatives lack a good interaction with science. 
These initiatives could gain from transdisciplinary approaches in which 
scientists, social innovators, businesses, public authorities and other 
stakeholders work closely together on new types of social innovations with a 
high impact on carbon emissions. This fits in the mission-oriented approach of 
Horizon Europe. 
Replication and upscaling of social innovations is still an important 
challenge, although progress on this point has been made. There is a need for 
research on replication and upscaling strategies and actions to gain more 
insight into applicable mechanisms. The private sector could help in the 
replication and upscaling of social innovations. 
5 Policies to support social innovation for decarbonisation  
Although social innovation in general is adequately supported by the 
European Commission, there are still actions to be taken to exploit its 
potential for decarbonisation fully, especially on the awareness of 
policy makers. 
The European Commission supports social innovation in various ways, 
for instance, through its R&I programmes. A policy review paper (Moulaert 
et al., 2017) was recently published that examined 30 social innovation projects 
in depth. It that warns of a reduction in the significance of social innovation for 
                                               
27 https://www.ashoka.org/en/fellow/vincent-legrand 
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social enterprise and business, and argues for recognition of a variety of forms 
of social innovation. It stresses that policies should be refined to support social 
innovation, bearing in mind the shift from ‘government to governance’, which 
calls for a more coordinating and facilitating role for the state. It observes an 
underuse of social science contributions in the analysis of societal challenges 
and policies to address them.  Beyond activities to support social innovation 
carried out by DG Research and Innovation, the European Commission also 
supports social innovation from the entrepreneurial side, providing funding to 
social enterprises and entrepreneurs via the common instruments suitable for 
this purpose, such as the SME instrument. The European Commission organises 
a grant competition published on the Social Challenges Innovation Platform that 
aims to match social challenges submitted by local authorities to 
entrepreneurial innovation. By providing EUR 30 000 grants to selected solution 
providers, the European Commission aims to transform the challenges into 
business opportunities. 
EU policy-making can support social innovation by enacting new 
legislation or by harmonising existing legislation to address the market 
fragmentation which obstructs scaling up. In this regard, the European 
Commission has recently released a Communication in which an action plan for 
fintech is proposed with a suggestion to create a passport for crowdfunding 
platforms to help them reach the EU scale. Crowdfunding can stimulate social 
innovation as a way to engage communities in the development of (local) 
projects. Kiva is a non-profit platform that expands access to capital for 
entrepreneurs around the world. Similar to microcredit, this is clearly a way to 
empower people as social entrepreneurs. A European association, the European 
Crowdfunding Network, promotes the use of alternative forms of finance, 
notably to boost the economic and social effectiveness of European structural 
and investment funds by better engaging people as tax payers and citizens in 
the allocation of public money.  
Many activities on social innovation, thus, have been initiated by the 
Commission. The question remains: What is still lacking, and what is 
the role of R&I in this? 
One of the bottlenecks for a wider uptake of social innovation is a lack 
of attention by policy makers to social innovation as a way to reach 
policy ambitions and goals. There is a need for policies that support social 
innovation, with a facilitating role for responsible authorities. The European 
Commission could launch a White Paper that creates awareness among Member 
State policy makers of social innovation for decarbonisation, by showing 
benefits and results of social innovation and by highlighting how local and 
national politicians and policy makers could support and facilitate social 
innovations for the decarbonisation of Europe’s society. Research could be done 
to develop new policy strategies and approaches that can be applied by policy 
makers to support social innovations. 
Another bottleneck is replication and upscaling of social innovations. 
Local and regional authorities can play a key role in supporting replication of 
proven social innovations within their territory. Research could develop the 
appropriate strategies and replication mechanisms for the further upscaling with 
and for these authorities, possibly in co-creation with other involved actors.  
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A point of attention for policy is the unequal distribution of the impact 
of the energy transition over groups and EU regions. Certain groups or 
regions in Europe will be disadvantaged by the energy transition (for instance 
because they rely on a fossil-fuel economy), which requires policy attention to 
redistribute the impacts of the energy transition. Social innovation could play a 
role in countering these disadvantages for certain groups or regions. 
6 Recommendations for R&I 
In the following, R&I recommendations are presented for the short term (2030) 
as social innovation plays a supportive role on the short term and needs to be 
adapted to the issues that are emerging on the longer term (that cannot be 
foreseen now). For the same reason, recommendations for research on 
behavioural and lifestyle change are also given for the short term. 
Social innovation and behavioural change are both part of innovation 
and societal change at systemic level. It has already been stated that social 
and technological innovation should be a unity of two parts that complement 
each other. Examples of cross-overs of social innovation and domains (mobility, 
energy, food and agriculture, etc.) have been given. Therefore, all system-level 
innovations recommended in this whole report have to contain a part that is 
dedicated to social innovation and behavioural research.  
Furthermore, a clear link exists with the mission on climate-neutral, 
‘circular’ and liveable cities. This mission has to propel social innovations 
and behavioural change for the short and long term, aiming to reduce carbon 
footprints to levels that are in accordance with the Paris Agreement. It should 
generate a network of successful examples of social innovations and 
behavioural change strategies to be the basis of their replication and further 
dissemination and upscaling.  
One of the challenges of R&I on social innovation and behavioural 
change related to reducing the carbon footprint is its interdisciplinary 
and transdisciplinary28 character. Scientists from diverse scientific 
backgrounds (social psychologists, political scientists, engineers, economists, 
etc.) should work together with social innovators, public policymakers, private 
innovators, citizens, etc. on new approaches for lifestyle change and social 
innovation that have a clear impact on the carbon footprint. Interdisciplinary 
and transdisciplinary cooperation is not self-evident and these benefit from 
research on effective interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary methods or 
processes for a better cooperation.  
There is a need for concrete information on the impacts (reduced CO2 
emissions) from social innovations and from strategies to change 
lifestyles. Robust evidence should be gathered in bottom-up real-world case 
studies as well as top-down model-based assessments to quantify the CO2 
emission reductions that can be achieved at local, regional and the EU scales 
                                               
28 Interdisciplinary research delivers new concepts and new insights through interaction 
among scientists from a variety of disciplines involved in the topic. Transdisciplinary 
research is even broader and delivers new concepts and approaches through involving 
scientific and stakeholder knowledge. 
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through social innovation and lifestyle change. Furthermore, Horizon Europe 
should focus on setting up research and empirical evaluation of social 
innovations and promising strategies for behavioural and lifestyle change in the 
practice of everyday life. A network of ‘living labs’ in the EU Member States 
could execute the experiments in a systematic way to distil learnings and 
change strategies that can be replicated and further disseminated.  
R&I is geared towards awareness, developing effective lifestyle 
programmes and other new approaches to influence the behaviour and 
lifestyles of EU inhabitants, such as feedback mechanisms on the carbon 
footprint through ICT applications, gamification, neighbourhood labs or other 
types of community-based approaches. These new approaches are to be 
disseminated and implemented in all EU Member States, while keeping good 
track of their impact through specific monitoring of CO2 emissions. Research 
should develop these new approaches, assess their potential for CO2 reduction 
and monitor the actual CO2 reduction. Education programmes directed at 
disseminating the knowledge needed and developing the appropriate skills, as 
well as public campaigns, should foster the effective implementation of the 
awareness and lifestyle programmes.  
Europe should actively stimulate social innovation initiatives related to 
the decarbonisation challenge through developing a specific 
programme, and through suitable financing mechanisms, both existing 
and new, such as microfinancing, crowdfunding, etc. R&I should be aimed 
at monitoring and evaluating the reduction of CO2 emissions through the social 
innovation initiatives, identifying best practices and developing suitable 
upscaling mechanisms. 
Replication and upscaling of social innovations are still major 
challenges, and relevant for their impact. Governance regimes that 
empower replication and deployment of often locally-rooted initiatives should be 
developed in co-production with the communities involved. Research should be 
set up for upscaling within and among regions those initiatives that help to 
expand the impact of social innovation for decarbonisation. Furthermore, 
awareness should be created about the benefits of social innovation for 
decarbonisation through showcasing best practices. Promising social innovation 
initiatives should be brought to the forefront and to the attention of private 
businesses, policymakers and politicians to gain awareness within these groups. 
Policymakers should be provided with portfolios of approaches and strategies to 
stimulate and promote in their territory social innovations in relation to the 
decarbonisation challenge. 
Social innovations create local jobs. To exploit the entrepreneurial potential 
of social innovation fully, research should target the skills and capacities that 
are needed for social innovations that are able to be commercialised, and 
policies should support capacity building. Certain regions or social groups in 
Europe will be disadvantaged by the energy transition, for instance, because 
they lack money, skills or the capacity to change, or because they are still 
heavily dependent on fossil fuels for their local jobs. Research and (social) 
innovation should be aimed at the equity aspects of the decarbonisation of 
Europe, creating (local) capacity to change, and at the same time creating new 
jobs. From past regional transitions that are similar to those in the 
decarbonisation challenge (for instance, the transition in the south of the 
Netherlands from coal to gas), we can learn what kind of transition strategies 
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have worked. Research should take stock of these experiences and experiment, 
making use of the lessons learnt. 
Exchange knowledge and experience on the international level, and 
learn from this exchange. Many international organisations and networks are 
active in the field of lifestyle change and social innovation related to the 
decarbonisation challenge. Cooperation with these international organisations 
(UN organisations, communities of networks, etc.) should be set up to exchange 
knowledge and experience, to expand the number of cases that can be 
researched, and to diffuse the developed lifestyle change strategies and 
European social innovations to a worldwide community.  
 
Figure 20: Possible R&I pathways to decarbonisation through social innovation, as a compendium to the 
priorities for cities. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION 
1 Introduction 
A well-designed transition towards decarbonisation will represent an 
unprecedented opportunity and challenge for the competitiveness and 
well-being of Europeans. The key to success is that decarbonisation is not 
seen as a single new leitmotif (or recurring theme) in Europe’s economic policy, 
but as one further element to be considered among all the other objectives, 
including high employment, social inclusion, a (semi-) circular economy and, 
more generally, the need to promote sustainable production and consumption.  
In addition to the sectoral-specific research needs highlighted in previous 
chapters, we discuss here four key general, macro-economic aspects that need 
to be the focus of R&I efforts to promote European decarbonisation successfully 
and to ensure economic and social sustainability not only in the EU but also in 
the rest of the world. 
We first highlight the macro-economic implications of decarbonisation. 
In this context, we discuss the critical conditions that need to be put in place to 
ensure that decarbonisation is not a burden on Europe’s business in an already 
highly competitive global economy, but one of several benefits that an 
innovation-driven low-carbon transition could bring about. We then discuss the 
need to mobilise significant financing capital to support decarbonisation. As 
highlighted by the High-Level Expert Group of Sustainable Finance, this will 
require a deep restructuring of the financing system. We then focus on the 
international trade dynamics and implications arising from 
decarbonisation. We conclude by highlighting the necessity to promote 
innovative and low-carbon business models to ensure that decarbonisation 
fully materialises. 
Promoting the understanding of these crucial aspects through targeted 
R&I programmes is absolutely essential to safeguard Europe’s 
industrial place in the global economy and to achieve the global 
decarbonisation goals. If decarbonisation was a largely European objective 
only, both the economic and the climate strategies would fail. 
2 The macro-economic implications of decarbonisation 
Deep decarbonisation, complementing existing economic objectives, 
can become an unprecedented economic and industrial opportunity for 
the European economy if it is well managed. It could boost Europe’s 
competitiveness and bring about important co-benefits in terms of jobs, 
competitiveness and overall well-being. However, this requires that 
decarbonisation priorities are also priced into international trade practices. The 
European Commission must avoid a situation in which within Europe, carbon is 
penalised, and the European economy is flooded by cheap goods from other 
constituencies that do not put similar restrictions on carbon. This is particularly 
relevant in the early phases of decarbonisation, when technologies are 
developed with high levels of investment. Research should also be devoted to 
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the question of how to allow the European economy to advance on 
decarbonisation without disadvantaging it in economic terms in an open and 
competitive global economy. 
Indeed, irrespective of choices regarding decarbonisation, European countries 
face difficult economic challenges in the next decades. First, the EU 
infrastructure, including energy and transport infrastructure, is aging. For 
instance, average energy infrastructure investments across all sectors of the 
economy would need to ramp up to EUR 1 000 billion per annum over the 
period 2040-2050. Second, while EU energy demand will stabilise, EU 
dependence on foreign energy will increase due to a decrease in domestic 
fossil-energy production. Third, oil prices are likely to remain volatile. This, and 
the increased dependence on foreign oil, will make the transport sector more 
vulnerable. Fourth, the EU building stock will have to be upgraded to reduce the 
exposure of households and businesses to fluctuations in world fossil-fuel 
markets. As has already been shown with renewable energy technologies, 
innovation arising from decarbonisation can generate new industries and 
investments that can contribute to addressing these challenges. 
The major policy challenge facing the EU at present is precisely to 
design a decarbonisation strategy which reduces emissions but also 
supports the core political priorities of giving a new boost to jobs, 
growth and investment while shielding the weaker sections of society. 
To achieve this, the economic benefits and co-benefits of decarbonisation need 
to be better understood, as do the policies required to deliver them. This 
includes the effects that policies and decarbonisation in any one sector or 
country may have on other sectors or countries, given that the choice of 
decarbonisation strategies in Europe will affect, and in turn will be affected by, 
the economic strategies of other countries. It will also include the positive 
effects, for instance on health, due to the phasing-out of fossil fuel burning. In 
any transition there will be winners and losers. The EU decarbonisation strategy 
needs to recognise this, and while generating economic and environmental 
benefits overall, needs to build in measures to support the weaker sections of 
society that might be adversely affected. 
Europe is well-positioned to address this challenge. Europe’s 
competitiveness almost entirely relies on cognitive capacities, which 
today must be put to the task of decarbonisation and greatly enhancing 
resource productivity. Europe has many comparative advantages compared 
with other regions in the world, for instance in terms of human capital, cultural 
heritage, media independence, soil fertility and moderate climate conditions. 
Europe possesses expertise and manufacturing capacity in some of the world’s 
leading technologies in a large number of sectors. However, it strongly depends 
on the import of raw materials from all corners of the planet, and is challenged 
by high labour and production costs. Many of these weaknesses could be 
overcome by promoting innovation, fully exploiting Europe’s domestic 
renewable energy resources, and closing materials loops within a more circular 
economy. 
Europe has a strong track record in the estimation through economic 
models of the short- and long-term impacts of decarbonisation, and of 
the different policy choices which can be used to promote this process. 
However, these models have been quite weak in their ability to capture the 
wider implications of innovation and of the implementation of new technologies. 
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In the 1990s, economic models were being improved by implementing 
endogenous technological change with the purpose of better accounting for 
phenomena such as learning-by-doing and learning-by-searching or R&D. Partly 
by lack of real-life representation, this research line lost impetus over the past 
two decades. Moreover, most of the models have no separate representation of 
the financial system. 
There is a strong need to reduce the large uncertainty around future 
projections of the implications of decarbonisation. Current economic 
analyses yield widely diverging results regarding the implications of the 
transition towards the use of low-carbon energy technologies in terms of 
economic growth, competitiveness and employment effects or job creation. It is 
not always clear why different models produce results that cover a broad 
spectrum of possibilities, that is, whether it is merely a matter of diverging 
input parameters or whether they originate from different assumptions about 
the economic structures and relationships that these models embody. 
R&I programmes need to design and implement an economic approach 
that succeeds in developing and deploying the next generation of low-
carbon technologies, so as to reap substantial advantages associated 
with decarbonisation in terms of industrial renewal and 
competitiveness. 
2.1 R&I recommendations 
To this end, in the short term (up to 2030), R&I actions should focus on 
strengthening economic model analyses to ensure informed 
policymaking. Efforts should be focused in particular on improving the 
representation of European industrial policy, financing mechanisms and the 
increased competitiveness that should arise from successful low-carbon 
innovation and deployment. Research on improving the integrated assessment 
of climate and economic outcomes deserves renewed attention. Important 
improvements include the successful representation of the technological 
developments of the recent past, especially the dramatic cost reductions of 
some renewables technologies, identifying decarbonisation bottlenecks, 
designing economically-viable strategies to eliminate harmful fossil-fuel 
subsidies, performing risk analyses in the financial sector, and estimating the 
weighted average cost of capital. The costs of PV, for example, have fallen 
much more in the past several years than even the solar energy optimists 
hoped for. These dramatic cost reductions should be more adequately 
accounted for in revised economic models to reflect the continued low-carbon 
technology advancements due to not only the gaining of experience and 
fundamental and applied research but also as a result of wider effects such as 
economies of scale and automation. R&I efforts also need to investigate how 
employment can be maintained in an open and competitive global economy. For 
example, the cost reductions in solar technology went hand in hand with a 
dislocation to other constituencies. If this were to happen across the board, 
Europe would be stuck in a structural high-unemployment situation. Such R&I 
efforts need to focus in particular on international trade policies and examine 
how globally desirable strategies such as decarbonisation could be integrated 
with rewarding, and not penalising, the early movers. 
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Economic models are powerful tools, but R&I efforts should be devoted 
to adapting, refining and expanding them. Specifically, models should be 
enhanced to reflect some of the quintessential interactions between low-carbon 
technology innovation on the one hand and financial mechanisms and 
investment risk-reduction strategies on the other, which currently they broadly 
do not. At present, one observes shifting patterns for the weighted average cost 
of capital, with progressively more beneficial financial conditions for renewable 
energy technologies and less advantageous ones for fossil fuel-based options. 
The economic and integrated assessment models used to inspect projections for 
the imminent energy transition — at global, regional, national and local levels — 
should better account for relative cross-sectoral changes in the cost of capital. 
R&I efforts should be devoted to better understanding the role of 
industrial policy with regards to reconciling and addressing different 
political and policy goals at the same time. These may include targets 
regarding not only climate change, but also other environmental concerns such 
as air pollution and biodiversity conservation, SDGs, communication and 
digitalisation. Further research should be carried out with regards to the 
indispensable role public policies and financial assistance mechanisms play and 
how they can optimally complement efforts from the private sector. It is also 
recommended to establish a broad R&D cluster around decarbonisation goals 
that connects energy-mobility challenges and related industrial value chains to 
the climate sciences. The development of decarbonisation pathways that include 
the above will allow framing of the prioritisation of R&I actions that enable 
Europe to lead on climate action while increasing its competitiveness. 
Another crucial short-run R&I priority is to assess, compare and project 
successful ways to remove environmentally harmful subsidies without 
disproportionately affecting vulnerable and less well-off households. 
Environmentally damaging subsidies, especially those to fossil fuels, inflict 
damage on both the economy and environment. The economy suffers from the 
costs of financing these subsidies, while the environmental harms from the 
activities being subsidised are increased. Significant macro-economic gains, as 
well as environmental improvement, can be realised through the removal of 
these subsidies, which should nevertheless be carried out in such a way as to 
protect more vulnerable members of society. However, each country will need 
to develop targeted strategies to address fossil fuel subsidies removal. 
In the medium term, R&I efforts should be devoted to the thorough 
assessment of the impacts of decarbonisation on labour, 
competitiveness and quality of life, including understanding 
uncertainty. This will allow the design of sound strategies to manage 
transitional costs. New low-carbon technologies will provide many new job 
opportunities as they are deployed, but there will also inevitably be job losses in 
those sectors that fail to adapt to a low-carbon future, especially in the fossil 
fuel industry. The new jobs will in many cases require different skills to the jobs 
they replace. More understanding is required of the gains in ‘new employment’ 
and the losses in ‘old jobs’, and their relative sizes, to establish the technical 
and socio-economic skills needed to assist the energy transition and climate 
change control efforts. 
Furthermore, multi-disciplinary research at the intersection of the 
natural and social sciences in the field of energy and climate change 
should be funded. In this respect, special focus should be devoted to 
 147 
enhancing the insights that economic analysis can give into the European 
competitive advantage in low-carbon technologies and industries. It should be 
much more researched how this advantage can be both fostered, and how 
energy-economy-environment models or other quantitative integrated 
assessment methods can create greater insight in the issues associated with 
transitioning from high-carbon to low-carbon economic activity. Much progress 
still needs to be made with regards to reflecting European industrial policy and 
competitiveness appropriately in these models. 
3 Financing decarbonisation 
Achieving the EU’s energy and climate targets will require a huge 
redirection of investments away from fossil-based and towards zero-
carbon technologies. Overall, Europe is relatively well placed to address this 
challenge, as Europe’s banks, insurance companies, institutional investors and 
stock exchanges have been significant players in the evolution of green (and 
sustainable) finance over the past 25 years, and particularly in the last five 
years. Achieving the EU’s energy and climate targets, while keeping and raising 
the level of employment and prosperity, will require large-scale investments 
across the European economy, estimated at around EUR 170 billion a year up to 
2025. However, the transition will only work if hurdles to long-term, physical 
investments (infrastructure, low-carbon transportation, electricity storage, etc.) 
are reduced and the permanent pressure on the corporate and financial sectors 
to deliver short-term results is attenuated. 
The EU will be able to deliver a ‘just transition’ only through swift and 
substantial action to harness and redirect both public and private 
investments towards large-scale, low-carbon and zero-carbon projects. 
This will radically shift the EU economy away from high-carbon, resource-
intensive and polluting sectors in favour of low-carbon economies. It will also 
secure net benefits and co-benefits for workers and communities, including 
better lifestyles, secure employment, increased productivity and global 
competitiveness. In this context, the public sector has a critical role in ensuring 
the right alignment of financial policies and tax policies, as well as in giving 
sufficient predictability on the overall policy framework so that investors can 
make the projections that are necessary to invest long-term capital. 
The EU need to engage in the re-design of the current financial system 
to support the transition towards a decarbonisation economy and, more 
broadly, a sustainable economy, as proposed by the High-Level Expert 
Group on Sustainable Finance. This restructuring entails, in particular, 
reducing the financial decision-making short-termism that is particularly 
embedded in many segments of the capital markets. In stock and bond 
markets, a range of short-term investors create undue short-term volatility and 
pressure for short-term results to the detriment of long-term orientations. 
Investment horizons that are shorter than the horizon generating the 
underlying economic return should be penalised. For example, whereas in 
corporations, returns on investment relevant for decarbonisation and 
environmental issues materialise over years, there is a range of investors 
including high-frequency traders, day traders, hedge funds and short-term 
stock traders that seek to extract returns over days and weeks, if not even over 
minutes and seconds (high-frequency trading). Such strategies of short-term 
value extraction are a massive detriment to the long-term investment needed 
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for decarbonisation. Mobilising investment capital for the low-carbon carbon 
transition needs to be a long-term commitment, setting in place a stable 
system which focuses on the long-term consequences of financial practices and 
does not disrupt them by short-term value extraction. 
Specifically, the financial system needs to be in tune with a model of 
economic development that will necessarily be more capital-intensive. 
In this respect, entire sectors and industries will need to shift their paradigms of 
economic production by breaking out of carbon-intensive capital and 
technologies. In practical terms, this entails switching away from financing the 
throughput of energy and materials and committing large sums of upfront 
capital to long-lasting assets. This puts prime importance on capital, and 
specifically on its cost, time horizon and quality. 
A non-trivial aspect of this massive transformational change is the need 
for investments in innovation — be it in technologies, business models 
or services. Innovation is inherently a highly uncertain endeavour. Rather than 
focusing mainly on near-term profits, the investment sector should take into 
consideration strategic fundamentals in investment decisions. In particular, for 
the private sector to be willing to commit substantial capital, investments for 
the low-carbon transition will need to earn a standard risk-reflective return. A 
further challenge arises from the fact that, being relatively new, low-carbon 
investments are subject to considerable technological- and policy-induced 
fluctuations that impact cash-flow and profitability calculations (e.g. feed-in 
tariffs, subsidies for renewables). Such technological and policy-shocks are a 
major concern for private investors, especially when it comes to investment in 
rather illiquid assets such as infrastructure. 
The role of public capital will be particularly crucial for infrastructure 
development, while private capital should play a leading role with 
respect to funding technologies. In this respect, as highlighted elsewhere in 
this report, a useful instrument is the creation of public-private partnerships 
targeted at supporting the early, more uncertain phases of R&I. Conversely, 
appropriate financing mechanisms should promote the influx of private capital 
during later stages of technological development. 
This is the time for action — the benefits of a sustainable financial 
system are sizeable and they now need to be seized. Through sustainable 
finance, the EU will be able to reap the full spectrum of co-benefits associated 
with decarbonisation. At home, Europe’s financial institutions will become more 
resilient, Europe’s businesses will access better priced and more patient capital, 
and they will be able develop the products, skills and innovations that are 
increasingly needed to deliver a healthy financial sector, and promote growth 
and employment. European citizens will see their sustainability values 
expressed in their financial choices, and their needs met. Abroad, first-mover 
advantage will grant a position of leadership to the EU, which has the 
opportunity to act as a champion of international policy reform for low-carbon 
and sustainable finance. 
European financiers will be able to serve global markets seeking 
unprecedented flows of sustainable finance. They will provide the platform 
for exports of sustainable financial services to the numerous countries now 
looking for capital and expertise to deliver decarbonisation and more generally 
the SDGs. Importantly, the EU leadership role will be paramount to ensure that 
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financial and trade flows into the EU consider sustainability appropriately and do 
not undermine fair competition that would hurt European employment. 
Designing a comprehensive strategy to finance sustainable and 
inclusive growth should be one of the key targets of R&I actions in the 
next decades. Fundamentally, it is important to recognise that the 
misalignment of today’s financial system is by no means an immutable 
situation. Such misalignment is simply the consequence of the evolution over 
decades of financing economic development and technological change focused 
on carbon-intensive energy. However, a comprehensive approach towards 
restructuring will be able to deliver a long-term solution and to change the way 
in which the duties of financial institutions, their governance, risk management 
and supervision are delivered. 
By 2050, R&I programmes should support the full restructuring of the 
financial system towards sustainability and implementation of sound 
strategies to fund fully the decarbonisation transition. 
3.1 R&I recommendations 
In the short term, a first R&I requirement is the generation of high-
quality data and information that can be used to inform decision-
making. This includes the definition and implementation of harmonised 
metrics, data quality requirements, availability and access guidelines, but also 
the development of a taxonomy for sustainable financing. It also points to the 
need to understand how to improve disclosure rules and procedures. The EU 
should also engage in experimentation with respect to new, forward-looking 
disclosure rules concerning sustainability-related financial risks. This will require 
trial and error by companies, as well as capacity building and promotion of best 
practice by all the key institutions involved, governments included. A successful 
example in this respect is that of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD), the first industry-led framework with the potential to 
become a ‘new normal’ of climate disclosure. Momentum behind the guidelines 
is growing fast, with more than 230 companies representing a combined market 
capitalisation of over EUR 5.1 trillion having voiced their support for the TCFD 
recommendations. 
A second important short-term R&I focus should promote the 
understanding of the barriers which hinder the flow of finance towards 
decarbonisation efforts, low-carbon technologies and low-carbon 
business models. First, it is crucial to expand our knowledge regarding the 
specific geographical, technological and business-model areas where 
investments are needed most. In this respect, it will be particularly important to 
devise ways to redirect capital flows towards remote regions to promote 
mitigation while making them economically viable. Second, research will also 
have to be put into the barriers to large-scale finance flowing into these areas, 
and how these barriers may be removed. 
Furthermore, R&I efforts in the short-term should be devoted to the 
design and implementation of a coherent and predictable policy and 
regulatory framework promoting the restructuring of the financial 
sector and the alignment of funding with long-term climate targets. This 
is absolutely crucial to allow financiers to allocate savings to low-carbon 
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technologies and business models with confidence, thus ensuring that the 
private sector plays the major role in closing the decarbonisation investment 
gap. Optimal strategies and policy instruments to overcome the short-termism 
in stock and bond markets should be studied. Practical solutions should be 
developed to limit the role and influence of short-term traders and investors in 
stock and bond markets that create undue volatility and hamper long-term 
investments. Crucially, R&I needs to identify how such policy instruments can 
be coupled with an even stronger orientation towards mobilising investment to 
address the long-term needs of the real economy, not only in terms of climate 
mitigation but also with respect to other priorities such as employment, 
education and savings. 
In the short term, R&I investments should also be focused on the 
development of forward looking economic models that include the 
financial sector alongside energy and climate. Such models will be 
instrumental in improving the simulation of the financial needs for the low-
carbon transition. They will also allow the identification of practical solutions to 
ensure that financial decision-making can anticipate the shifts that will arise 
from transformational sustainability, and capture future opportunities while 
minimising their related risks. Importantly, such models should have a sectoral, 
regional and national dimension. 
In the medium term, R&I efforts should allow modification of the 
behavioural barriers of investors and financiers which give rise to 
financial market myopia. Such myopia draws investments away from long-
term value creation and undermines the financing of deep decarbonisation. It 
hampers investments in real assets that are amortised over many years and the 
development of technologies and business models that will drive the transition 
to sustainable development. On the one hand, the long-term horizon of end-
beneficiaries (such as pension funds, household savers and sovereign wealth 
funds) is currently not reflected by financial intermediaries (due, for instance, to 
principal-agent issues and misaligned performance metrics and incentives). On 
the other hand, the needs of businesses for enduring capital are undermined by 
an excessive focus on short-term price performance, particularly on listed 
equity and bond markets.  
In the long-term, R&I efforts should ensure the identification and 
implementation of financial instruments which move capital at scale. 
This entails ensuring that long-term considerations on low-carbon investments 
are included in investment strategies, risk management, asset allocation, 
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conventional bottom line related to fiscal performance as well as social impact) 
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4 International trade dynamics and implications 
Over the past few decades, a rapid and complete global integration of 
trade and finance has led to an increasing geographical disconnect 
between the production of goods and their consumption and use. The 
delocalisation of production and the associated transportation of raw materials, 
intermediate and finished goods have increased around the globe, with a clear 
impact on global CO2 emissions, as well as on environmental risks of all kinds. 
This process has accelerated significantly as China, Eastern Europe and other 
emerging markets integrated into the global economy and attracted global 
production across the whole range of industrial as well as agricultural goods. 
From 1997 to 2007, for example, global emissions grew by 2.8 % per year but 
global emissions from trade of goods grew by 4.6 %. In 2007, about 7 Gt of 
CO2 emissions arose from global trade of goods alone (Andrew et al., 2013). 
Trade provides important economic opportunities for both exporters and 
importers, but is also associated with significant environmental and climate 
costs, with indirect social costs (unemployment, premature deaths, social 
security expenses), and decline of entire regions. Delocalisation and shifts in 
production and transportation patterns have for a long time been considered as 
economically efficient, based on measured costs of capital and labour input. At 
the same time, many export-oriented economies have a high level of carbon 
intensity. This is for instance the case of China, from which the manufacture of 
exports is a substantial source of CO2 emissions. It makes no climate sense for 
manufacturing to move from CO2-efficient to CO2-intensive economies. In 
addition, industry relocation and de-industrialisation has high social costs, 
triggering unemployment and internal and external migration. 
Deindustrialisation is not an inevitable result of decarbonisation. Indeed, many 
industrial and manufacturing sectors in the EU are decarbonising and yet have a 
massive trade surplus. Even in some energy-intensive sectors such as 
chemicals, the EU is a global leader. 
The magnitude and bilateral flows of carbon emissions associated with 
the production and consumption of traded goods have important 
implications but remain uncertain. Initial estimates suggest that 
combined international trade in carbon (as fossil fuels and also due to 
the production of traded goods) increased from 12.3 GtCO2 (55 % of 
global emissions) in 1997 to 17.6 GtCO2 (60 %) in 2007 (growing at 
3.7 % year). Within this, trade in fossil fuels was larger (10.8 GtCO2 in 
2007) than trade in embodied carbon (6.9 GtCO2), but the latter grew 
faster (4.6 % year compared with 3.1 % year for fuels) (Andrew et al. 
2013). Yet, these estimates are strongly influenced by methodological 
considerations regarding how to account for emissions in traded goods. 
The increasing interdependence of countries via international trade has 
important implications for both energy security and climate policy, and 
is worthy of further study. Furthermore, the environmental impact of trade 
goes beyond the CO2 problem alone. For instance, recent findings suggest that 
about 22 % of premature deaths related to PM2.5 pollution (762 400 deaths) 
were associated with goods and services produced in one region for 
consumption in another (Zhang et al., 2017). 
Only a few studies exist on the effectiveness of environmental and 
trade policy levers to counterbalance the impact of trade-related 
emissions. A shift to a decarbonised world can certainly be expected to change 
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trade patterns as the costs of carbon emissions become increasingly 
incorporated into the prices of goods and services, and is likely to go hand-in-
hand with greater congruence of production and consumption of goods, with 
positive impacts on local employment and regional development. In light of 
this, it is paramount to explore how trade decisions can be optimised, taking 
into account external costs, that is, how to ensure that sustainability 
considerations and goals are reflected in trade patterns. This is particularly 
important now that the cost of environmental externalities has risen. Research 
is required into policy measures which could address this issue, such as border 
tax adjustments. The literature assessing the impact of environmental 
and climate policies on competitiveness, industry relocation and carbon 
leakage29 has come to contradictory results. There is still too much 
uncertainty as to whether more stringent climate policy simply leads to 
relocation of industrial production to countries with laxer environmental 
standards, and to an associated increase in emission in those countries which 
(partly) offset the reduction of emissions the policies should have brought 
about. Theoretical analysis and simulation models suggest that the issue or 
relocation and carbon leakage is a potentially relevant one, while empirical 
analyses of sectoral and firm dynamics have not found strong support for either 
the pollution haven hypothesis or carbon leakage. The extent to which this is 
related to unrealistic assumptions in models on the one hand, and to empirical 
choices and the inability to compare actual developments with a proper 
counterfactual on the other, is not clear. 
By 2050, R&I programmes need to support the decarbonisation of 
trade-flows. 
4.1 R&I recommendations 
In the short term, R&I actions need to understand and provide 
quantitative assessment as regards the relation between greenhouse 
gas emissions and trade. Clearly, the first gap to be addressed is that of 
measurement. Computing embedded emissions is a complicated process with 
large uncertainties. Several efforts should be carried out to fill the gap. 
Research that develops consolidated methodologies and maintains open-source 
databases of trade-related emissions, their past dynamics and their future 
projections should be encouraged. Countries and companies should be required 
to report consumption-based emissions on a regular basis, following clear 
reporting rules. Finally, international cooperation should be deployed to develop 
international standards, in cooperation with the UNFCCC (which currently tracks 
emissions where they are produced). This could also clarify the role of trade-
related emissions in international climate negotiations. Furthermore, methods 
and approaches to quantify climate and environmental costs of delocalisation 
need to be developed, with a specific focus on key sectors such as agriculture. 
Strategies and approaches to reduce the emission intensity of highly polluting 
imports need to be designed and evaluated. Finally, the impact of embedding 
environmental considerations into global trade dynamics on the welfare of 
European consumers, on their employment and on the competitiveness of 
European industries will have to be fully understood. 
                                               
29  Carbon leakage is measured as the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking 
domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries. It is 
expressed as a percentage, and can be greater or less than 100 %. 
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R&I actions in the short-term should focus on understanding what 
strategies and policies are effective in lowering the emission intensity 
of highly polluting imports. The focus should be on super-polluting industries 
and sectors, for which mitigation could provide a win-win solution to decrease 
consumption and production emissions simultaneously. For instance, emissions 
embodied in Chinese exports are primarily the result of China’s coal-based 
energy mix and the very high emissions intensity in a few provinces and 
industry sectors. The effectiveness of trade-related policies will depend on 
several criteria (legal, economic, etc.). Recent modelling work has devised a list 
of priorities for policy tools, which include technology lists, supply chain 
procurement, carbon-intensive material charges, infrastructure improvement, 
product location at scale and retailer product choice. These policy levers are 
believed to be effective in reducing imported CO2 emissions, and at the same 
time be acceptable to citizens in the sense that they would not raise the prices 
of goods by too much. 
Another important area of concern for R&I actions should be the 
agricultural sector, for which a detailed assessment of trade-related 
carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions should be performed. This 
requires understanding of where agricultural goods are produced and where 
they are shipped. In this context, a crucial concern should be that of quantifying 
whether farmers, who are low in the global value chain, are able to get good 
prices for their products, and whether profits associated with the trade of 
agricultural goods are reaped by those higher up the value chain (i.e. 
supermarkets, etc.). There are a number of indirect measures which pertain to 
trade, including sustainable trade and government procurement programmes, 
circular economy programmes and mandatory sustainability reporting, whose 
effectiveness in reducing the carbon content of trade needs to be assessed. 
Overall, more research should be devoted to rethinking the mix between global 
and local to reduce trade-related carbon emissions. In this respect, low-carbon 
business models discussed below could play a crucial role. 
In the longer run, R&I efforts should be focused on identifying demand-
side and supply-side policy levels to reduce trade-related 
environmental costs and capitalise on trade-related co-benefits. In this 
respect, a key component will be the development of approaches to embed 
carbon emissions considerations in trade measures and to promote the 
harmonisation of carbon related standards and measures internationally. The 
understanding of the solution space is currently very limited and would need to 
be drastically improved before legislating policies. On the demand side, many 
policy levers exist, ranging from behavioural ones (e.g. information disclosure, 
labels, nudges) to regulatory tools (standards, mandates). Citizens’ knowledge 
of the impacts of trade is limited, despite the wide-ranging consequences on 
health, environment, employment, etc. The potential for better-informed 
decision making is large, but more tests — possibly conducted via randomised 
control trials — are needed. Regulatory schemes are better understood. 
Nonetheless adequate knowledge is lacking about their distributional impacts 
and economic consequences. On the supply side, measures — most notably 
border tax adjustment — exist, but their use is contentious and can lead to a 
race to the bottom, especially in the current political situation. Nonetheless, 
other measures exist. 
Another target of longer-term R&I programmes should be to favour the 
establishment of academic fora which promote the design and 
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harmonisation of standards and environmental policies across 
countries. Indeed, simply focusing on domestic interventions alone cannot 
resolve the issues. R&I actions should promote the debate regarding the extent 
to which trade measures in respect of greenhouse gas emissions be successfully 
embedded in the international debate about trade more generally. They should 
support the achievement of multilateral environmental agreements that can 
contribute to decreasing the wedge between production-based and 
consumption-based CO2 emissions. This debate is complex because a part of 
why production is delocalised and trade plays such an important role is linked to 
the fact that some countries have laxer environmental policies and standards 
than others. However, other aspects also play a crucial role. For instance, 
labour costs are much higher in developed countries than in developing 
countries. A possible way to partly reduce this imbalance would be to support 
the improvement of working conditions, labour standards and benefits in low-
income and developing countries. This clearly could have immense impact on 
competition and comparative advantages. 
5 Innovative and low-carbon business models 
At present, innovative business models represent a small share of the 
market and are followed and implemented mainly by niche companies. 
Business models describe how companies create, deliver and capture value. 
Deep decarbonisation of the European economy requires that all economic 
activities develop innovative low-carbon business models which will allow them 
to deliver products and services with low- or zero-carbon content and 
processes. This is currently hindered by the presence of institutional, 
behavioural and regulatory barriers. Such barriers will need to be overcome to 
promote an adequate acceleration of the development and deployment of low-
carbon business models. 
There is great potential for innovative, low-carbon business models in 
all sectors of the European economy. There are many successful examples 
of innovative and low-carbon business models, including those centred around 
production of low-carbon products, promoting conservation and recycling, or 
focusing on servitisation (i.e. the selling of services, rather than products). Low-
carbon business models also include processes compatible with the circular 
economy concept. Innovative, low-carbon business models have emerged in 
several areas and industries (see Box 1). 
The emergence of innovative business models is often brought about 
by, and at the same time reflects, deep societal and attitudinal 
changes. This is exemplified for instance by the transport sector, which has 
seen an increase in business models centred around mobility-as-a-service, e-
hailing, peer-to-peer car rental and car-pooling 2.0. The proliferation of these 
modes of alternative, lower-carbon mobility clearly reflects the fact that car 
ownership has become less attractive for younger generations. At the same 
time, these types of services are favoured and supported by the proliferation of 
ICT technologies, which allow faster and better market coordination and 
matching. Similarly, the emergence of low-carbon logistics business models is a 
direct result of increases in online shopping, which has changed consumer 
behaviour and increased the demand for home deliveries. 
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Not all new business models are low-carbon. For instance, the current 
business model for mobile phones leads to much resource inefficiency, with 
(carbon- and material-intensive) hardware (i.e. the cell phones) being offered 
for free as part of a subscription plan, leading to a high rate of turnover in 
hardware, with a fast rate of introduction by producers of new models. This 
increases resource intensity and negative social impacts (i.e. conditions of 
workers in mines, disposal of electronic materials, etc.). In personal transport, 
companies such as Uber and Lyft offer convenience by enabling travellers to 
contract trips via an app. While these mobility business models have the 
potential to reduce carbon emissions per passenger kilometre by increasing 
vehicle occupancy and decreasing the number of vehicles on the roads, they are 
also likely to increase the overall demand for transport because they are cheap 
and can conveniently be booked via an app. Similarly, business models based 
on block-chain technologies (hyper-ledger and smart contracts) could 
potentially prove instrumental in decarbonisation (promoting traceability of 
sustainable materials and low-carbon transactions, peer-to-peer distributed 
energy grids). However, the impacts of these business models on energy 
consumption and carbon emissions are not yet fully understood and could 
potentially be very high. 
In the long term, R&I actions should support the development and 
diffusion of low-carbon business models. 
Box 1: Examples of low-carbon business models 
Logistics: Examples of low-carbon logistics businesses include those focusing 
on (lower-carbon) last-mile deliveries. Typically, a consolidation centre 
coordinates the final part of the distribution with other logistics firms, 
eliminating the need for individual trips to each shop. This increases vehicle 
loading factors and it is very interesting for local authorities as it can contribute 
to reduced congestion and emissions in and around commercial centres. 
Furthermore, last-mile deliveries logistics services can be provided via very low- 
carbon freight modes (i.e. walking, cycling). 
Energy: The integration of ICT into the energy system enables energy service 
companies (ESCOs) to offer contracts for energy supply, energy performance, 
heating (comfort contracting), integrated energy and facility management. Also 
in this case, customers are provided with a service (lighting, heating, cooling, 
power) and it is in the best interest of the supplier to implement the most cost-
efficient measures as higher energy consumption results in lower profits. A 
successful example is that of the ‘pay-per-lux’ model, emerging from a 
collaborative project between architect Thomas Rau and Philips. The innovative 
business model came about due to the specific demand for a service, rather a 
product. The architect turned to Phillips, asking to be provided with a light plan 
for one of his new buildings. In response, Philips created a minimalist plan for 
lighting services which relies as much as possible on the building’s natural 
sunlight and on very efficient LED lighting combined with a sensor and 
controller system that dims or brightens the space, as needed. This intelligent 
lighting system is based on Phillips retaining ownership and control of the 
product, and the customer paying for a maintenance and service plan.  
Smart cities: The potential for innovative, low-carbon business models is high 
in cities. For instance, designing cities to enable the flourishing of local farms 
can reduce food miles. Examples of such businesses include a GrowUp Box, by 
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GrowUp Urban Farms, that has developed 14-m2 aquaponics containers where 
tilapia and vegetables are farmed and sold to local restaurants. Other 
approaches include Sky Greens, a system to grow more food by using vertical 
structures or orchards on roofs such as the Brooklyn Grange or the Deu Horta 
Na Telha in São Paulo. 
Industry: The use of artificial intelligence and robotics will increase 
productivity in industry by steering product and process innovation. This, in 
combination with low-carbon energy infrastructure, will reduce the carbon 
intensity of manufactured goods. Businesses conducting carbon accounting 
audits and those assessing the resilience of firms regarding the risks associated 
with the negative impacts of climate change are also emerging. The impact of 
3D printing to reduce carbon emissions depends on the type of product. While it 
is more efficient to mass produce cheap items, 3D printing could play a role in 
high-cost low-demand goods such as complex engineering parts. This could 
decrease the need for storage space and transportation. 
Low-carbon products: Examples of business models revolving round a low-
carbon product are Tesla products and other smaller examples such as 
LifeStraw, which uses carbon-offset systems to distribute and finance easy-to-
use equipment that removes waterborne bacteria and parasites. Finally, 
examples of business models favouring conservation are H&M and M&S ‘bring 
your old clothes’ campaigns. 
5.1 R&I Recommendations 
In the short-run, R&I actions should be focused on understanding what 
are the most cost-efficient innovative low-carbon business models, and 
what potential emission reductions can be expected from their 
widespread diffusion. Innovative and low-carbon business models are 
nowhere near being mainstream. They are very heterogeneous in 
characteristics and impacts across the different sectors. There are only few (and 
rarely comparable) analyses aimed at understanding successes or failures. 
Overall, there is a lack of clear and systematic understanding on how business 
models are facilitated (or impeded) by the interaction with the other sources of 
low-carbon profitability. Such knowledge should be developed. To this end, data 
collection and data analytics are crucial. For instance, a sort of repository for 
case studies could be devised containing a collection of systematic reviews and 
results. This would then become a key resource for much-needed evidence-
based business decisions and policy making. 
Research needs to understand the role played by the regulatory 
framework, energy prices and labour costs in the success and failure of 
innovative, low-carbon business models. Another main source of 
complexity in business model innovation is due to the uncertainty of associated 
behaviour and impacts on the environment, the economy and society (the three 
sustainability dimensions). It is key to identify in which environments low-
carbon business models thrive, and in which they fail. Furthermore, firms need 
to be supported in identifying value flows and exchanges, thus promoting 
opportunities for business model innovations and de-risking experimentation. 
Importantly, the potential of business models for developing countries needs to 
be understood. Indeed, low-carbon business models targeted for the social and 
institutional frameworks of developing and fast-developing countries will have a 
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very high marginal impact on decarbonisation, given that emissions are 
projected to increase significantly in those countries in the years to come. 
R&I actions should support the development of economic and climate 
models which can capture the dynamics associated with innovative, 
low-carbon business models. Such models will help in demonstrating the 
impact of new business models. For instance, the outcomes of high levels of 
penetration of connected and autonomous vehicles in the transport sector are 
still not well understood. While there will be energy consumption efficiencies 
due to new vehicle designs and more efficient driving, there could be rebound 
effects via modal shifts from public transport to smaller vehicles. Research is 
needed to ascertain the rebound effects of those new business models and 
innovative technologies. 
R&I efforts should be devoted to the education of the workforce to 
promote the proliferation of low-carbon business models and 
strategies. Workforce education is a crucial component in ensuring the uptake 
of low-carbon business models. Specifically, this can be achieved by developing 
educational models focused on nurturing a general low-carbon entrepreneurial 
spirit, while raising awareness and clarifying the relevance of climate change 
targets. While it will be crucial to target the highest levels of management 
within those organisations, deep decarbonisation will be possible only if the 
whole workforce within businesses understands the importance of a low-carbon 
economy and contributes to a low-carbon production process, and if the 
awareness level of customers increases. Overall, entrepreneurs should be 
trained to focus on early customer discovery and validation, which will ensure 
that customers’ perceptions, awareness and attitudes towards lower-carbon 
businesses are incorporated in business strategies and models. Indeed, 
developing an innovative business model is an iterative process of putting into 
practice, learning and adapting or developing. Finally, low-carbon, innovative 
and successful business models often arise from the presence of strong 
leadership on the side of the firm, or the active consumer, as discussed in the 
chapter on social innovation. 
6 Summary of recommendations on the economic implications of 
the decarbonisation transition 
This chapter discusses four general cross-cutting issues which will play a crucial 
role in the decarbonisation of the European economies and which need to be 
the focus of R&I efforts. First, decarbonisation will have important macro-
economic implications. Second, decarbonisation will require the 
mobilisation  of significant financing capital. Third, decarbonisation will 
be impacted by — and will impact — international trade dynamics. 
Fourth, innovative and low-carbon business models need to be promoted 
to successfully promote the transition. Overall, this chapter puts forward some 
key R&I needs to ensure that considerations regarding these important aspects 
are factored into decision- and policymaking. 
First, in the short-run, R&I actions should strengthen the data 
collection, monitoring and modelling ability of the European Union, to 
promote a full and detailed understanding of the macro-economic implications 
of decarbonisation. This includes data collection, which will enable the 
quantification of the economic implications of decarbonisation. It also entails 
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investing to economic models, which should be enhanced to study financial 
flows and investments but also to address key research questions related with 
international trade dynamics or the key role of low-carbon business models. 
In the medium-run, R&I actions should finance the assessment of the 
macro-economic implications of decarbonisation and the design of 
strategies to address the key barriers hindering this process. This 
implies understanding the impact that decarbonisation can have on trade and 
the competitiveness of different industrial sectors, and how to overcome the 
barriers linked with the deployment of zero-carbon technologies and their 
associated investment needs. It also requires research to identify the 
appropriate policy mix to reduce embedded emissions, to promote low-carbon 
business models and to ensure that transitional costs of decarbonisation are 
mitigated through appropriate social policy measures. 
In the long-run, R&I actions should be devoted to monitoring progress 
with respect to decarbonisation targets, as well as to the establishment 
of stable partnerships for decarbonisation. This includes the promotion of 
interdisciplinary research, but also research on the effectiveness of policy 
instruments and measures and the ability to respect targets. It also includes 
R&I actions targeting the full restructuring of the financial system, the design of 
effective strategies to move capital at scale, cooperation around the 
harmonisation of trade standards and, more generally, the sharing of 
information and experience regarding successful low-carbon business models. 
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
Figure 21: Possible pathways in R&I on the economic implications of the transition.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recently published IPCC ‘Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways’ (IPCC, 2018) provides an exhaustive assessment of the modelling 
work that may help to estimate the residual CO2 budget consistent with the 
Paris Agreement goals. Notwithstanding the uncertainties related to the 
absolute amounts, what emerges from this literature assessment is that 
emissions should peak as soon as possible and decrease very rapidly, including 
those of short-lived GHGs and in particular of methane, if we wish to minimise 
the uncertain potential impact of negative emissions. The scientific literature 
shows that the rate of decarbonisation, i.e. the higher or lower speed at which 
emissions are reduced, has an impact on the probability of achieving a lower or 
higher final temperature stabilisation. But the most important message of this 
IPCC Special Report is that there is a sizeable difference of impacts between 
1.5 °C and 2.0 °C, and that above 1.5 °C there is the risk of triggering some 
non-linear effects. The costs of keeping the planet at 1.5 °C are higher, but 
these are outweighed by the avoided impacts and co-benefits. Climate action 
ambition must therefore step up. 
As argued in the introduction, the EU has to maintain and increase its 
leadership in research and innovation for developing zero-carbon solutions 
towards a sustainable planet, so as to maintain its leadership in climate action. 
Research and innovation investments are the best way to address the 
decarbonisation challenge while also ensuring European industrial and economic 
leadership. 
As ‘sectoral’ chapters of this report already contain a concluding section where 
recommendations for addressing the research and innovation dimensions are 
presented, this final section focuses on the system-level, cross-cutting 
dimensions of the decarbonisation challenge. 
Before discussing these dimensions, it is worth listing again the guiding key 
principles that were proposed in the introduction to develop a EU strategy for 
research and innovation in the zero-carbon domain and to summarise some of 
the evidence presented in earlier chapters with respect to each principle. 
Engage in a race to the top in innovation for decarbonisation, searching 
for new alternatives. 
A good example comes from the European Battery Alliance, launched in October 
2017 by the European Commission. This industrial initiative has the goal of re-
establishing a competitive battery industrial sector in Europe, which is 
considered essential, in particular to support the transformation of the 
European car manufacturing sector towards electromobility. This initiative 
contains several action areas, as well as a research and innovation component. 
While among the actions we can find support for the development of cell 
manufacturing, including that based on current Li-ion technologies, an 
important debate took place for the definition of the priorities of a dedicated 
Horizon 2020 call on batteries, where we can find the following statement:“[…] 
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towards a sustainable planet, so as to maintain its leadership in climate action. 
Research and innovation investments are the best way to address the 
decarbonisation challenge while also ensuring European industrial and economic 
leadership. 
As ‘sectoral’ chapters of this report already contain a concluding section where 
recommendations for addressing the research and innovation dimensions are 
presented, this final section focuses on the system-level, cross-cutting 
dimensions of the decarbonisation challenge. 
Before discussing these dimensions, it is worth listing again the guiding key 
principles that were proposed in the introduction to develop a EU strategy for 
research and innovation in the zero-carbon domain and to summarise some of 
the evidence presented in earlier chapters with respect to each principle. 
Engage in a race to the top in innovation for decarbonisation, searching 
for new alternatives. 
A good example comes from the European Battery Alliance, launched in October 
2017 by the European Commission. This industrial initiative has the goal of re-
establishing a competitive battery industrial sector in Europe, which is 
considered essential, in particular to support the transformation of the 
European car manufacturing sector towards electromobility. This initiative 
contains several action areas, as well as a research and innovation component. 
While among the actions we can find support for the development of cell 
manufacturing, including that based on current Li-ion technologies, an 
important debate took place for the definition of the priorities of a dedicated 
Horizon 2020 call on batteries, where we can find the following statement:“[…] 
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it is the complete electric batteries value chain and life-cycle that has to be 
considered, from access to raw material, over innovative advanced materials 
and nanotechnologies to modelling, production, recycling, second life, life cycle 
and environmental assessment and skills.” It is very questionable whether 
incremental progress on Li-ion technology, for which Asian manufacturers cover 
about 90 % of world production, is worth pursuing in the EU, using resources 
that could be better used for breakthrough developments in new directions.  
The value chain approach proposed by the call is very appropriate, as it is here 
that competitiveness can be generated. 
Give priority to zero-carbon solutions that have the potential to be 
developed and deployed within the 2050 timeframe. 
Europe has a very small remaining carbon budget to to stay within the Paris 
Agreement goals. This calls for focusing public research and innovation funding 
on solutions that eliminate emissions without creating further lock-in of lower 
emissions. The development and deployment timeframe of new zero-carbon 
technology is an issue (it cannot be longer than 20 years from today), and it is 
also connected with its critical size and modularity.  Low-carbon technologies 
may be necessary in a limited number of cases for a limited time when difficult 
transition issues need to be addressed. This is the case, for instance, in the 
transport sector, where residual funding for incremental improvement of today’s 
technologies should be limited to aviation and shipping, where zero-carbon 
solutions still look far from being marketable. However, in all sectors, research 
should first look at how to reduce demand, and not only at replacing today’s 
fossil fuel-based technologies with cleaner ones. 
Explore and develop portfolios of zero-carbon technologies, promoting 
diversification, and reducing the risk of too early and risky choices. 
Smart diversification makes economies stronger and more resistant to crises 
and market fluctuations. Europe has the capacities, in terms of scientific and 
technological competence, engineering skills and financial robustness, to 
develop technology portfolios and decide on which priorities to invest. 
Emphasise system-level innovation, promoting sector coupling, so that 
the individual elements of decarbonisation fit together in a coherent 
whole. 
The interplay between zero-carbon energy generation and the electrification of 
industry, mobility, heating, and of other services is very evident, and has been 
broadly outlined across the report, highlighting the enabling role of digital 
technologies for system-level management. Fossil fuels created a system that 
can only be replaced by another one, and not by individual technologies. 
Focus investments in the high added-value segments of value chains. 
Photovoltaic technology was developed in Europe, but the substantial drop in 
unit costs driven by technological development and market volume resulted in 
the move of the PV industry to Asia, where costs of mass manufacturing are 
lower. It has been claimed that the decline of the European PV industry was due 
to feed-in tariff schemes. This analysis is superficial, in that PV is today cost-
competitive almost everywhere thanks to the unit costreduction triggered by 
the feed-in tariff schemes. Furthermore, higher added-value segments of the PV 
value chain — such as plant engineering, production of inverters and ancillary 
equipment, financing, etc. — are still providing value in Europe. What this does 
teach us, however, is that demand side policies can be successful drivers of 
accelerated deployment of innovative technologies but should be supplemented 
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by a strong R&I policy so as to achieve a competitive edge in production as 
well. 
These five principles have to be complemented by a sixth one: 
Engage in smart international cooperation for zero-carbon innovation. 
Value chains have increasingly become international, across various complex 
technological domains.  International cooperation should not therefore only be 
limited to the research phase, but should also develop at higher TRLs until 
market penetration. This may generate important win-win situations, 
particularly, as in the previous point, if the segments of value chains where 
Europe may excel have high added value. It is important to speak up about this 
evident issue in times when ‘EU first!’ slogans are emerging, and in discussion 
about the new research and innovation framework programme, Horizon Europe. 
1 The system-level dimension of the decarbonisation challenge 
As stated above, only a system-level approach to decarbonisation can be 
appropriate, and this has to be reflected in research and innovation priority-
setting. 
An example of the system-level dimension, building on the conclusions of 
Chapter 2, is that a fully decarbonised power system at EU level is possible, 
even with today’s technology. However, considering that the decarbonisation of 
other sectors – namely transport, industry, and (partially) residential heating – 
strongly relies on their electrification, the demand for electric energy is 
expected to grow substantially in the coming years. Energy efficiency in 
all sectors, and particularly in industry, is therefore the necessary 
starting point. However, as shown in Chapter 4, although profitable low-
carbon solutions are available, these are not yet deployed at their potential 
scale. It is necessary to invest in short-term research to investigate why, and 
test possible actions for removing existing barriers that limit their diffusion. 
Chapter 2 also concluded that the decarbonised power system will require 
smart grids and systems capable of integrating baseline production 
(from hydro, biomass and nuclear, and in the transition period from natural 
gas) with variable wind and solar energy. These systems will need to 
integrate electric energy storage and the utilisation of excess wind-solar energy 
for the generation of hydrogen or the production of synthetic fuels (providing 
that non-fossil sources of carbon, e.g. from industrial fermentations, are 
available). 
The inter-sectoral dimension is therefore of outstanding importance. For 
instance, batteries of electric cars connected for recharge should be capable of 
contributing to peak grid demands, while the bioeconomy – with its 
management of organic feedstock and residues – should provide ways for 
making the circular economy a true means of mitigation. 
The complexity of the future energy system can only be managed through its 
pervasive digitalisation and smartness. This will require substantial 
developments from research and innovation in the medium term. Within the 
same timescale, large-scale demonstrators of hydrogen and synthetic fuels 
production from excess renewable energy – through processes that can be 
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easily switched on and off – have to be realised close to the point of use by 
clusters of energy-intensive industries. 
Partnerships with industries will be required to boost carbon-neutral 
innovation at all stages, in particular for those industries with process-based 
emissions. This will lead to changes in feedstock (e.g. bio-refineries and green 
chemistry) and alternative materials (e.g. using engineered wood instead of 
cement and steel in construction). Partnerships with industries are also needed 
to develop the radical breakthroughs needed to fully decarbonise some ‘difficult’ 
transport means, such as aviation, shipping and heavy-duty road transport. 
As illustrated in Chapter 5, the multi-purpose agriculture-forestry 
bioeconomy of tomorrow will not only have to contribute to this intersectoral 
effort, but also guarantee the role of soils as carbon sinks and the concurrent 
deep reduction of other greenhouse gas emissions. 
Cities (see Chapter 6), with their peri-urban industrial locations and agricultural 
areas, constitute the ideal integrating laboratory for the future energy 
system. Here – beyond the deployment of zero-carbon technological solutions 
– spatial planning, integrated urban mobility plans, urban regulations and social 
innovation will provide the necessary push and pull dimensions for helping the 
decarbonisation transition to succeed, including by acting on individual and 
social habits. In this respect, mission-oriented research and innovation 
programmes co-designed with the main city actors may be the most successful. 
All the above aspects, in particular with regard to system-level issues, have 
always to take into account the various dimensions addressed in Chapters 7 and 
8 of this report, i.e. the aspects of social innovation, finance, trade, new 
business models, and policies needed to promote the development and 
the diffusion of zero-carbon innovation. 
Finally, it is necessary to accompany and facilitate the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement through adequate support to the first-class climate change 
science that the European scientific community has developed over the last 
few decades. The success of the EU greenhouse gas emission reduction strategy 
is also linked to the five-year update of the nationally determined contributions 
that the Paris Agreement links to science. Therefore, it is of utmost importance 
that key knowledge gaps in climate change science are adequately supported 
by future programmes, not only in relation to the biogeophysical aspects, but 
also the economic ones and the research on policy design. The importance 
given to the Earth system and economic modelling dimensions – where 
Europe has leading roles – has to be continued. So too does looking into the 
future to support decision-making. In this regard, the achievement in the long-
term of a seamless and reliable weather-to-climate prediction system 
that can allow quantification of risks and provide climate services to end-users 
is of primary relevance. 
The above high-level summary of this report is also presented in a time-based 
graphic format at the end of this chapter (Figure 22): an updated version from 
what was presented one year ago in the Interim Recommendations of this High-
Level Panel in 2017. This proposal aims to provide a major input to the strategic 
programming of the forthcoming Horizon Europe, by providing priorities to 
organise the 35 % of climate-related investments that are expected in the 
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period 2021-2027, which should be complemented by national programmes and 
by even bigger private investments. 
2 Horizon Europe 
2.1 Climate mainstreaming in Horizon Europe 
The mainstreaming of climate action in EU Framework Programmes, 
with its 35 % target, has to be substantial and not simply a formality. Climate 
change is the major global physical risk caused by human activities that can be 
halted by human decisions and actions. Actions are urgent and necessary, 
they are not an option. The risk of exceeding the Paris Agreement targets 
and falling into a warming runaway situation is too high and must be avoided 
by all means. The carbon budget that is estimated by the IPCC as safe for 
staying ‘well below 2 °C’ as requested by the Paris Agreement provides the 
upper limit of acceptable emissions. In research and innovation, all programmes 
have to contribute to solutions, while programmes that have the potential to 
generate higher GHG emissions have to be discontinued. The EU Treaties 
provide a very good basis for this line of action. However, it is necessary to 
embed the climate dimension more deeply, in the application of the ‘integration 
principle’ (Art. 11 TFEU), and of the ‘precautionary principle’ (Art. 191 TFEU). 
Such climate dimensions can only be assessed through complex projections, 
and not by simpler tests as is the case with most environmental pollutants. In 
turn, this should affect the use of the new ‘innovation principle’ that is currently 
being proposed. It is precisely for these reasons that the forthcoming Horizon 
Europe, particularly all programmes under Pillar II dedicated to Global 
Challenges, must explicitly address climate change and recognise the constraint 
of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. Within this broader framework, the 
contribution to decarbonisation should be a guiding principle for the strategic 
planning that will design and operationalise the Horizon Europe activities. It is 
at this planning stage that the coherence with the 35 % target will need to be 
checked. 
2.2 Mission-oriented activities 
A mission-oriented approach is needed for those complex societal challenges 
which require solutions within the medium term (5 to 15 years) that cannot 
simply be achieved by relying on independent developments driven by market 
conditions or by current innovation trends. Missions, currently being debated in 
the design phase of Horizon Europe, allow the achievement of difficult goals in a 
focused way. Particularly for challenges with a profound cross-sectoral 
dimension that requires the contribution of different stakeholders, and where 
public engagement is of high importance. 
This Panel formulates three proposals for missions in our recommendations, 
which are synthesised in Figure 22: 
 A mission that could be called ‘the Internet of Electricity’, meaning the 
transformation of the power system based on renewables, integrating 
storage, transmission, dispatchment, and through smartness and 
digitalisation. This is a fundamental step towards the full integration and 
decarbonisation of the energy system; 
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 A mission on European soils as carbon sinks, addressing the need for 
structural and management changes capable of making EU agriculture, 
forestry and land use contribute to the overall carbon neutrality of the 
continent, as needed by 2050; 
 A mission on climate-neutral, ‘circular’ and liveable cities (including 
energy, mobility, waste, construction, urban planning, etc.), that may well 
be formulated as the one presented in a recent paper of Mariana Mazzucato 
(Mazzucato, 2018) and entitled ‘100 carbon-neutral cities by 2030’. 
2.3 Partnerships 
PPPs are very relevant means to drive a critical mass of investments in 
some fields of industrial development where it is essential to bring to 
maturity new complex processes, and to generate breakthroughs that may 
become the basis for further competitive research by individual players outside 
the partnership agreement. For the decarbonisation challenge, the role of public 
investments is also to correct market failure, level the playing field, and then 
leave market competition to follow on. The HLP is therefore of the opinion that 
PPPs may be necessary for limited periods of time, for instance the first 10 
years of development of zero-carbon solutions for industries showing process-
based emissions (steel, chemistry and cement). PPPs should have the goal not 
only of developing the basis for a portfolio of alternative carbon-neutral 
processes, but, in possible solutions with intrinsic difficulties or complexities, to 
also develop alternatives capable of replacing the functions of today’s products. 
Partnerships for decarbonisation of this kind have to be designed based on the 
decarbonisation constraints and on the commitments of the Paris Agreement, 
with the goal of exploring all possibilities for arriving at carbon neutrality. Their 
long-term horizon has to go very much beyond incumbents’ short-term plans – 
through visionary research and innovation programmes. 
2.4 Transition Super-Labs  
The urgency and the complexity of the challenge however requires a 
further ‘instrument’, here defined as a real-life laboratory where 
systemic innovation for the transition to a fully decarbonised economy 
is tested at scale in locations where particularly difficult transition 
efforts will be required. There is compelling evidence that rapid 
decarbonisation of advanced industrialised societies can only be achieved 
through systemic solutions. In other words, the transformation of whole entities 
– such as non-sustainable business complexes, mining regions and polluted 
metropolitan areas – is required, not just the replacement of wasteful 
components by more efficient ones. In theory, based on big data and simulation 
modelling, such transformations can be straightforwardly identified and devised. 
For instance, cost-benefit analysis and operations research deliver optimal 
concepts for multimodal transport systems or for sector coupling that 
maximises CO2 reduction without hampering performance and competitiveness.  
However, these concepts often fall apart when theory collides with technical, 
environmental and socioeconomic realities: critical bottlenecks have been 
overlooked; cultural resistance has been underrated; ecological trade-offs have 
been ignored; and so forth. What ultimately matters is the truth on the ground, 
where targets, timetables and measures have to be matched. This is the 
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challenge of the mission-driven integration of innovative elements and 
steps. 
Research and innovation will constitute the core of the intelligence needed to be 
deployed at large territorial scale, making use of other sources of European or 
national funds. The HLP therefore proposes to establish a small number of 
‘Transition Super-Labs’ (see Figure 23), where rapid decarbonisation is 
conceptualised, implemented, monitored and revised in line with the insights 
gained on the transformational behaviour of the complex system in question. 
These are flagship demonstrators where research, business, administration and 
civil society co-produce integrated solutions. 
Super-Labs would be realised in critical locations where the transition can be 
particularly difficult – such as coal-mining areas, territories characterised by 
high density of energy intensive industries, cities with very energy inefficient 
building stock, etc. 
Candidate demonstrators are: 
 mining-industrial complexes that need to be transformed quickly without 
destroying their value-creation potential; 
 conventional agricultural regions that are suitable for conversion into 
climate-neutral/negative bioeconomies and can also become havens for 
biodiversity and sustainable tourism; 
 metropolitan areas where novel concepts of mobility, construction and 
operation can be combined, most notably by making use of the powerful 
tools provided by digitalisation and artificial intelligence. 
Mission-driven integration should be funded from a portfolio of sources – 
merging European, national, regional and private funds - for 5-10 years under 
the supervision of Horizon Europe. The Climate-KIC of the European Institute of 
Innovation and Technology (EIT) (or a new KIC within the EIT) can be the 
nucleation element for broad territorial alliances among academia, research 
centres, industry, public administrations, and other stakeholders. 
2.5 Climate science 
The focus on the ‘solution space’ in relation to climate change should 
accompany the maintenance of a strong European programme on climate 
change science, in particular to reinforce the IPCC process, and through its 
reports to feed the Paris Agreement process. The 5-year cycle of the Global 
Stocktakes has to be informed by science, and very robust and high-evidence 
statements in IPCC reports will be of outmost importance for raising ambition 
and achieving the Paris Agreement goals. In the coming years, the more the 
available carbon budget for remaining within the maximum warming targets is 
used, the more it will be necessary to have highly reliable modelling and 
simulation tools available to support decision-making at all levels. 
The new possibilities offered by artificial intelligence and machine learning will 
allow new developments in tracking, attributing, and forecasting a number of 
climate phenomena and events. However, this will not replace the need to fill a 
number of knowledge gaps in climate processes, in order to increase modelling 
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capabilities. A lot still needs to be done to be able to forecast and quantify the 
impacts of climate change, the triggering of non-linear responses, the 
occurrence of extremes and of low-probability high-consequence events. 
Focused attention on the areas of the planet where climate is changing more 
rapidly with high potential consequences for biodiversity loss, such as the 
Arctic, has to be continued and extended to other areas of high risk, such as 
the oceans, tropical areas, and Antarctica. 
In terms of mitigation, integrated assessment models are still limited and have 
to evolve, because they are increasingly used to support informed decision-
making. They need in particular to be able to consider the effects of lifestyle 
and behavoiural changes, and other non-economic factors. 
A stable policy environment will be a key framework condition to ensure that 
this huge innovation challenge is successfully addressed. For this reason, 
research on policy design and policy evaluation will be an important component 
of the future European R&I endeavour. 
In addition, economic research on adaptation should lead to a more complete 
consideration of the costs of adaptation and of the costs of non-action. 
2.6 Outreach and education 
The Herculean research and innovation efforts that have been briefly depicted 
for preparing the full decarbonisation of EU economies and societies by or 
around 2050 have then to be reflected in a revision of school and university 
curricula of all grades, that incorporate climate change knowledge within the 
ordinary basic body of knowledge in science, engineering, economics, political 
science, geography and even history teaching. It is therefore recommended 
that the development of school and university teaching materials and relevant 
outreach programmes that are also addressed to citizens more generally should 
be a contractual obligation of Horizon Europe projects in the climate change 
domain. The understanding of the mechanisms and underlying challenges of 
anthropogenic climate change cannot remain restricted to few insiders. 
*** 
The role of publicly funded research and innovation is of paramount importance 
for the success of the decarbonisation strategy of the EU. As extensively argued 
here, climate change is the result of the biggest market failure of our 
times, a ‘tragedy of the commons’ that can only be corrected through the 
intervention of governments and by steering zero-carbon innovation through 
very large public R&I investments. Such R&I programmes will have the double 
effect of providing new incentives associated with deep decarbonisation for the 
many incumbents currently benefiting from the fossil fuel economy, and of 
promoting a new generation of brave and visionary actors to lead this 
challenging transition. 
Time is short, and efforts must be adequate to the challenge, which is 
immense. 
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Figure 22: Proposed priority research and innovation actions for supporting the decarbonisation process in 
different areas in the timeframe 2018-2040, in order to achieve the 2050 goals indicated in the boxes. Red 
arrows represent Horizon Europe mission-oriented actions; yellow-brown arrows represent Horizon Europe 
public-private partnerships. All linear arrows are intended as roadmaps that produce various outputs 
throughout their timeframe until their end-date, when the activity should be completed and deployed in 
society. Many of the proposed actions are interrelated, and their results contribute to different 2050 goals. 
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Figure 22: Proposed priority research and innovation actions for supporting the decarbonisation process in 
different areas in the timeframe 2018-2040, in order to achieve the 2050 goals indicated in the boxes. Red 
arrows represent Horizon Europe mission-oriented actions; yellow-brown arrows represent Horizon Europe 
public-private partnerships. All linear arrows are intended as roadmaps that produce various outputs 
throughout their timeframe until their end-date, when the activity should be completed and deployed in 
society. Many of the proposed actions are interrelated, and their results contribute to different 2050 goals. 
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Figure 23: Conceptual representation of Transition Super-Labs: large territorial initiatives for fostering the 
transition to a zero-carbon economy in particularly vulnerable areas. 
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Which strategy to adopt in research and innovation in order to speed-
up and foster mitigation policies in the EU that respond to the goals 
of the Paris Agreement, while growing the competitiveness of the EU 
economy? To reply to this question, the nine Members of the High-Level 
Panel on Decarbonisation have designed a straightforward strategy, 
which implies that the design of future programmes of Horizon Europe 
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2021-2027 – and of similar national programmes in the EU - have to 
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alternatives to fossil-fuels are still far from the marketplace. 
Studies and reports
